EXHIBIT EH: CANADIAN DEPENDENCY, U.S. HEGEMONY, AND THE AMORPHOUSNESS OF ENGLISH CANADIAN CULTURE

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This thesis begins by examining the factors that have resulted in the dependent nature of Canada's political and economic structure, and proceeds to examine how this has contributed to the cultural amorphousness of English Canadian identity. The hegemonic authority of American and trans-national interests, established and maintained in the cultural sphere through the extensive monopoly of the distribution of cultural and media products, perpetuates the amorphousness of English Canadian culture through the appropriation of Canadian space by the international image industry. Such categorization of Canadian space reflects and perpetuates the imaginary representation of Canada within the dominant ideology as an indistinct and amorphous entity, and comes to usurp the materiality that constructs the lived identities of English Canadians.

TABLE OF CONTENTS

Page

PREFACE

AS CANADIAN AS...

Some fifteen or twenty years ago, the *Globe and Mail* newspaper in Toronto held a write-in contest. The object of the contest was to gain some understanding of how people conceived of themselves as Canadians, by asking them to complete the phrase "As Canadian as..." in such a way that would parallel the phrase "As American as apple pie." Contestants were encouraged, then, to try and encapsulate what it meant to be Canadian. What values did it evoke? What kind of character or personality was immediately brought to mind? What kind of social situation did it reflect and represent? The winning entry, selected from well over a thousand responses, was "As Canadian as possible, under the circumstances".

So accurate and effective was this phrase in concisely summarizing the reality of Canadian culture and identity that it quickly worked its way into the national lexicon, essentially fulfilling the objective of the newspaper contest by encapsulating, within the minds of many Canadians, what it means to be Canadian. The constant struggle to define and conceptualize Canadian national identity would seem to have become in and of itself a crucial, definitive aspect of who we are as a nation. But what are the circumstances, then, that we are forced to struggle against in the process of self-determination? Why, for that matter, is a continual process of self-determination even necessary? Should a

national identity, character, and purpose not be something self-evident?

My analysis that follows is largely concerned with the relationship between issues of space, place, and identity within English Canadian culture, and the manner in which Canada's inherent dependency has facilitated and perpetuated American cultural hegemony, which in turn has resulted in the categorization of Canada's inherent amorphousness as a defining cultural characteristic.

In Chapter I, I will provide an historical analysis of the circumstances and conditions that have resulted in the absence and amorphousness that typify Canadian culture and identity. Canada's inherent dependency, a result of geographic and climatic circumstance and a colonial predilection towards continentalist economic practices, will be introduced as an important factor in the establishment of the hegemonic relationship in which Canada is marginalized and made subordinant to the interests of a dominant power, most notably and recently the United States. The effects of Canada's dependent character on the process of establishing its communications channels and its (in)ability to permit the development of national forms of cultural expression will be the subject of an analysis that will culminate in a case study of the Canadian Co-operation Project, which allowed for the entrenchment of the American film industry in Canada's exhibition and distribution sectors.

A prominent assertion running throughout my analysis is the argument that Canada, which has always been a deficient example of the traditional model of the nation-state and has also developed as a nation-state in direct relation to the cultural and economic hegemony of a dominant power, serves as an early prototype for the evolution of the new nation-state developing to meet the demands of the globalized world. Chapter

II will examine the manner in which the effects of American media imperialism in Canada anticipate the impact of American cultural products and signifiers on other national cultures around the world. I will also provide a case study that illustrates in concrete terms the hegemonic authority exercised by American interests in maintaining the perpetual motion of information flows that both facilitate and perpetuate the system of cultural distribution that maintains the hegemonic order.

Chapter III will largely be devoted to substantiating and identifying the distinction of 'English Canadian' culture and identity. This analysis will expand on the relevance of issues and concerns raised in Chapter I, such as the manner in which Canada's inherent dependency, absence, and amorphousness can be interpreted as national characteristics that can actually allow for the development of a national discourse and forms of cultural expression. Also in this chapter, I will examine the manner in which some forms of English Canadian cultural expression can be seen as an example of a new kind of nationalism, which expresses a keen awareness of its subordinant nature while still identifying it as a source of empowerment. The English Canadian rock band The Tragically Hip will serve as the model for this particular study, which will also offer insight into the relationship of English Canadian discourse to issues of technology and the implications of this for the development of the new nation-state.

The purpose of Chapter IV is to elaborate on and complicate my arguments in Chapter III, making it clear that, in spite of the forms of cultural expression employed by many English Canadians, English Canadian culture remains marginalized, even within its own nation and especially with respect to film and television, as a result of the dominance of American cultural discourse in Canada. Again, it will be explained that this is a

phenomenon that has resulted not from external American oppression, but rather with the complicity, both historical and contemporary, of the Canadian state. Canada's inherent dependency, it must be remembered, is a crucial component to fully understanding the conception of space and place within English Canadian culture, and the representation of amorphousness as a defining cultural trait. I will conclude this chapter by examining the current state of dependency that exists within the film industry in Canada, and discuss how this further marginalizes an English Canadian filmic discourse.

In Chapter V, I will attempt to draw from my assertions and conclusions made in the previous chapters to assist in my analysis of American films and television series that appropriate the amorphousness of Canadian locations. This amorphousness is constructed and packaged as a commodity, a process that further entrenches the hegemonic control of American and trans-national interests and the subordinance of Canadian concerns. I will draw from theories of cultural geography as well as media industry studies to elaborate on how this conception of Canada is maintained and perpetuated by the international image industry, due to the dominance of American cultural discourse as a system of representation and the dependency of Canadian interests which necessitates their inability to construct a different definition of the Canadian character.

CHAPTER I

THE POLITICAL AND ECONOMIC CHARACTER OF CANADIAN SOCIETY: AN HISTORICAL PERSPECTIVE

There's a dream he dreams where the high school is dead and stark
It's a museum and we're all locked up in it after dark
Where the walls are lined all yellow, grey and sinister
Hung with pictures of our parents' prime ministers
Wheat kings and pretty things,
wait and see what tomorrow brings.

-- The Tragically Hip, "Wheat Kings"

The sense of stifled desperation expressed in the excerpt above is typical of the Canadian perspective, and indicative of the events and circumstances that have helped form the Canadian consciousness. Canada has, throughout its entire history, been a peripheral nation, so marginal and ideologically diffuse, in fact, that it has been argued whether Canada can even be said to constitute a nation in the traditional sense of the word. With two distinct founding national traditions, French and English, each possessing a different historical legacy and claiming different national priorities, Canada's national character, further complicated by an ethnically and religiously diverse population, has been fragmentary and divisive at worst and ambivalently peaceable at best. Issues and conflicts that have arisen, both internally amongst various Canadian groups and externally in relation to other nation-states, have paradoxically been complicated by and ultimately resolved in typically ambivalent manner by Canada's lack

of autonomy. This inherent amorphousness and the inability of the Canadian consciousness to define itself on its own terms, relying instead on conceptions held and propagated by dominant interests, is indicative of the extent to which dominant outside interests, be they French, British, American, or trans-national, have consistently and continually exercised control over the economic, political, and cultural character of the Canadian consciousness. Because of these conditions, as well as others that will be discussed and analysed throughout this thesis, Canada can be seen as a model of the new nation-state emerging from the ashes of the Fordist period and forged by the effects of globalization; a nation-state in which cultural distinctness and national priorities are subordinate to economic imperatives determined by global trends.

Canada's Economic Background: Staples Theory,

Branch Plant, Dependency

Studies of Canada's cultural situation have tended by and large to focus on Canada's colonial history and its subsequent lack of autonomy and sovereignty in the context of relationships with Britain and the United States, as well as Canada's status as a dependent state, both economically and culturally, existing on the periphery of the dominant American metropole. The focus of much attention by scholars has been the impact of this on Canada's (in)ability to express and even develop its own cultural concerns through channels and modes of communication that have been marginalised by or made subordinate to the priorities of the dominant ideology, be it British, American, trans-national, or some combination thereof. As Richard Collins has observed, the ever-present motif in studies of Canadian culture and identity and the relationship between these and the country's economy has been the manner in which they tend to integrate

"dependency theory with a long-established Canadian conception of the nation being synonymous with its communication systems."[1] Collins also explains that, although dependency theory originated as an avenue for analysing economic relations, and usually from a Latin American or Third World perspective, it "has metamorphosed to embrace cultural relations, and 'dependency' is now a pervasive metaphor used to characterize Canada's relation to the United States. It has become the dominant optic through which scholars of Canadian communication...have analysed the Canadian audio-visual media."[2] The difficulty in determining a solid conception of Canadian identity, then, has been attributed not only to Canada's colonial past and the difficulties of self-determination associated with it, but even more so to the affect on the Canadian cultural consciousness of the inability to communicate its own cultural discourse through the channels that have supposedly been constructed for that very purpose. Such a dilemma tends to promote the sentiment that the expression of national priorities are irrelevant in comparison to those of the dominant ideology. Therefore, that which is considered 'national' becomes marginal and fragmentary, even within the conceptions of that particular national consciousness.

A predicament such as this could very easily be attributed to Canada's colonial history, and the manner in which this has resulted in an emphasis on the priorities of the dominant discourse, but it must be remembered that Canada was never a colony in the traditional sense of the word, and that the particularly unique set of circumstances that influenced its evolution as a nation also influenced the way it primarily perceives its national characteristics only through the externally imposed dominant discourse. Stephen Clarkson has argued that Canada's colonial status, and the manner in which it has affected the formation of Canadian culture and identity, has often been misinterpreted, insisting

that "it would be better to understand Canada historically as an outpost of empire, rather than a conquered colony."[3] As such, Clarkson suggests that the Canadian character has been shaped not by generations of oppression from an outside source, which to a certain extent might inspire a kind of collective revolt that binds people together in a cohesive national sentiment, but rather by centuries of passive involvement, of situations in which we have been told what to do, or have simply understood what was expected of us, and have participated at the benefit of a semi-prosperous, largely peaceable existence. This particularly passive development and our continual reliance upon a dominant order has also accounted for the lack of a cohesive national political culture and the nationally unifying symbols and philosophies that it would produce.

In his seminal study *The Fur Trade in Canada: An Introduction to Canadian Economic History*, first published in 1926, the Canadian historian Harold A. Innis argues that the Canadian economy was structured and organized around the production or extraction of a number of staple goods, beginning with the beaver pelt during the fur trade in the seventeenth-century and continuing with lumber, wheat, minerals, and paper and agricultural products in the centuries to come. Because of the manner in which Canada was utilized as a resource hinterland for the benefit of more economically and technologically advanced nations, Innis argues, Canada developed as an appendage subordinate to the dominant metropoles of first France, then Britain, and eventually the United States. As a result, the very basis of the Canadian economic philosophy is one in which Canada specializes in fulfilling the needs of more firmly established business interests, relies upon foreign capital, and thus becomes nothing more than a peripheral satellite economically dependent upon the dominant centre. The ideological implications

of this are also dramatic, as it is argued that the peripheral nation, dependent as it is upon the economic welfare of the dominant nation, therefore aligns its own ideological values and priorities with those of the centre.[4] Thus, in the long run, staples theory holds implications not only for Canada's economic structure but also its ideological and cultural character. The excerpt at the beginning of this chapter, from a song by the English Canadian band The Tragically Hip (who will be the subject of further discussion in Chapter III), illustrates the profound and deeply-ingrained impact of Canada's economic dependency upon Canadian psychology and identity. We are a nation of "wheat kings," the song proposes, a people defined by our role as 'hewers of wood and drawers of water' undertaken for the benefit of interests to whom we remain subordinate, while we lament the historical legacy that has brought us to where we are but remain unable to take charge of our own destinies and take our future down a new path.

For many, however, staples theory has not provided adequate explanation for the development and evolution of Canada's economic character. Richard Collins, feeling that other factors such as geography and climate played as much a part in the evolution of Canada's economic behaviour as its reliance on the exportation of staple goods, has argued that "History poses a problem to staples theorists in that the development of manufacturing in Canada and Canada's transition to its current highly urbanized state are not readily reconciled with the underdevelopment predictions of staples theory. The second stage of dependency theory has therefore argued that manufacturing in Canada has been essentially of a 'branch plant' kind and that the metropolitan powers, pre-eminently the United States, have retained R&D and high value-added stages of production at home."[5] The leading proponent of dependency theory in terms of understanding Canada's

economic relationship with the United States has been Dallas Smythe, who, as Collins notes, "cites both Canada's status as the country with the highest direct U.S. investment (31 per cent of all foreign U.S. direct investment in 1964, 22 per cent in 1978 with the United Kingdom in 1978 the next largest recipient of U.S. investment, with 12 percent) *and* Canadian investment in the United States -- 1978 $6.2 billion -- as evidence of Canada's dependency."[6] Manjunath Pendakur has also explained how American dominance of the means of distribution in Canada's film and media sectors is symptomatic of the hegemonic structure within the Canadian economy as a whole:

> Canada has been the chief destination of U.S. direct investment since the turn of the century, accounting for a consistent 25 percent... The book value of U.S. direct investment in Canada is estimated to be nearly $40 billion. This amounts to about 80 percent of all foreign investment in the country... [I]n recent years retained earnings of foreign subsidiaries have been the principal source of additions to foreign direct investment. Foreign direct investment is generally in the most lucrative and key sectors of the economy. For example, 78 per cent of Canada's oil and gas, chemicals, automobile, and electrical products industries are controlled by U.S. investors.[7]

The numbers that Smythe and Pendakur cite here are indicative of a time when there arose in Canada an outcry against such a great degree of foreign ownership of Canadian business. The level of foreign control in Canada reached its peak at 37.6% in 1971. In response, the Trudeau government in 1973 enacted the Foreign Investment Review Act (FIRA). Though FIRA was successful in curtailing the extent of foreign ownership in Canada, the Mulroney government, which was also responsible for negotiating the North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA) with the United States and Mexico in the late 1980's, abolished FIRA in 1985 and replaced it with Investment Canada, whose mandate was not to discourage foreign investment but rather to promote and encourage it. Recent

studies indicate that foreign-owned companies constituted 31.5% of the $1.3 trillion corporate revenue in Canada in 1996,[8] a sharp increase that brings Canada near the same level that it was so determined to turn away from twenty-five years ago.[9]

Dependency as a Condition of Canadian Political and Economic Culture

It seems clear, then, that a reliance on foreign capital is a very tangible and unavoidable aspect of Canada's economic reality. Canadian historian Mel Hurtig has asserted that "There is no other major developed nation in the world that has the degree of foreign ownership that we have in Canada, not by a long shot."[10] As I have previously mentioned, Canada's economic dependency can be seen as a product of its historical and geographic circumstances, and arose as a necessary element of the building of the Canadian nation-state. Michael Bliss has asserted that "in an integrated continentalist economy, a branch plant structure designed for anything but regional economies would have been inefficient and superfluous."[11] With its tariff protection policy -- the National Policy -- dictating its economic and political agenda, the Macdonald government of the late nineteenth-century sowed the seeds for a branch plant economy dependent on foreign capital, but did so in the interests, and by the only manner feasible, of establishing in Canada a strong and stable economy. "The economic nationalism of the late nineteenth-century," Bliss argues, "operated and was known to operate to induce Americans to enter Canada and participate directly in the Canadian economy... [I]t now appears to have been a peculiarly self-defeating kind of economic nationalism."[12]

If dependency was proffered by the federal government as a national requirement, it was not over the objection of the Canadian people at the time. In describing the economic climate and the attitudes of the general populace towards branch plant

industries and the welcoming of foreign capital into Canada around the turn of the century, Bliss has further argued that

> massive inputs of foreign capital were seen to be absolutely central for this concept of national economic development. Outside money was wooed without regard for nationality or modern distinctions between direct and portfolio investment. Few people in the half-century after Confederation questioned Canada's absolute reliance on foreign capital. Aside from worrying now and then about ever being able to pay off our debts, no one was seriously upset about the ultimate consequences of a high percentage of foreign ownership -- either British or American -- of our resources. Least of all were they worried about the flow of interests and profits to foreign countries. As *Industrial Canada* commented in 1908, 'That a portion of the profits made on the development of our latest resources has to be paid out in interest is no hardship, since without the capital there would have been no profits at all'.[13]

It would seem, then, that Canada has been the model nation-state for trans-national investment opportunities, serving as an early prototype for the kind of free flowing, barrier-less trade that has become an increasingly common aspect of the world market at the end of the twentieth-century. Though there have been numerous federal policies attempting to prevent or curtail free trade with the United States throughout Canada's history, the attempts have been consistently unsuccessful, something which Michael Bliss attributes to the unwillingness or inability of the federal government to enforce such laws when pressured by the United States (an example of which will be discussed in a case study in the next chapter), predicated by a dependency on capital from south of the border that essentially provides the structure and stability of the Canadian economy. The National Policy of tariff protection, Bliss argues, ironically "caused more American manufacturing penetration than completely continentalist or free trade policies would have encouraged... The funny thing about our tariff walls was that we always wanted the

enemy to jump over them."[14]

Some parallels can be drawn, in fact, between the Canadian trade relationship with the United States at the turn of the century and the current state of activity on the world market. As buzz words like 'Americanization', 'globalization', and 'free flow' increasingly cause countries like Britain, Germany, and particularly France to dig in their heels against the onslaught of American cultural products and economic imperialism, while also inspiring them to pontificate on the nature of their societal and cultural distinctness, the inevitable comparison of their current circumstance to the overall character of Canada's cultural situation (which I will discuss further in Chapter III), must come with an important distinction. On the one hand, Canada is indeed the "clearest early warning system to many countries who are still on the fringe of a universal process that is proceeding with enormous impetus,"[15] which is a result in part of our geographic proximity, lack of cultural screens, and our dependent economic structure that allows American business interests, including all forms of media, to cross relatively freely over the border. But it must also be remembered that Canada has never had the experience of existing as a nation-state without having to negotiate with the presence and influence of the United States. Therefore, the sense of dependency ingrained in the Canadian consciousness is not merely one of an economic nature; it is a result of the "political dependency and absence of sovereignty"[16] that has been the fate of a people handed from the French to the British empires and that has grown into its own in the shadow of an older, more prosperous and affluent nation, on whom it had to paradoxically rely for capital in order to avoid being consumed by the threat of manifest destiny. Or as Leo Panitch has observed, "Canada had exchanged the '*shadowy and unreal* independence

offered within the British empire for the *shadowy and unreal* independence tolerated by the Americans.'"[17]

Abraham Rotstein has provided further explanation for the collective national psychology that accepted, approved of, or at the very least was generally unconcerned with the establishment of such a dependent economic structure in Canada:

> What we [Canadians] understand least is the nature of power, particularly as it applies to the economy. Power has generally been treated with deep suspicion and arm's length reservation in English political philosophy... We have relied instead on a faith in the built-in harmony of the market society growing out of Adam Smith's maxims about the individual pursuit of self-interest. The effect has been to gloss over or to negate the importance of the locus of economic power. Thus when the power to make decisions shifts out of the country by virtue of foreign ownership of the economy, we are barely conscious that anything of importance has happened.[18]

Of course, Rotstein is a little too extreme in his assertion that Canadians are "barely conscious" of foreign economic control or the shift in power to outside interests that goes along with it. Indeed, part of our identity as Canadians is based on our passive/ aggressive relationship to such issues. As Collins has argued, "Resistance to centrifugal forces in Canada and the 'continentalist forces' in North America have been consistent themes in Canadian history and public policy. Both communications and the state have been central to Canada's continuing process of nation-building and self-assertion."[19] A more accurate addendum to Rotstein's argument, then, would be that Canadians are indeed aware of such issues as the locality of power and the sources that drive and benefit from our economy, and often demand that steps be taken to remedy the situation. But when such an attempt is rebuked by the dominant interest, as it typically is, we turn away, dejected and reticent, comfortable with the 'pretty things' that we do have, and resigned to

'wait and see what tomorrow brings'. "In other words," Tony Wilden argues, "this country has never at any time since the Europeans named it been other than a colony controlled, exploited, and garrisoned for the benefit of somebody else -- someone other than the working people of many nationalities who built it, someone other than the working people who still carry it on their backs."[20]

That government policies and industry agendas, both in the early years of the economic development of the Canadian nation-state and throughout this century, contributed to Canada's dependency on foreign capital is an important fact to consider, but one that must also be analysed further. As I have mentioned, the Canadian state had little choice or opportunity available to it other than to continue its national development along essentially the same lines that its colonial past dictated. Partha Chatterjee reminds us that the colonial state "was not just the agency that brought the modular forms of the modern state to the colonies; it was also an agency that was destined never to fulfil the normalizing mission of the modern state because the premise of its power was a rule of colonial difference, namely, the preservation of the alienness of the ruling group."[21] Thus, Canada's dependency can be seen as a result of our historical evolution from a colonial 'outpost of empire(s)' to a nation-state that, as a direct result of our consistent and continual subordinance to dominant interests, lacks the necessary sovereignty and autonomy of modern states. In this regard, American hegemony within Canada must not be seen as something imposed upon us from the outside -- a philosophy which implies that the resistance against such hegemony could well result in its removal, as though one were trying to struggle out of a straight-jacket -- but rather as something that constitutes a very integral part of who we are as Canadians, something that makes up the fabric of our

national consciousness. To deny or refuse to acknowledge this fact is to be counter-productive. The notion of dependency, then, reaches far beyond the realm of the economic or the political, beyond the boundaries of government and the nation-state, and into the collective consciousness of the Canadian people. Dependency, Collins argues, "is secured and maintained more fundamentally in civil society itself -- in the integration of all the dominant factions of capital under the hegemony of the American bourgeoisie, in a continental labour market and international unions, and above all in our culture -- not so much the 'haute culture' of the intellectuals but the popular culture which is produced and reproduced in advertising, the mass media and the mass educational system."[22]

Dependency is propagated in Canadian society by working itself into a cycle of resistance/conflict/denial/acceptance. In other words, Canadians, believing themselves to be citizens of a modern nation-state and not of a colonial entity, are drawn to resist their roles as subordinates to others, resulting in a diplomatic conflict (see case study in Chapter II) in which their demands and concerns are invariably denied, resulting in a bitter acceptance that further, and paradoxically, fuels both their ultimate acceptance of their fate and their desire to resist it further.[23] Summing up the extent to which dependent capitalist development has become ingrained in the socio-economic necessities of the Canadian lifestyle, Bliss asserts that "On the whole Canadians continue to believe -- wisely, I think -- that a limited but prosperous national existence is preferable to a pure, poor nationality."[24] But even when such an act of acceptance is made, the contradiction between a prosperous existence and a poor nationality remains. It is never resolved, and the psychic scars run deep in the Canadian consciousness. Wilden, in discussing the structure of power in Canada, describes the effects of this contradiction on the

conceptions of Canadian identity:

> But many Imaginary Canadians in positions of power insist that Canada is an independent, industrialized, democratic state. Others, a little less ignorant perhaps, but no less cynical, declare that if Canada is a colony, then that is what Canadians want. Others yet more extremist will say that this is the best Canadians can hope for or deserve. But we are not by birth or nature 'colonials'. We were not born with a 'colonial mentality'. We were brought up and trained to be this way, in our collective history as in our personal lives.[25]

Though Canada may not be a colony, and its people therefore not colonials, in the traditional sense of the word derived from nineteenth-century imperialism, it still cannot deny the lack of autonomy that characterizes its state and affects the consciousness of its people. Northrop Frye has echoed Wilden's concession that Canadians are indeed conditioned into thinking of themselves as a powerless, subordinate, dominated people. Drawing from his experience teaching in both American and Canadian universities, Frye has observed that "'American students have been conditioned from infancy to think of themselves as citizens of one of the world's great powers. Canadians are conditioned from infancy to think of themselves as citizens of a country of uncertain identity, a confusing past, and a hazardous future.'"[26]

The extent to which dependency as a characteristic of the Canadian consciousness is maintained and propagated as much by Canadian interests -- not just at the level of business and industry but also in the realm of the social and cultural -- as it is by American hegemony must not be underestimated. It pervades all aspects of Canadian society from within and is utilized by outside interests to their own advantage. The tendency in Canadian political culture, however, is to believe that dependency is forced upon us from the outside, and that the state, be it the federal or provincial governments,

represents the means by which such dependency must be averted. As I have already illustrated, though, the Canadian state has done more to entrench the notion of dependency in Canadian thought than any American corporation could ever achieve. Thus, as Abraham Rotstein has argued, "the current mix of cultural practices in Canada does not exist because of some collusion on the part of American capital and the Canadian state, but because current cultural practices have been largely accepted and internalized by Canadians themselves. The state does not stand above society, either as the bete noir of cultural dependency or as the potential saviour of national cultural development."[27] In order for a strong, distinct Canadian identity and culture to be determined and flourish in its own right, then, we must first acknowledge the nature of dependency in Canada and its relationship to American hegemony, rather than continually attempting to struggle against the hegemonic order on its own terms. Canadian cultural dependency, a result of the inherent historical legacy ingrained in our economic character and political culture, for better or worse, represents an indelible and undeniable part of who we are today, and we cannot successfully forge a strong and healthy national cultural identity without first recognizing and coming to terms with this.

Dependency and the Lament for Cultural Expression

A great deal of attention will be paid in this thesis towards media industries in Canada and the impact of their administration on English Canadian cultural identity, particularly with regards to the regulation, or lack thereof, of the access of American media products to Canadian modes of communication and to the complicity of the Canadian state in this process. In many respects, the dependent nature of Canada's economic structure clouded the minds of many government leaders and officials in the

first half of this century who were unable to conceive of the impact of this dependency on Canada's cultural spheres. The tendency of Canadians to view their country's dependency as an external oppressive force, and to struggle in Sisyphean fashion against the dominant order when the only real possible outcome is the reassertion of our own subordinance, only began to take shape in the postwar period and finally coalesced in government initiatives in the 1960's. Prior to this time, as I have already discussed, there was little organized concern about foreign control of certain sectors of the economy or of various industries, or of the effects that such dependency may have on Canadian culture or national identity. The Massey Commission, filed by federal committee in 1951, was the first time a cohesive argument was presented which outlined in material fashion the impact of Canada's economic dependency on the United States on cultural activities and forms of expression in Canada. Though many of the Commission's recommendations pertaining to the Canadian Broadcasting Corporation (CBC) were taken into consideration by the federal government, action was not taken in the Canadian film industry or music industry (better described as communities rather than industries, actually) until the late 1960's.

As I will discuss in further detail in Chapter III, Ian Angus has identified the rhetoric of left-nationalism as the primary impetus behind the movement towards somehow rectifying the effects of Canada's economic dependency on its modes and channels of cultural expression. Angus argues that "the main rhetorical form of left-nationalism is a lament for the failure adequately to preserve the past and an argument that such preservation requires a radical reorientation in the future."[28] The sentiment within Canada that there occurred in the past a series of failures to preserve our national

culture is legitimate and justifiable, but the state has continually erred in its attempts to forge a different future, primarily by relying on policy implementation and other actions that treat dependency as externally imposed rather than inherently Canadian, and thus attempt to struggle against the hegemonic order on its own terms. Examples of such cases will be presented throughout this paper, but I would like here to briefly summarize some of the events within Canadian cinema in the first half of this century that would later serve as an inspirational albatross in the context of left-nationalism.

Ted Magder has explained that, in spite of Canada's consistent refusal to institute regulatory policies of any kind against the exhibition of American films or to set up a quota system of some kind that would benefit the indigenous film industry -- something undertaken by virtually every other Western industrial nation at some time during the inter-war period -- Canada was actually the first Western industrialized country to found a state-run film production institute. Despite the enthusiasm and moderate success of some of the early filmmakers and their efforts (Nell Shipman serving as the best example), the production of feature films facilitated by the institute, founded in 1918, quickly proved incompatible with the small domestic market, vast geography, and poor communications infrastructure that Canada offered. By the mid-1920's, the federal government had abandoned the institute and the overall project of establishing a film production industry, apparently following the advice of many American industry insiders who quipped that it made as much sense to set up a film industry in Canada as it did to build a pulp mill in Hollywood.

With the establishment of an indigenous film industry in Canada clearly no longer on the federal government's agenda, Ray Peck, the director of the Canadian Government

Motion Picture Bureau, began to view the prosperous American film industry as yet another source of capital from the dominant centre that could perhaps be persuaded to 'invest' some of its capital in Canada. In 1927, Peck explained that, "We are attempting at all times, as Canadians, to induce American capital and manufacturing interests to come into Canada and establish branch factories. I look on the American film industry much as a branch factory idea insofar as it affects Canada. American motion picture producers should be encouraged to establish production branches in Canada to make films designed for British empire consumption."[29] The nature of Canada's dependency is perhaps best illustrated in Peck's last sentence here. Not only was he promoting an American branch plant film industry in Canada, but his intention was that it be for the benefit of the other dominant centre to whom Canada was subordinate. It would seem as though an independent Canadian film industry was of no concern to those who had the power to establish one. The American industry had repeatedly declined Peck's invitation since 1925, but meanwhile in Britain in 1927, as Pendakur explains further, "the British government intervened to preserve British film production by passing the Film Act of 1927 which imposed a distributor's quota thereby making the production of British films inevitable."[30] With this regulation of the distribution of films in Britain restricting the access of American films to British theatres, the American majors finally accepted Ray Peck's invitation to produce films in Canada. These 'quota quickies' allowed the American industry to circumvent the distribution quota in Britain by qualifying under the banner of 'British empire consumption', and also, as I will discuss further in Chapter III, served as a significant milestone in the shift in dependency from Britain to the United States.

What is most evident from the examples above, though, is the extent to which Canada has seemed incapable of diverging from its inherent dependent nature. In attempting to encapsulate the political, economic, historical and sociological reasons for Canada's particular political cultural identity, Rotstein has explained that:

> The greatest weakness in the set of requirements for preserving Canadian independence is the peculiar intellectual and political tradition that forms the basis of the Canadian political culture. While we have gained the legal trappings of sovereignty and independence, we are unable to muster the symbols and the political vocabulary necessary to understand the vital interests of this country and to act for its preservation. The essential weakness of a Canadian political culture lies in its derivative liberalism. This is the heritage of an intellectual colonialism whose concepts and symbols are inadequate to our dilemma and bypass the major problems surrounding Canadian independence.[31]

This lack, or absence, of such national symbols and concepts is also a reason why the Canadian filmic discourse has been so weak in its evolution (a discussion continued in greater length in Chapter IV). The paradox exists in the fact that government officials and policy makers have emphasized the importance of developing a film culture that expresses national interests and both reflects and promotes national culture, when it seems clear that: a) officials and policy makers have little autonomy in the face of Canada's legacy of dependency and the hegemonic control exercised by American and trans-national interests; and b) largely because of this dependency, Canada's particular national culture, with its lack of unifying symbols and concepts and an aversion to heroic myths -- indeed, it is better defined by what it is *not* than by what it is -- lends itself very poorly to the medium of film, especially when that medium, and its distribution throughout Canada, is dominated by the glorified, seductive mythologies created by the American cinema.

Case Study: the Canadian Co-operation Project

In short, then, attempts to free Canadian cinema from Canada's historical dependency collided head-on with the results of a half-century of neglect of the distribution, exhibition, and production sectors of the Canadian film industry. The final nail in this coffin would be driven by the Canadian Co-operation Project, which laid the groundwork for ensuring that the distribution and exhibition of films within Canada would be controlled by the American industry. Indeed, Magder explains that, as a direct result of the Project, instituted in 1948, "Canada had come to represent the one last bastion of Hollywood's halcyon days. The MPAA's annual report of 1952 noted that Canada's percentage of Hollywood's domestic market had gone from 4 per cent in 1948 to 10 per cent in 1951. With $18.5 million in remittances, Eric Johnston [president of the MPEAA] was able to report that 'outside the U.S. itself, Canada ranks as the second largest market in the world for Hollywood films.'"[32]

Since the rise of Hollywood's international presence in the years following the First World War, countries around the world have been wary of both the ability of American films to infiltrate and dominate their nation's movie screens (this will be analysed further in the next chapter) and the implications of this on their respective national cultures. As a result of the advantageous position held by American industry after both World Wars, virtually every Western industrialized nation in the world took steps in both instances to regulate the flow of American films, often simultaneously in an effort to support their own national cinema, however small. Hamelink has described in greater detail how other countries responded to the threat of American cultural imperialism manifested by the film industry:

> the massive invasion of American films in the early 1920's caused restrictive measures, first by Germany, later by France and the U.K. After the Second World War, with massive imports of U.S.-made films, worries rose in European countries about the protection of national film production and about their balance of payments. These worries motivated measures of import control that largely worked along two lines. The number of imported films was limited (so-called number quotas) and screen time was shared between foreign and domestic films (so-called screen quotas).[33]

Hamelink asserts that these policies had by the 1960's resulted in a more balanced environment in which "the European film industry became stronger, a strong trend towards trade liberalism emerged in Europe, and several co-production and co-investment schemes for film production developed between European markets and the U.S. film industry."[34]

Canadian officials, however, as I have described above, took no such steps. Instead, as Magder explains, "In 1948, they negotiated their own special deal with the Hollywood majors... The Canadian Co-operation Project, as it came to be known, was yet another attempt at branch plant production; it could be termed a success only if its primary goal was to leave the commercial film sector unfettered and unchanged."[35] The branch plant production which Canadian officials were attempting to establish by way of the Project was not American film production, though this would develop into a viable economic opportunity some forty years later. Rather, the aim of the Project was to increase direct American investment in Canada in as many sectors of the economy as possible, an objective that hardly needed the encouragement of a government-endorsed policy. Instead, the American film industry, through the administration of exhibition exercised by the MPAA and the MPEAA, established Canada as a branch plant *market* to

serve as an additional, and in many cases surplus source of revenue for the American domestic market. In this regard, the role of the Canadian market for American films in the postwar period anticipates that of the overseas and particularly the Asian market in the period following the end of the cold war, providing the American industry with surplus revenue to be gained at little cost in addition to the revenue received from the domestic American market. The manner in which the American film industry achieved the means of accomplishing this will be discussed in the next chapter. The Co-operation Project, then, positioned Canada as a branch plant not in terms of production, but rather in terms of consumption. Distribution and exhibition of films in Canada remained firmly under the control of the Hollywood majors, by way of the MPAA and MPEAA, and the Canadian public was constructed as nothing more than what Dallas Smythe has termed an 'audience commodity'. In Chapter IV I will discuss the recent development of the utilization of Canadian locations for the actual production of American films for international consumption, and postulate the effects and implications of this on Canadian culture and identity.

The Co-operation Project was essentially an opportunity for the American industry to suppress the growing desire among some circles in Canada to ensure that steps were taken to loosen the grip which American interests had over the distribution and exhibition sectors of the Canadian industry, and to even pass legislation requiring that a portion of the profits made by the American majors from the exhibition of films in Canada be invested in the production of Canadian films. Magder explains how Government Film Commissioner Ross McLean tried to spearhead such an initiative in the years following the Second World War:

> On 1 December 1947, McLean sent a memo to the minister of National Revenue, J.J. McCann, that endorsed the government's stated intention of encouraging 'the investment of funds by United States owned companies in the production of films in Canada for international distribution'... McLean felt that friendly persuasion would not suffice to ensure compliance...[and] recommended that the American companies be 'induced or required to invest a portion of the yearly Canadian revenues -- say $4,000,000 to $5,000,000 -- *primarily in producing films in Canada*'.[36]

The MPAA, which already faced such restrictive measures against the exhibition of American films in European nations, was not about to allow the Canadian market to start building walls against the flow of American cultural products, especially considering the ease of export which American products had traditionally enjoyed into Canada, not to mention the lackadaisical attitude taken by the Canadian government in relation to the activities of the American film industry in Canada prior to the Second World War. Indeed, the dependent nature of the Canadian economy on American interests allowed the American film industry to side-step any restrictive measures against the distribution and exhibition of their films in Canada by offering the federal government a set of industrial objectives that, on the one hand, would appeal to the Canadian tendency to rely on American capital, and on the other, would facilitate the entrenchment of the American film industry in the distribution and exhibition sectors of the Canadian industry. The following excerpt from a memo drafted by Eric Johnston, president of the MPEAA, lays out the criteria for what would become the Canadian Co-operation Project:

> 'a) to make a short film explaining Canada's trade-dollar shortage to American and Canadian audiences; b) to increase coverage of Canadian subjects in American newsreels; c) to have short films made about Canada by U.S. film companies; d) to obtain distribution of some NFB films in America; e) to insert some Canadian sequences in U.S. feature films; f) to make a series of

> radio recordings by U.S. stars extolling the virtues of Canada as a vacation land; g) to distribute fewer 'low-toned' gangster films in Canada; and h) to appoint a staff man for liaison of the project.'[37]

Evident in the above passage is the very clear sense of Canada as a subordinate, marginal, weaker nation whose concerns and priorities are not only seen to be insignificant, but so too is its very character. Aside from the immediate material effects of the Co-operation Project -- the banal, stereotypical, and geographically inaccurate representation of Canada in American films, the failure of the Canadian state to regulate the distribution and exhibition of American films in Canada -- its real significance lies in the way it both revealed and perpetuated the cycle in which Canadian dependency on American capital leaves the powers of Canadian cultural definition and characterization in American hands, resulting in the conception of Canada within the dominant ideology as one of absence and amorphousness. The effect of this on the manner in which Canadians conceive of their own identity and culture will be touched on throughout this thesis, and examined in greater detail in Chapters IV and V.

The positive reception of the Co-operation Project by the majority of Canadian government officials reflected, as Magder puts it, "the complex, much broader relations of dependency that deeply penetrated Canadian society... What is crucial to understand is that the Canadian state had not simply caved in to American pressure with respect to film policy. Nor did the problem lie in Hollywood itself, as though it stood alone as an ideological and commercial structure."[38] Rather, the federal government, as in its earlier actions of economic dependency discussed above, possessed full complicity in events that resulted in circumstances perceived to be detrimental to Canadian culture, which the federal governments of later generations would dedicate hundreds of millions of dollars

trying in vain to overcome. However, feeling that the "popular culture" of the American cinema was an inconsequential threat to the cultural lives of Canadians, many Canadian business interests and ruling elite at the time of the Project treated the American film industry much in the same way that the industrial activities of the dominant centre had always been viewed in Canada; as a means by which our own economic initiatives could be strengthened. Magder, in a rich analysis that deserves full attention, explains the economic and political environment at the time of the Project's approval:

> As David Wolfe has cogently argued, the Liberal government (and Howe in particular) was eager to encourage direct American investment in Canadian manufacturing. Indeed, Wolfe suggests that the Exchange Conservation Act made the building of branch plants the 'government's explicit goal.' Seen from a broader perspective, the Canadian Co-operation Project can be quite conveniently situated within the overall effort to attract direct American investment to Canada in the immediate postwar period. Moreover, the Canadian government strongly supported the principle of tariff reduction at the first round of the GATT negotiations. Thus, coercive or discriminatory measures, such as quotas or subsidies for private Canadian film production, would have been anathema to the overall macro-economic strategy of the Canadian state. Hollywood, had, in a sense, made an offer that Canadian officials, *given their own economic policy preferences*, could not refuse. What was perhaps even more important is that no one within the private Canadian film industry had proposed a better scheme to increase production activities.[39]

From the Canadian perspective, it was felt that the Project would ultimately increase American investment in Canada in more indirect than direct ways, such as through tourism and the overall impact of having Canada's image and reputation advertised, as it were, in Hollywood films and American media (the advertising potential of these channels will be examined in the next chapter). However, this strategy proved incredibly naive and misguided. In fact, the manner in which Canada was represented in the films

that filled the requirement of "including some Canadian sequences in American films" only served to perpetuate the conception of Canada held by the dominant ideology and thus further established the subordinance of Canadian culture within the periphery of the United States. Magder explains that, "As Pierre Berton chronicles, the films and the references remained as inane as ever -- it was a very unreal Canada that found its way onto the theatrical screen. Tourism figures do show an increase of American visitors to Canada, but the figures are far lower than the increase in Canadian tourists to the United States. American films were still doing what they did best -- selling the United States to the world. The MPAA continued the Project until 1957, when it was quietly put to rest."[40]

Canada's economic dependency, then, has profound implications not only on the economic character of the Canadian state but also on the social, political, and cultural realms of the Canadian consciousness, both because of the internal ramifications of dependency as well as the external conception of Canada disseminated by the dominant ideology. Canada's dependent nature, then, has continually resulted in a lack of autonomy in areas where outside interests are dominant, particularly in the distribution of cultural products in Canada, thereby weakening the ability to both define and defend a notion of Canadian culture, further relegating Canada to a position of subordinance on the periphery of the United States. Furthermore, Hannerz has explained that "peripheral states are often what Gunnar Myrdal some twenty years ago described as 'soft states', with very little capacity for policy implementation. This tends to be obvious enough in the area of cultural policy. Clearly the performance of the state in managing cultural flow depends in some significant part on material conditions. The soft state is often an

impoverished state which may ill afford to maintain a powerful cultural apparatus."[41] Though the Canadian state, in spite of its lack of autonomy and its intrinsically subordinate character, cannot be accurately described as "impoverished," its cultural apparatus can, especially in comparison to other western industrialised states. Indeed, many observers have noted how Canada serves as a prescient example of the effects of American control over a nation's cultural distribution channels, something that will be discussed further in the next chapter.

If it can be argued, as it will be in Chapter III, that the nation-state as we know it has reached a stage of obsolescence and must now evolve into an entity more suited to the trends and demands of the new millennium, and that the 'culture of the market' necessitated by the mandate of the trans-national corporation will likely be the force determining what these trends and demands will be, then perhaps it is not difficult to argue that Canada, having developed as a nation-state in direct response to the trends and demands of the American nation-state -- which has served as the forerunner to the model of the trans-national corporation -- can be looked at as a prototype of the nation-state to be. In Chapter III I will examine the extent to which the English Canadian discourse exists 'in between' the ideologies of America and Europe, allowing it to have a unique perspective on issues of technology that are pertinent to the evolution of the nation-state. Chapter IV will be dedicated to an analysis of the extent to which English Canadian culture and identity have been marginalised in Canada by the preponderance of the dominant American discourse. My discussion in Chapter V will focus on the depiction and utilization of Canadian-ness in the trans-national image industry as an example of the manner in which Canada facilitates the material realization of what Michael Rustin has

called "'abstract universalism,' with its 'denial of the particular location of human lives in place and time', its placeless and nonreferential sense of identity."[42] In Chapter II, I will expand on my discussion in Chapter I by analysing the manner in which American cultural hegemony is maintained and perpetuated in Canada, and extrapolate on the implications of this for other nation-states.

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1. Richard Collins, *Culture, Communication, and National Identity: The Case of Canadian Television* (Toronto: U of Toronto P, 1990) 161.

2. Collins 160.

3. Stephen Clarkson, "Canadian-American Relations: Anti-Nationalist Myths and Colonial Realities," *Nationalism, Technology, and the Future of Canada*, ed. Wallace Gange (Toronto: Maclean-Hunter Press, 1976) 105.

4. A number of prominent scholars have argued that Canada served as an important assistant to the ideological struggle undertaken by the United States during the cold war, acting as a geographical buffer, international supporter, and as a kind of right-hand-man in the formation of organizations such as NATO, GATT, and NAFTA. For an extended discussion of these issues, see Robert Bothwell's *Canada and the United States: The Politics of Partnership* (U of Toronto P, 1992); and John Herd Thompson and Stephen J. Randall's *Canada and the United States: Ambivalent Allies* (McGill-Queens UP, 1994).

5. Collins 161.

6. Collins 168.

7. Manjunath Pendakur, *Canadian Dreams and American Control: The Political Economy of the Canadian Film Industry* (Detroit: Wayne State UP, 1990) 32.

8. Mark MacKinnon, "Foreign ownership is on the rise," *Globe and Mail* [Toronto] 1 Feb. 1999: Al.

9. The reasons for the shift in political and economic policy between the Trudeau years of the early 1970's and the Mulroney government only a decade later are too numerous and intricate to discuss here, though they can largely be attributed to Mulroney's tendency to align Canadian economic policy to that of the Reagan administration. What is interesting to note, however, is that in spite of the contemporary support enjoyed by both the Trudeau and Mulroney governments (Mulroney's Conservatives were, after all, elected for a second time in 1989 on the platform of free trade with the U.S. and Mexico), national sentiment in the years following their administrations has been much less forgiving to Mulroney than to Trudeau (something that will be alluded to once or twice more throughout the course of this thesis). In fact, in a recent poll conducted by Ekos Research Associates, which asked 1,441 Canadians in all provinces to name the person whom they felt was most qualified to run the country, Trudeau ranked at the top of list, garnering a "positive trust rating" of 42% while Mulroney ranked dead last with a positive trust rating of 12%. Source: Joan Bryden, "Mulroney the least trustworthy: poll: Pierre Trudeau trusted," *National Post* [Toronto] 30 Dec. 1998: Al.

10. *Globe and Mail* [Toronto] 1 Feb. 1999: Al.

11. Michael Bliss, "Canadianizing American Business: the roots of the branch plant," ed. Ian Lumsden (Toronto: U of Toronto P, 1970) 32.

12. Bliss 32.

13. Bliss 33.

14. Bliss 32.

15. Abraham Rotstein, "Binding Prometheus," *Close the 49th Parallel*, ed. Ian Lumsden (Toronto: U of Toronto P, 1970) 210.

16. Collins 161.

17. qtd. in Ted Magder, *Canada's Hollywood: The Canadian State and Feature Films* (Toronto: U of Toronto P, 1993) 85.

18. Rotstein 220.

19. Collins 5.

20. Tony Wilden, *The Imaginary Canadian* (Vancouver: Pulp Press, 1980) 136.

21. Partha Chatterjee, *The Nation and its Fragments: Colonial and Postcolonial Histories* (Princeton: Princeton UP, 1993) 10.

22. Collins 172.

23. Again, The Tragically Hip concisely address this phenomenon in their song "Courage": "So there's no simple explanation / for anything important any of us do / and yea the human tragedy / consists in the necessity / of living with the consequences / under pressure, under pressure. / Courage, my word, it didn't come, it doesn't matter, / Courage, it couldn't come at a worse time."

24. Bliss 40.

25. Wilden 2.

26. qtd. in William Metcalfe, *Understanding Canada: A Multidisciplinary Introduction to Canadian Studies* (New York: New York UP, 1982) 392.

27. Magder 17.

28. Ian Angus, *A Border Within: National Identity, Cultural Plurality, and Wilderness* (Montreal: McGill-Queens UP, 1997) 32.

29. Pendakur 132.

30. Pendakur 133.

31. Rotstein 217.

32. Magder 75.

33. Cees J. Hamelink, "The Politics of World Communications," *Media and Cultural Regulation*, ed. Kenneth Thompson (London: Sage Publications, 1997) 179.

34. Hamelink 179.

35. Magder 63.

36. Magder 71.

37. Magder 72.

38. Magder 63.

39. Magder 74.

40. Magder 75.

41. Ulf Hannerz, "Scenarios for Peripheral Cultures," *Culture, Globalization and the World System*, ed. Anthony D. King (Minneapolis: U of Minnesota P, 1997) 121.

42. Morley and Robins, *Spaces of Identity* (London: Routledge, 1995) 39.

CHAPTER II

FILM AND MEDIA DISTRIBUTION AND CULTURAL HEGEMONY: A CANADIAN PERSPECTIVE

It is important to remember that Canadian dependency has largely determined American hegemony in Canada, and not the other way around. However, American cultural hegemony and media imperialism have a tremendous impact in perpetuating this dependency. In many ways the American and trans-national media industries have positioned themselves to increasingly assume the role of the dominant power to which the Canadian nation-state is subordinate. As the dominant power that maintains the hegemonic order in Canada has increasingly become more invested in cultural industries and the production and distribution of cultural products (by the end of the 1980's, the U.S. entertainment industry was second only to aerospace as a "foreign-trade earner for the U.S. national economy"[1]), so has Canada's dependency shifted from the realm of the economic to affect that of the cultural. Accordingly, Canadian reaction to this shift has intensified in equal measure; the apathetic approach of the first half of the century towards curtailing American investment in Canada quickly gave way to panicked awareness with the rise of television and escalated in the late 1960's and 1970's into a vigilant but fruitless attempt to turn the tide. My goal in this chapter is to trace the evolution and advancement, as well as examine the current legitimacy, of American media imperialism, keeping in mind the argument that Canada, having been subjected to

hegemonic control for nearly a century, serves as a model for the manner in which nation-states will likely evolve under the global hegemony of trans-national interests.

Media Imperialism: A Review

The primary undercurrent running through most of my analysis concerns the impact and effect of American media and cultural products on the evolution of English Canadian consciousness, and how American hegemony has both capitalized upon and perpetuated English Canada's inherent dependency and amorphousness. In order to provide an appropriate sense of context and prevent my analysis from slipping into generalizations and oversimplification, an overview of the structure, function, and effects of media imperialism, as well as an examination of its legitimacy, is needed.

Media imperialism, or cultural imperialism, has been subjected to a fair amount of revision since its development as a discourse in the 1970's, and in some cases has even been refuted on the basis of its supposed inaccuracy and illegitimacy in properly determining the causes and effects of the flow of information from the centre on the culture and economic structure of the periphery. Herbert I. Schiller, the leading proponent of the media imperialism thesis, views the 'imperialist' source as a monolithic and oppressive entity, and the relationship between centre and periphery as one which is completely determined, monitored, and controlled by dominant interests in the centre who act in the name of capitalist development and under the guise of the free flow of information, which itself is a construction created and utilized by the dominant interests in their attempts to penetrate foreign markets while safe-guarding their own. In discussing the circumstances that facilitate the actions of the imperialist centre, Schiller explains the overall result of the economic and cultural influence of the centre on the

periphery:

> The result of these diverse yet interconnected activities and relationships is a cultural take-over of the penetrated society. The impulse that produces cultural domination originates with commercial imperatives, but this in no way diminishes the impact on the cultural landscape of the penetrated society... From the time a region/nation is absorbed into the system, it is compelled -- given some latitude in the national circumstances of developmental level and degree of political independence -- to adapt its production, its working force, its rewards, its concepts of efficiency, its degree of specialization, its investments, and its resource priorities to the world capitalist economy.[2]

What stands out most in Schiller's analysis is the conception of the dominant centre as an aggressive 'penetrating' force, and the marginal periphery as a passive recipient who is both unable to resist the commercial imperatives of the dominant interests and is largely uninvolved in the process of adopting the economic and cultural signifiers of the centre. Though there is still a fair amount of validity in Schiller's assertions regarding the hypocrisy of the 'free' flow of information, and his analysis of the overall structure upon which dominant interests rely is also sound, he tends to treat the 'imperial' centre as monolithic, and ultimately his analysis, in its inability to consider the autonomy and the potential reactions of the peripheral interests and its insistence that the centre serves as the ultimate determinant of economic and cultural behaviour, reflects in many ways the same kind of thinking that it purportedly condemns.

The media imperialism thesis proposed by Schiller has come under criticism, and in some respects has been considered outdated, largely because of the manner in which the analysis is based largely on the impact of the imperial tendencies of one nation-state on a less sovereign, more subordinate nation-state. In a globalized world where the role

and influence of individual nation-states is seen to be receding, theories of cultural imperialism are increasingly considered incompatible with the more fluid structure of the New World Order. As Ien Ang has argued, "most theories of cultural imperialism remain firmly couched within transmission models of communication... Such a vision is not only theoretically but also historically inadequate: in a world system where capitalism is no longer sustained through the coercive submission of colonized peoples (as in nineteenth century high imperialism) but through the liberal institutions of democracy and the sovereign nation-state, equation of power with imposition simply will not do."[3] Though Ang's assertion here that the contemporary influence of a dominant power is foiled by the "liberal institutions of democracy and the sovereign nation-state" seems naive (as I will illustrate in the next case study), the media imperialism argument has been further complicated by theories of audience reception, which argue that peripheral consumers seldom ingest cultural codes and signifiers from the centre in the same manner as those who reside in the centre, and that therefore peripheral groups are empowered by their sovereignty as consumers which may reinforce their own cultural values just as much as transplanting those of the dominant power.

Having been subjected to scrutiny and analysis and several rounds of revision, the media imperialism thesis has managed to evolve in accordance with many of the criticisms and characteristics brought about by the increasing globalization of the world market. Magder has explained how a more revisionist approach to media imperialism succeeds in considering the role and function of nation-states, the fluidity of capital and cultural flows between centre and periphery, and the complicity of national representatives within peripheral nations:

> Over time a more accurate and subtle, if also more complicated, version of media imperialism has been developed. It recognizes at least four characteristics of media imperialism that the earlier versions overlooked or undervalued: first, that the imperialist centre (the United States or others) is rarely omnipotent; second, that the dependent periphery is rarely powerless to offset the dynamics and effects of media imperialism; third, that specific actors within the periphery (including on occasion state officials) may indeed benefit from and facilitate the process of media imperialism; and fourth, that the effects of media imperialism are often unintended and unpredictable.[4]

It is important that theories of media imperialism be revised and adapted to reflect the reality of contemporary trends in the international flow of capital and cultural products, rather than being dismissed as outdated or incompatible within current conceptions of the operations of nation-states. The power and influence of dominant interests, be they American or trans-national, are too firmly entrenched within the structure and operation of international business and politics for the ramifications of their actions and policies not to be considered to have a vital impact on those who are subordinate within their sphere of influence. The model of media imperialism Magder provides above, for example, clearly offers many direct parallels to the situation of American cultural hegemony in Canada, and serves as a kind of template with which to examine the relationship between dominant and subordinate interests.

It would be in our best interests, then, to avoid any overly revisionist approach to the causes and effects of media imperialism on a micro level and focus instead on the effects and ramifications of media imperialism on a macro level; on the manner in which the cultural consciousness of an entire people is seen to be affected by the economic and cultural activities of one nation impacting upon another. Magder, in an attempt to condense the concept of media imperialism to an understanding of its most basic

operation and results, has noted how, in the eyes of many scholars, Canada serves as an ideal example of the long-term effects of one nation's media and culture on another:

> As J.O. Boyd-Barrett explains, media imperialism may be defined as 'the process whereby the ownership, structure, distribution, or content of the media in any one country are singly or together subject to substantial pressure from the media interests of any other country or countries, without proportionate reciprocation of the country so affected.' The definition fits the Canadian case to a tee; not surprisingly, the literature on media imperialism tends to make special mention of the Canadian case. In his discussion of media imperialism Anthony Smith reflects a wide consensus: 'The culturally and politically debilitating effects of media dependence are perhaps most eloquently illustrated by taking an example not from the non-aligned or developing countries but from the developed world itself. Canada has always been obliged to struggle to maintain a thriving indigenous culture because of the proximity of the United States with its enormous output of information and entertainment... It has conceded the right of free flow and has suffered the consequences.'[5]

It must be reiterated here that the temptation to interpret American media imperialism as a purely oppressive and external force, something to which Smith succumbs towards the end of his statement above, is an inaccurate oversimplification of the matter which ignores the broad system of relations (which I described in the last chapter) that determine both the origin and development of the hegemonic relationship between the dominant power and the subordinate interests. The system of operations that facilitate media imperialism must therefore be viewed within the context of the particular relationship between the dominant and the subordinate, and to that end I offer this following case study.

Case Study: Split-Run Magazines and Canada's Cultural Autonomy

Me debunk an american myth? And take my life in my hands?
-- The Tragically Hip

The imperialistic notion of a dominant nation exerting its cultural values onto a

weaker, less developed nation by way of cultural products and signifiers that flow from the dominant core to the oppressed periphery, though still a general occurrence, has become greatly complicated by the question of what constitutes a nation, and also by the parameters within which nations exist and are related to on a daily basis. Ian Angus argues that globalization has brought about "a genuinely transnational economic environment dominated by large corporations that are increasingly gaining leverage over nation-states and whose influence cannot therefore be theorized as the influence of one nation-state over another."[6] However, while Angus' assertion that the influence exerted in the globalized world economy is that of corporations and not nation-states may be correct, the effects and ramifications that arise from this influence can still be seen as reflecting national and/or nationalist concerns, and therefore can still be regarded as the influence of one national culture on another. That the main players in this drama have shifted from political entities to business conglomerates illustrates the fluidity between politics and commerce in the global community, but in no way assuages the impact of such influence on cultural issues.

Consider, for example, the recent trade dispute waged between Canada and the United States. This very heated debate, which concerned the issue of advertising in split-run magazines (whereby copies of an issue sold in Canada contain Canadian advertising, the fee for which is paid to American publishers) centred around Canada's Bill C-55, whose aim was to "keep the $350-million advertising pie in Canadian hands, thereby ensuring the financial viability of the home-grown magazine industry."[7] The Canadian side was being fought by Canadian Heritage Minister Sheila Copps, while the American trade officials were backed by Time Warner Inc., Microsoft Corp., and Walt Disney Co.,

(who, in a twist of post-modern fate beyond ironic and almost too cruel for words, holds the legal publishing rights to the image of the Royal Canadian Mounted Police). A senior U.S. trade official has viewed the dispute as "purely a commercial issue...a difference of opinion over competition, not over culture... It's somewhat demeaning to phrase it as such." Bill Merkin, a former U.S. deputy trade representative currently working as a trade consultant in Washington, has echoed the observation that American trade officials "see this as a money grab for two Canadian companies, pure and simple. The United States just doesn't buy the Canadian concern about culture."[8]

The two Canadian companies in question are Telemedia Inc. of Montreal and Rogers Communications Inc. of Toronto, who virtually dominate the Canadian magazine industry and stood to gain more than anyone else (in financial terms) if Bill C-55 had become law. From the American point of view, then, it was a situation of American corporate interest versus Canadian corporate interest, and as such, would warrant an appropriate retaliation if not resolved in favour of the American side. Deputy U.S. trade representative Richard Fisher "warned that up to $4-billion of Canadian steel, wood, plastics, textiles and apparel could soon face sanctions at the border, most likely punitive duties," if the Canadian government refused to back down on Bill C-55 and the magazine issue.[9]

If a $4-billion retaliation on a $350-million issue seems somewhat extreme, it is best to keep in mind what is at stake from the perspective of American corporate interests. Dennis Browne, director of the Centre for Trade Policy and Law at Carleton University, has claimed that "the entire Canadian magazine advertising market is worth about a morning's worth of two-way Canada-U.S. trade, which flows at a rate of $1-

billion a day. 'It's peanuts [Browne argues]. It's silly that this thing is getting the kind of attention that it is in the United States. But it underscores the importance of entertainment industries to the United States and culture to Canada.'"[10] Browne has further warned that "if Ottawa thinks it's getting a rough ride on magazines, it's only a prelude to what it will likely get over looming disputes over satellite television, movie distribution and the Internet."[11] What the magazine issue illustrates, then, is an example of the domino effect; the manner in which dominant corporate interests approach the global economic environment in an attempt to preserve their hegemonic authority. Simply put, the thinking goes that if the first domino cannot be pushed over, none of the others in the line will fall either. Christopher Sands, director of the Canada Project at the Washington-based Center for Strategic and International Studies, has observed that "'Canada is the vanguard... Canada is where we deal with issues first. If we don't resolve them here, we will see barriers cropping up globally.'"[12] An individual domino itself may be worth peanuts in the grand scheme of things, but the game operates as a system, and the loss of revenue from one domino theoretically makes the revenue from others inaccessible. In this manner, systems upon which dominant interests rely for the maintenance and continuation of their hegemonic authority, such as the international image industry, tend to operate like perpetual motion machines; if they are made to slow down in any way then they are rendered inoperable and are not properly fulfilling their function (this will be discussed further later in the chapter). As Morley and Robins explain, "Capital has always sought to overcome spatial barriers and to improve the 'continuity of flow'... 'The ability of both capital and labour power to move...from place to place depends upon the creation of fixed, secure, and largely immobile social and

physical infrastructures. The ability to overcome space is predicated on the production of space.'"[13] Or, for that matter, on the maintenance of space that has already been produced and has therefore become integral in managing other spaces that have been incorporated into the system.

Bill C-55 will be before the Canadian Senate in May 1999, and if it is passed it will become law. Canadian and U.S. officials, however, have been negotiating a resolution that would effectively take the place of Bill C-55. Canadian officials have been motivated to resolve the issue due to the pressure placed upon them by the sectors of Canadian industry targeted by the American trade threat. The manner in which the resolution has been negotiated, however, reflects the cycle of Canadian dependency I described in Chapter I, and illustrates Canada's lack of autonomy and the dominant position that the American nation-state still holds in affecting Canadian policy, be it economic or cultural. The trade war against the various sectors of Canadian industry threatened by the United States proved so imposing and was so effectively handled by the U.S. negotiators, that not only is Bill C-55 essentially being superseded, but in order for the Canadian representatives to persuade the U.S. officials not to enforce trade embargoes of any kind, further concessions had to be made which in effect have given the United States a better deal on split-run magazines and more access to the Canadian publishing industry than they had before Bill C-55 ever became an issue. The *Globe and Mail* has reported that, "In return for postponing the threat [!], the U.S. administration has won a pledge that Ottawa is willing to change some aspects of its 35 year-old magazine policy -- including postal subsidies for publishers, foreign ownership restrictions, tax breaks for advertising placed in Canadian magazines and Bill C-55 itself, Canadian and U.S.

officials have confirmed."[14]

As well as illustrating the process by which American corporate and political interests maintain their hegemonic authority within the entertainment and communications industries, corporate conflicts and international trade disputes such as the one provoked by Bill C-55 also shed light on the mentality utilized in following such practices. The refusal of American officials to acknowledge the Canadian concerns over culture is largely due to the fact that the American side is also, in its own way, attempting to preserve its own cultural standards. One of the difficulties in negotiating issues of trade in which the Canadian argument is based on cultural protection while the American side is focussed on matters of "fair" competition in a free market economy, is not so much that Americans fail to realize the Canadian perspective in relation to culture, but rather that Canadians fail to realize that the American side is equally interested in its own culture, which is based extremely heavily on consumerism. Allan Smith, on the one hand, has argued that "Americans did not even see Sony's purchase of Columbia Pictures as an event to be reacted to in cultural rather than economic terms... [T]he chief significance of the sale was nonetheless held to relate to what it meant for America's waning economic power. There was simply no sense that what had happened would have an impact -- negative or positive -- on American culture as such."[15] However, Smith's assertion that the purchase of an American entertainment company by Japanese interests was perceived to have no impact "on American culture as such" is a half-truth, and fails to consider the impact that the web of economic dominance has on stabilizing and nurturing the American conception of self that provides the basis for American culture. Perhaps more appropriate is Graham Murdock's assertion that "the ideology of

consumerism encourages people to seek private solutions to public problems by purchasing a commodity... It also redefines the nature of citizenship itself so that it becomes less a collective political activity than an individual, economic activity -- the right to pursue one's interests, without hindrance, in the market place."[16] The principle ideals of American society -- independence, autonomy, liberty, the pursuit of happiness -- have become embedded in a culture that is based not so much on characteristics of expression (i.e., art, literature, film, theatre, music) as it is upon the sheer presence of these and other cultural products in as many aspects of life as possible.[17] The "empire of the market," as J.G.A. Pocock has called it, has created a culture of the market as well.

In this sense, it can be argued that one of the ways in which American and trans-national business interests have been able to ensure that trade barriers remain flexible and information flows remain free for the transmission of cultural products, thereby allowing them to maintain their dominant position in foreign markets around the world, is by tipping the playing field in their favour and imposing the ideals of market imperative over those of cultural expression. Ien Ang has argued that "It is not just a question of 'cultural imperialism', that older term that suggests the unambiguous domination of one dependent culture by a clearly demarcated other. The homogenizing tendencies brought about by the transnational era may be better characterized by the term 'cultural synchronization' and it poses quite a different problem as to the politics of cultural identity."[18] In other words, the infiltration of foreign markets relies on the attempt to synchronize the cultures of other nations with the economic culture, the culture of the market, of the United States, so that cultural priorities and nationalist sentiment become secondary to a nation's economic well-being and stability. In this manner, issues of

national culture and sovereignty are eclipsed by the importance of maintaining a sense of equilibrium in the economic sphere. For example, Morley and Robins have noted J.G.A. Pocock's assertion that what is being created is

> an economic community based on 'a set of arrangements for ensuring the surrender by states of their power to control the movement of economic forces which exercise the ultimate authority in human affairs. The institutions jointly operated and/or obeyed by member states would then not be political institutions bringing about a redistribution of sovereignty, but administrative or entrepreneurial institutions designed to ensure that no sovereign authority can interfere with the omnipotence of a market exercising *sovereignty* in a metaphorical because non-political sense.'[19]

However, this is not to say that the effects of cultural imperialism have faded, only that the means by which they are implemented have had to adapt to changes in the climate of global economic and cultural affairs. The machinery put in place by the purveyors of cultural imperialism has not been dismantled by the anxiety over the role and position of the nation-state in the New World Order, and dominant interests have in many ways been safeguarded by the extent to which the infrastructure upon which their position relies has retained its influence.

American Monopolization of Distribution Channels

Perhaps one reason why theories of media imperialism seem so difficult to dismiss from a Canadian perspective is because of the long and well documented history which dominant interests have exercised in the cultural sphere in Canada. Another factor that legitimates the tenets of media imperialism would appear to be the effectiveness of the rhetoric upon which the dominant order relies to both maintain and further its hegemonic authority. The concept of the free flow of information has of course played a

tremendous role in maintaining the stability of the hegemonic order, and also in ensuring the constant progression of the dominant discourse which perpetuates the legitimacy of the dominant ideology. Sandra Gathercole, drawing from the cultural imperialism thesis, has plainly identified America as "a media imperialist," asserting that the United States "'invented the concept of the free flow of information to justify its own unilateral penetration of foreign markets.'"[20] An important note here is that the free flow of information, more than merely justifying the "unilateral penetration of foreign markets," is actually the main factor that has made such penetration possible. Schiller has argued that "it is now evident that the historical coincidence of these two phenomena -- the policy of free flow of information and the imperial ascendancy of the United States -- was not fortuitous. The first element was one of a very few indispensable prerequisites for the latter."[21] Furthermore, the manner in which information flows have been utilized by American interests to establish and maintain the economic dominance of American cultural products illustrates the contradiction inherent within the structure of "free" flows of information. Magder, for example, has described how the free flow argument was crucial in establishing the foothold of the American film industry in Canada's exhibition and distribution sectors:

> Though it operated as a cartel, the MPEA understood well the ideological value of free trade and freedom of expression. 'The free exchange of ideas,' MPEA president Eric Johnston said in his first address to the Motion Picture Association of America, 'is more important than the free exchange of goods. There must be no obstacles to the transit of the media of communications'... Like all infringements on the 'free' market, protectionism promoted mediocrity, and state subsidies distorted the 'democratic' structure of demand and supply. Of course, Johnston's rhetoric was based upon the assumption that an equal exchange of motion pictures actually existed in the market and that the monopolistic

> practices of the major distributors in no way distorted the dynamics of free competition.[22]

Gathercole, continuing her discussion of American imperialism, has provided other examples of the manner in which the control, both physical and ideological, exercised by the dominant order over the manner in which information flows are both defined and accessed, has resulted in a highly regulated system that favours and promotes dominant interests. She has stated that "'The country which controls the world's film markets has not neglected to control its own. In fact, America is the most xenophobic and protectionist media market. It shares with Red China the distinction of having less hours (2%) of its television time devoted to foreign programming than any other nation.'"[23] Part of the process of maintaining cultural hegemony, then, is to ensure that peripheral concerns remain in the periphery and are thus perceived from the centre to be marginal, both in form, content, and most importantly, ideological value. To quote an old sports adage, the best (cultural) defence is a good offence; keep all the play in the other team's zone and they have no chance of scoring on you.

One of the other ways this is achieved is through the process Immanuel Wallerstein has described as that in which "the powerful of the world seek to commodify and thereby denature the practices of cultural resistance. They create high market demand for the forms of avant garde (and/or exotic) artistic production. They create high-tech market networks for the distribution of previously artisanal or illicit production of the means of every day life; that is, they transform a private domain into a semipublic one."[24] By doing so, the dominant power reassures its hegemonic authority and effectively stifles any possibility of a cultural resistance within the subordinate nation. As we have seen

with the example of Bill C-55, American interests still enjoy an extremely advantageous position when it comes to negotiating the conditions regarding their access to message transmission channels in Canada. Though the example of the magazine industry in Canada serves to illustrate the manner in which a country's very economic welfare can be threatened in order to protect, maintain, and enhance the dominant position of American interests, the dominance of American cultural hegemony is normally maintained through the international monopoly enjoyed by American interests in the fields of broadcasting, communications, and entertainment. Schiller reminds us that "External domination in cultural communications is achieved in many ways, but the prerequisite is the control of both the message (image, information) production and the message transmission channels,"[25] for it is through these channels that not only material products are disseminated but also ideological values and priorities, which serve to extend the function of distributing cultural products to include that of actually distributing cultural values and ideals. Film industry analyst Harold Vogel has explained in further detail how the control of distribution channels in the cultural and communications spheres both maintains and perpetuates the hegemonic authority of the dominant order: "'Ownership of entertainment distribution capability is like ownership of a toll road or bridge. No matter how good or bad the software product (i.e., movie, record, book, magazine, TV show, or whatever) is, it must pass over or cross through a distribution pipeline in order to reach the consumer. And like at any toll road or bridge that cannot be circumvented, the distributor is a local monopolist who can extract a relatively high fee for use of his facility.'"[26]

To put it simply then, as Nicholas Garnham has argued, "'It is cultural distribution, not cultural production, that is the key locus of power and profit. It is access to

distributions which is the key to cultural plurality.'"[27] The international monopolization of distribution channels for film, media, and other forms of communication by American interests has been the integral aspect in the development, maintenance, and evolution of American cultural hegemony. Guback and Varis have described some of the results that have been wrought by this development: "The economic power of films distributed abroad by American multinational companies is particularly impressive, because less than 10 per cent of the features produced in the world in any given year are made in the United States, yet for years they have occupied about half the screen time in world theatres (excluding those in socialist countries). According to a representative of the MPEAA, much of this success is attributable to the worldwide distribution networks of the major American film companies."[28] Continued access to foreign markets has been achieved and maintained through several developments throughout the course of this century. Three main interrelated factors have combined to solidify the control of international distribution channels by American interests. The first of these is the actual material access to the means of distributing products throughout the world. Guback and Varis have explained in great detail the process by which American businesses were able to consolidate their interests in foreign markets, thus allowing for the formation of cartels to oversee and ensure the success of American business abroad, such as the one which the Motion Picture Association of America (MPAA) created in the interest of supporting the economic health and expansion of the major American movie studios:

> Although United States law prohibits agreements restraining commerce among competitors in the domestic market, it makes an exception where overseas trade is concerned. The Webb-Pomerene Export Trade Act of 1918 allows domestic competitors to cooperate in foreign trade by forming export associations that

> might otherwise be held illegal under anti-trust laws. Companies supposedly competitive in the American market are allowed to combine, to fix prices, and to allocate among themselves their foreign customers. This legislation was one of the United States' Government's earliest efforts to stimulate exporting by small medium-size firms at a time when few companies were concerned with foreign markets. But a 1967 study by the Federal Trade Commission found that in reality, just the opposite actually took place; 'companies that have gained advantages from the Act (have) not been the smaller firms in our economy, but rather those that are large in an absolute sense and which simultaneously have major positions in the markets they serve. A number of associations in the motion picture and television field have been organized under terms of the Webb-Pomerene Act... The most important of these groups is the Motion Picture Export Association of America (incorporated in 1945), which is the international arm of the MPAA. By bringing together the 'nine largest producers-distributors of film in the world and allowing them to act in concert through a single organization', the MPEAA presents a kind of unified front to other nations of the world."[29]

Understanding the structure and function of the MPEAA and the access it allows American cultural products into foreign markets further illustrates the importance of 'free' flows of information in ensuring the continued success of American cultural products abroad. So long as the channels for distribution remain open will they be flooded with products produced by those who administer and regulate the channels themselves.

The second main factor in the monopolization of the distribution channels for cultural products by American interests has been the mass appeal of American films and cultural products abroad. Morley has referred to Richard Collins' "National Culture: A Contradiction in Terms," in which Collins quotes a *World News Survey* from the 1930's, which reported that "film exhibitors in working class areas were 'on the whole satisfied with the more vigorous American films...(but) practically unanimous in regarding the majority of British films as unsuitable for their audiences. British films, one Scottish

exhibitor writes, should rather be called English films, in a particularly parochial sense; they are more 'foreign' to his audience than the products of Hollywood from over 6,000 miles away.'"[30] It must be noted, however, that this level of acceptance is only accomplished as a result of the ability of the American film industry to distribute their products en masse to other nations, and also due to the size of the American domestic market, which is the third factor in facilitating American cultural hegemony. As Straubhaar has explained, the size of the American domestic market

> enabled both films and television programs from U.S. producers to enjoy early and continued export success. The variety of immigrant ethnic groups in the U.S. market encouraged production for a broad popular culture. This production was successful in building on the large North American Market; the industry structures grew rapidly. The result was a vast scale for U.S. cultural industries compared to the rest of the world, industrial rationalization in the film studio system, and the accumulation of financial and personal resources. U.S. cultural industries also showed innovation in genre and content. Considerable development of film genres in the 1920's, 1930's, and 1940's was accompanied by export success.[31]

This export success Straubhaar refers to was certainly aided by the standardization and commodification of film into genres, but was primarily facilitated and sustained by the American distribution monopoly, administered by the MPEAA, which granted American films greater access to movie screens around the world than any other national cinema. In fact, it is important to remember that Canada, fully incorporated as part of "the large North American market" Straubhaar refers to, is a country whose national cinema has virtually no access (less than 2% in 1998, as I explained in the last chapter) to its own screens as result of its position of subordinance within the structure of American hegemony. The success and popularity of American films in countries such as England

and Scotland also exemplifies the complicity of the more peripheral or subordinate nations in the establishment and maintenance of American cultural hegemony, and serves as an example of the complexity of media imperialism, illustrating how it is not just a matter of external oppression on the part of the dominant interests. Furthermore, the continued success of American films and cultural products abroad, though tremendously aided by the distribution monopoly, has served to legitimate the ideological philosophies and motivations of the dominant order, as well as justify the means by which this dissemination has been accomplished, namely control of distribution channels.

It should be noted here that the major American film distributors also exercise a monopoly in their own country, and are currently engaged in the very kinds of vertically integrated operations that were outlawed by the Paramount decree enacted by Congress in 1948. *The Independent Film and Video Monthly* has alluded to this, explaining that "the exhibition climate underwent a sea change in the Eighties, thanks to the nullification of a major anti-trust decision passed in 1948 that banned studios from owning and controlling blocks of theatres. Today, studios are again free to monopolize chains and control most of the screens across the country."[32] Balio confirms the allowance of monopoly practices in the American market, which were permitted for decades in international distribution and exhibition, stating that "Columbia started the trend in 1986 by purchasing a small chain of theatres in New York City. Within a year, MCA, Paramount Communications and Warner Communications bought or acquired stakes in important theatre chains around the country."[33] That these changes in business policies should come in the late 1980's was more than fortuitous or coincidental. With the blocs and boundaries of the Fordist period rapidly crumbling, American multi-national corporations were quick to see

the benefits of fewer international barriers to their media products. At the same time that they were insisting that information travel through free flows without the obstructions of quotas, levies or trade sanctions of any kind, they were equally adept at ensuring that their own economic structure remained resistant to outside influence. The following statement, issued by Time Warner in 1989 explaining its reasons for merging, helps put into perspective the manner in which businesses reacted to the changes in the market climate brought about by the trends of globalization: "'In the Eighties we witnessed the most profound political and economic changes since the end of the Second World War. As these changes unfolded globalization was rapidly evolving from a prophecy to a way of life. No serious competitor could hope for any long-term success unless, building on a secure home base, it achieved a major presence in all of the world's important markets.'"[34] The secure home based referred to here is, of course, the largest domestic market in the world. With a monopoly on the distribution and exhibition of films in both the domestic American market (including Canada) and abroad, American and trans-national corporations have capitalized heavily on the 'free' flow of information.

The Perpetual Motion Machine, The MPAA, and The Billboard Argument

As I mentioned in my discussion of Bill C-55, the necessity of information flows to remain free and uninhibited illustrates the manner in which American cultural hegemony exists as a kind of perpetual motion machine. As I have just discussed, American cultural hegemony is maintained and perpetuated by the monopoly enjoyed by American interests in the international distribution of cultural products, the mass appeal of American cultural products, and the size of the American domestic market. It must be remembered, however, that these three factors do not exist independently of each other,

but in fact are interrelated components that both rely on and facilitate the success of the others. The monopoly of international distribution channels could not have been developed were it not for the size of the domestic market which allowed for the growth of companies and business interests that were large enough in scope to expand into the international arena. As Guback and Varis explain, the domestic American market "has allowed productions to be on a financial level often dwarfing competitors. While this in itself does not ensure superior products, it has permitted the amassing of capital that supports worldwide systems for distributing products."[35] The domestic market has also facilitated the development of technological resources that have been obtained as a result of the continued financial success of American interests at home and abroad.

The international distribution system, then, is simultaneously a product of the large resource base of the domestic market, and is also the entity that facilitates the continued growth and success of that market by enabling the access of domestic interests to international markets, thus increasing the potential profit margin of domestic interests which in turn contributes to the amount of capital and technological resources available for the production of goods. There is therefore a tremendous amount at stake for dominant interests who rely on the perpetual motion of this distribution machinery, which can be seen as the justification for the role and function of the MPAA and the MPEAA, as well as the manner in which they view the world market as a kind of domino game, where the failure to access one market will prevent the access of others. The continued access to international markets, then, supports the dominant order not just in financial terms, but even more so in terms of maintaining the ideological dominance that facilitates access to the distribution channels that, in turn, make possible the access to foreign

markets that provide the surplus revenue that keeps the whole cycle in motion. There is so much more at stake than just the revenues generated by films and cultural products themselves, or even by the symbolic presence of such American media products all over the world: in the eyes of the MPAA and the business and congressional interests they represent and protect, these products are billboards, not just for the consumer items present in and therefore advertised by them, but most importantly for American ideology. As Guback and Varis explain:

> The deep penetration of world markets by American motion pictures, an MPEAA executive once observed, has been accomplished in spite of trade restrictions directed at them. The exportation of American media materials, moreover, is said to contribute positively to the United States balance of payments, quite apart from revenues gained directly by them. 'We know,' an MPEAA official has asserted, 'that motion picture and television programs are one of the most effective means of creating demand for American goods in foreign markets. When attractive U.S. products are seen on the screen, it generates an immediate demand for them which benefits other American export industries'.[36]

In other words, then, even though the distribution monopoly provides for the health and security of large sectors of the dominant economy by furthering the ubiquity of American cultural products, the most important item these products advertise and sell is the set of values and beliefs that encourage people to 'buy into' everything else associated with it.

In addition, the monopoly of distribution channels and the large American resource pool -- facilitated both by the large domestic market and the ability of products to add considerably to their profit margins in the international market place -- ensures continued access to foreign markets while also providing those markets with goods of a standard unmatched by other producers due to the inability of other interests to access the

channels that enable and perpetuate the cycle of capitalist expansion. With the logic of the entire system I have just described justified by its own inevitable success, the producers and distributers who maintain and utilize this structure become increasingly invested in maintaining their hegemonic authority, which in many ways relies on convincing the subordinate interests of the ideological motivations that justify the dominance of the hegemonic order. As Schiller has explained, "Cultural-informational outputs are largely, though not entirely, determined by the same market imperatives that govern the overall system's production of goods and services. Yet, as we are all aware, cultural-informational outputs represent much more than conventional units of personal-consumption goods: they are also embodiments of the ideological features of the world capitalist economy. They serve, extremely effectively, to promote and develop popular support for the values, or at least the artifacts, of the system."[37]

The manner in which global information flows combine to operate as an interrelated and ever-evolving system, with the end result ultimately being the maintenance of the dominant order's hegemonic authority, helps to explain, then, the importance of maintaining the perpetual flow of communication, media, and cultural products in the eyes of those who administer and manage the international distribution channels. This distribution framework, through its ability to disseminate not only products but also their attendant ideological implications and motivations, ultimately buttresses the hegemony enjoyed by dominant interests. More subordinate interests are therefore relegated to the periphery, unable to access the ideological channels that disseminate forms of cultural expression. In Chapter IV, I will discuss in greater detail the marginalization of English Canadian culture and identity, facilitated by the dominance

of the American discourse in Canada and the inability of English Canadian cultural expression to connect with the nation. I will begin by examining in Chapter III the substance and character, or lack thereof, of English Canadian culture.

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1. Doreen Massey, "A Place Called Home," *New Formations* 17 (Summer 1992): 5.

2. Herbert I. Schiller, *Communication and Cultural Domination* (White Plains: International Arts and Science Press, Inc., 1976) 8-9.

3. Ien Ang, "In the Realm of Uncertainty," *Communication Theory Today*, ed. Crowley and Mitchell (Cambridge: Polity Press, 1994) 196.

4. Ted Magder, *Canada's Hollywood: The Canadian State and Feature Films* (Toronto: U of Toronto P, 1993) 9.

5. Magder 8.

6. Ian Angus, *A Border Within: National Identity, Cultural Plurality, and Wilderness* (Montreal: McGill-Queens UP, 1997) 42.

7. Barrie McKenna, "Canada on front line in cultural battle," *Globe and Mail* [Toronto], 18 Jan. 1999: Al.

8. *Globe and Mail*, 18 Jan. 1999: Al.

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11. *Globe and Mail*, 18 Jan. 1999: Al.

12. *Globe and Mail*, 18 Jan. 1999: Al.

13. David Morley and Kevin Robins, "No Place Like *Heimat*: Images of Home(land) in European Culture," *Space and Place*, ed. Carter et al. (London: Lawrence and Wishart, 1993) 29-

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14. Barrie McKenna and Heather Scoffield, "Ottawa bends on magazines to avoid U.S. trade war," *Globe and Mail* [Toronto], 13 Mar. 1999: Al.

15. Allan Smith, *Canada: An American Nation? Essays on Continentalism, Identity, and the Canadian Frame of Mind* (Montreal: McGill-Queens UP, 1994) 112.

16. Graham Murdock, "Citizens, Consumers, and Public Culture," *Media Culture: Reappraising Transnational Media*, ed. Skormand et al. (London: Routledge, 1992) 19.

17. Author Toni Morrison has sardonically argued that America does not want its artists to have careers, it wants them to have commercial hits.

18. Ang 253.

19. David Morley and Kevin Robins, *Spaces of Identity* (London: Routledge, 1995) 177.

20. qtd. in Richard Collins, *Culture, Communications, and National Identity: The Case of Canadian Television* (Toronto: U of Toronto P, 1990) 14.

21. Schiller 24.

22. Magder 67. Please note, although Magder uses the acronym MPEA, he is referring to the MPEAA, the Motion Picture Export Association of America. It would seem that Magder simply feels the last 'A' is redundant.

23. qtd. in Collins 14.

24. Immanuel Wallerstein, "The National and the Universal: Can There be Such a Thing as World Culture?" *Culture, Globalization, and the World System*, ed. Anthony D. King (Minneapolis: U of Minnesota P, 1997) 101.

25. Schiller 72.

26. qtd. in Tino Balio, "Adjusting to the New Global Economy: Hollywood in the 1990's," *Film Policy: International, National, and Regional Perspectives*, ed. Albert Moran (London: Routledge, 1996) 27.

27. Morley and Robins, *Spaces of Identity* 33.

28. Thomas Guback and Tapio Varis, *Transnational Communication and Cultural Industries* (Paris: UNESCO, 1982) 30.

29. Guback and Varis 29-30.

30. David Morley, "Electronic Communities and Domestic Rituals," *Media Culture: Reappraising Transnational Media*, ed. Skormand et al. (London: Routledge, 1992) 72-3.

31. Joseph D. Straubhaar, "Beyond Media Imperialism: Asymmetrical Interdependence and Cultural Proximity," *Critical Studies in Mass Communication* 8 (1991): 45.

32. *The Independent Film and Video Monthly*, Vol. 20 No. 3 (April 1997): 29.

33. Balio 24.

34. Balio 23.

35. Guback and Varis 31.

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37. Schiller 6.

CHAPTER III

THE RHETORIC OF CULTURAL IDENTITY AND THE EXPRESSION OF ENGLISH CANADIAN CULTURE

In this chapter, I would like to turn my attention towards the specific matter of Canadian identity, and the question of what constitutes English Canadian culture. No small task indeed, these issues have been the subjects of scholarly and intellectual debates that have filled dozens of books in the last three decades alone. My objective here, however, is to gain as clear an understanding as possible of English Canadian culture, as well as the dynamics of Canadian national identity, in order to realize what is at stake and what is being threatened by the prevalent dissemination of American cultural and ideological discourses. I will attempt to achieve this by focussing not on the contributions and accomplishments of various individuals and organizations (i.e., John Grierson, the NFB, CFDC/Telefilm, etc.), but rather on the rhetoric employed by those whose analyses and interpretations of the plight of Canadian culture resulted, over the years, in the implementation of various policies and the founding of certain organizations within the film and broadcasting fields. I feel that an understanding of Canadian culture and society can be garnered from the study of: the manners in which people have reacted to American hegemony; the policies that have been implemented in attempts to foster Canadian expression and industry; and the rhetoric utilized to tie it all together. Later in

the chapter, I will focus a great deal of attention on Canadian discursive strategies and the manner in which these help contribute to cultural expression. Furthermore, I will also shed light on the extent to which American ideology and discourse have been so prominent in Canada that they have not only threatened Canadian identity and culture, but are themselves indirectly responsible for shaping certain distinctly Canadian cultural characteristics, since national expression is inevitably defined in relation to American ideology, thus further illustrating the impact of American media on Canadians and the reactive nature of Canadian culture and identity.

Locating English Canadian Identity

As I have previously discussed, Canadian national identity has long been difficult to determine. From its origins as a colonial outpost of the French and then British empires, to a country whose foundation was based more on the fear of manifest destiny than on any binding nationalist sentiments, through the transition from loyal British dominion to a branch plant of the American economy, Canada has continually possessed a national character consisting of reaction rather than proaction, spectatorship rather than instigation, pragmatism rather than jingoism. These, of course, must not be regarded as the sole defining characteristics of Canadian identity, but rather as the most pertinent to my discussion. The question of Canada as a national entity has been the subject of innumerable debates, and my aim here is not to offer definitive evaluations but rather probe in greater detail how aspects of Canada's national character have found expression within contemporary English Canadian culture. To achieve this, an understanding of the manner in which Canadian identity has been constructed is necessary. Focussing on the origins of the Canadian condition, Ian Angus has concisely summarized that, "In obvious

contrast to the United States of America, Canada has no heroic founding myth. For the French population, their historical memory is one of conquest by force of British arms. For Canadians of British extraction there is little more than the negative tradition of Confederation precipitated by fear of American expansion. A lowest common denominator of rejection is not a powerful cement to hold ethnically distinct groupings together."[1] Furthermore, an important consideration alluded to here by Angus is that the question of what constitutes Canadian identity is further complicated by the question of what constitutes Canada. Rather than attempting to determine the unifying cultural characteristics between the 'ethnically distinct groupings' that comprise the nation, I will instead focus my discussion on questions pertaining to the culture and identity of English Canada, which, due to its lack of cultural screens such as language, its close proximity to the United States (90% of English Canadians live within 150 miles of the U.S. border), and the continentalist strategies of many Canadian business leaders and government officials, has long been extremely susceptible to the influence of American media freely crossing the border.

In singling out English Canada as the focus of my attention, I do so for these reasons above. I am not proposing that English Canada be considered a monolithic example for issues of culture and identity regarding the country as a whole. There are issues and concerns that are unique to other groups within Canada, such as the Quebecois and First Nations, that cannot be properly addressed within a discussion of English Canada. However, the recognition of Canada's many distinct groups requires the acknowledgement that only together do they all constitute Canada as a nation. In order for this to be achieved, English Canada must be regarded as only one aspect of the

Canadian nation-state, rather than representative of the nation in its entirety. As Ian Angus has asserted:

> it is necessary to accept that what the country will be in the future is open to discussion and negotiation between the relevant groups. There are at least three such groups: First Nations, Quebec, and English Canada. The last, however, has not referred to itself as a nation. In calling itself as Canada, it has elided the key question of its relation to the others and especially the history of violence whereby the Canadian state, as all other states, was constructed. A genuine debate about the future of the Canadian nation-state cannot occur if one group claims to monopolize the term 'Canada' without discussion. For this reason, we must recognize our distinctiveness as English Canadians -- that is, those Canadians who inhabit the part of the country where English is the ordinary language of public interaction.[2]

The equating of English Canada with 'Canada', or as Angus describes it, "the current practice of calling English Canada the 'Rest of Canada' or 'Canada outside Quebec',"[3] has therefore been a contributing factor to the elusiveness of determining a solid conception of Canadian identity. If one proceeds from the assumption that English Canada is in fact 'Canada', then an attempt to define Canada as a whole is confounded by the fact that the traits and characteristics of the other groups -- such as Quebecois, First Nations, and, a populace omitted by Angus but deserving of mention particularly in the context of 1990's globalization, the New Immigrants -- do not coalesce under the banner of 'English Canada'. Therefore, English Canada itself must be located individually in terms of culture and identity so that its own contributions to the collective Canadian culture and identity may be distinguished from those of the other groups.

In spite of the historical, social, and cultural divisions that exist between English Canada, Quebec, and the other groups that constitute the Canadian nation-state, there are

of course elements of a common history, society, and culture that they all share as 'Canadians', regardless of their hyphenated nationalism. The degree to which one takes precedence over the other will depend on one's own history, social and cultural background, and most importantly political beliefs. For Richard Collins, the amount of flux between nationalisms within Canada is not a sign of weakness within the structure of the nation-state, but rather just the opposite:

> Canada holds together as a political institution, a state, very well. The absent fit between nation(s) and political institutions in Canada clearly has tensions and insecurities (the slumbering giant of Quebec nationalism, the unsatisfied hunger in English Canada for identity in a nation-state of the good old-fashioned kind), but what is most striking about Canada is not how imperilled a state it is, albeit it ill merits the stipulations of nationalism, but rather how unimportant these stipulations are. Canada is a remarkably stable and successful state. It is best understood in terms of Ramsay Cook's brilliant aphorism that Canada is a *nationalist* state, not a nation-state.[4]

The nationalist character of this state, however, has grown increasingly fragmented in the ten years since Collins' observation, during which we have seen the rejection of two national referendums on national unity (or so they were called), the virtual expulsion of one of the country's founding political parties from official party status as a protest against former Prime Minister Brian Mulroney, a sovereignty referendum in Quebec come within a whisker of being in favour of secession, and the number of official national political parties grow to five, all of which have their constituencies concentrated in different regions of the country, and two of which gained office on the platform of nationalist issues pertaining to their respective regions. Through all this, commonalities between the different nationalist groups are still very evident, especially with regards to

one theme in particular. As Angus states, "Both English Canada and Quebec have articulated their goals through an emphasis on preserving themselves (though, of course, against different perceived threats)... Such an emphasis on preservation implies a background context in which sociological nationhood is perceived as existing but disappearing or endangered."[5]

In terms of locating and expressing English Canadian identity, then, Angus argues that even though preservation has been the key concern, the primary theme or mode through which the realization of preservation has been sought has been "a contemporary evaluation of the validity of the nation."[6] As I have already pointed out, the only nation that English Canada has associated itself with is Canada as a whole, and therefore the federal government was seen as the body best suited for the operation of preserving 'the nation'. Angus identifies the discourse of left-nationalism as "the key component of the self-expression of English Canada in the period of permeable Fordism from the end of the Second World War to the beginning of the Free Trade Agreement in 1989."[7] It was during this time that the process of preserving Canadian identity was at its peak, and it was through the discourse of left-nationalism that this process was put into practice. By 'permeable Fordism', Angus refers to the hegemonic discourse that came into being in the capitalist world in the post-war period, also referred to as 'Keynesianism' or the 'welfare state'.[8] Left-nationalism, which Angus describes in further detail here, would come to influence most if not all of Canada's cultural policies that were implemented during this period:

> There were two main components of this left-nationalist discourse: an analysis of the historical reasons for the continued dependency that characterized the Canadian

> economy and an argument for the necessity of cultural autonomy, both intrinsically (as the key aspect of the expression of national identity) and strategically (as a condition for gaining control of the economy)... [I]ts impact on Canadian society was such as to propose the assertion of cultural autonomy without fundamentally altering the condition of economic dependence.[9]

The philosophical driving force behind the rhetoric of left-nationalism and the policy implementation it inspired, was the belief that the federal government could validate the nation by implementing policies that, on the one hand sought to build and strengthen forms of cultural expression, while at the same time neglecting the infrastructure upon which these modes of expression relied for their very survival. In other words, policy makers attempted to open up avenues for national cultural expression while ignoring the fact that part of the national character of the time was one of economic subordinance to the United States. Hence, the Canadian Film Development Corporation Act of 1968 established a process by which Canadian filmmakers were able to obtain funding for their films, but made no mention of avenues being made available for distribution or exhibition, aspects of the industry completely dominated by American interests and therefore almost totally unavailable to Canadian films.

Essentially then, left-nationalism assumed, correctly, that culture is a construction, and national cultures are thus constructed by a nation's governing body by implementing policies whose results and ramifications affect the collective consciousness of the mass population. As Immanuel Wallerstein argues, "Clearly, in any given state, after 100 years of making such decisions, it is very clear that a 'national' culture will exist even if it didn't exist at the outset. A particular past, a heritage is institutionalized."[10] However, the problem encountered in implementing policies to foster Canadian film in the post-war

years was that many of the government initiatives that had already been taken throughout the first half of the century had not necessarily been in the interest of fostering a Canadian cinema independent from the influence of the American industry and its policies. Rather, the film industry was viewed with tremendous neglect for its economic and cultural potential by the federal governments of the time. For example, I mentioned in Chapter I how Ray Peck, the director of the Canadian Government Motion Picture Bureau in the late 1920's, encouraged American film companies to utilize Canada as a branch plant for their productions: "'We invite Americans to come over to Canada to make automobiles and a thousand and one other things, and why not invite them to come over and make pictures..?'"[11] Furthermore, when the British Film Act of 1927 limited the distribution of American films in Britain, American film companies, now under the formal invitation of Ray Peck and the Canadian government, brought their operations across the border for the production of 'quota quickies'. Manjunath Pendakur observes that, "Remarkably enough, the Canadian government allowed the country to be used by the American film industry in its attempt to subvert the quota law in Britain. One wonders where the Canadian government placed its allegiance -- with imperial Britain or the imperial United States?"[12] And, for a final insult to injury, Seth Feldman notes how, following the end of the Second World War, "the federal government agreed to Hollywood's demands for the Canadian Co-operation Project, a deal that quashed the possibility of a feature film industry in exchange for a token recognition of Canada's existence in their real movies."[13]

Thus, when the Canadian government founded the CFDC in 1968 and attempted, at least in the hopeful eyes of many Canadian filmmakers longing for a national cinema that would actually reach the nation, to implement policies that would somehow construct

avenues for expression of a national culture through film, it did not seem to realize that the film culture which had been constructed up to that point was one of subordinance to American interests. With this in mind, it is easy to understand the origins and importance of the concept of preservation in English Canadian culture, and Canadian culture in general. It is also clear why those subscribing to left-nationalism, the dominant cultural discourse in Canada in the post-war period, would so stringently adopt the strategy of cultural preservation. However, Angus asserts that this sentiment manifested itself in a very specific manner: "The emphasis on the 'preservation' of our historical cultures has been a significant rhetorical form within which left-nationalism has articulated its prospective world-view in relation to the past. One might say that the main rhetorical form of left-nationalism is a lament for the failure adequately to preserve the past and an argument that such preservation requires a radical reorientation in the future."[14]

This sense of the past being lost and of history being non-heroic, un-mythic and uneventful is an important aspect of Canadian identity. Ultimately, it results in a philosophy that sees the present as a kind of last stand, a time in which decisions must be made and solutions implemented in order to prevent the situation of dependency and deficiency from continuing in the future. This mode of thought also encourages a continual examination of the identity crisis at hand, proceeding from the belief that "the key to identity is simple awareness of identity, conscious or otherwise."[15] However, due to all the different cultural and national concerns that combine to form the multi-faceted dimensions of Canadian identity, simple awareness of one's identity may very well result in an awareness of the divisions in national concerns rather than the similarities; an awareness that the shops in your neighbourhood do not advertise in your language, or that

a particular province has three times as many Senators as another of equal size, or that a particular metropolitan area hundreds or thousands of miles away controls the majority of businesses that operate in your community. As Richard Collins argues, "What weakened the Canadian state yet further was the fatal trap that every attempt to grasp such a collective definition only drove the internal divisions yet deeper."[16]

English Canadian Culture: Anticipating the Effects of Globalization

I would like to, for a moment, complicate my argument thus far by evaluating the relevance of the study of national identity in the midst of the globalized New World Order of the 1990's. Or to phrase this in the form of a question, has the singular discussion of Canadian or English Canadian identity become something of a moot point? Ien Ang has asserted that "in the increasingly integrated world system there is no such thing as an independent cultural identity; every identity must define and position itself in relation to the cultural frames affirmed by the world system."[17] This is, of course, a trend that has been recognized and monitored for a number of years now, and has been felt perhaps most dramatically in Europe, as I will discuss in a moment. Ultimately, globalization and modernity have greatly affected the ways in which people conceive of their national identities, due to the manners in which the New World Order has shifted the emphasis from the boundaries and blocs of the Fordist era to a more fluid, though still decidedly hegemonic, global model in which information, capital, cultural signifiers and products infiltrate the nations of the world with greater ease. Ian Angus echoes this sentiment, stating that "We are now situated in a period of transition from the prior consensus of permeable Fordism towards a new hegemonic formation that will come about in a world of globalization and new social movements. In this period the politics of

national identity may well go the route of the declining influence of the nation-state."[18]

Canada, however, has long experienced these characteristics of globalization that have only recently begun to affect other cultures around the world. The history of Canada's economic dependency on the United States in this century -- precipitated by geographical circumstance, lack of political autonomy as a colonial outpost, and ultimately manifested in the form of a branch plant economy reliant upon and subject to the whim of the imperial elephant to the south[19] -- has resulted in the tremendous difficulty of the Canadian body-politic to regulate the flow of American cultural products and signifiers within Canada. In the opinion of some, the situation of the last one hundred years or so has had the effect of Americanizing Canadian society, or erasing in Canada any significant marks of distinction between it and the United States. Prominent media scholars have in fact discussed Canada as though it were nothing more than a "miniature replica" of the United States.[20] Thus, the infiltration of media and other information flows has been perceived as a kind of cultural scourge, wiping out whatever was there before and replacing it with the values and products of the source of the media dissemination, leaving the governing body of the dominated nation subservient to the wishes of the foreign corporations who run a good majority of the country's key industries. As Richard Collins argues: "New electronic distribution technologies make possible large transnational publics for information and culture and an international market-place that can only be weakly controlled by nation-states. Technological change is, at least potentially, globalizing the Canadian condition."[21]

In a sense, then, Canada can be seen as a kind of early prototype for the situation faced by many industrialized nations who are experiencing a crisis of cultural identity in

the face of the penetrating presence of American and trans-national cultural products. Ien Ang has further asserted that in Europe it has already reached the point where "American cultural symbols have become an integral part of the way in which millions of Europeans construct their cultural identities."[22] This situation has existed for so long in Canada that, as I will further argue later in this chapter, Canadian-ness is frequently defined in relation to American qualities and characteristics, though notably often only in terms of opposition (i.e., we may not know who *we* are, but we do know we are not *them*). Another parallel between the current cultural climate in Europe and the Canadian condition is evidenced in David Morley and Kevin Robins' article, "No Place Like *Heimat*: Images of Home(land) in European Culture". In it, Morley and Robins extensively discuss the cultural identity crisis being experienced by many Europeans in a section they entitle "Where is Europe Anyway?".[23] The similarity of this query to Northrop Frye's indelible summation that the essential question within Canadian identity is "Where is Here?" is very telling. This question seems to arise out of the sense that one's location -- not just in a physical sense but rather in a frame of mind; one's place of existing if you will -- is in fact not one's own, and is instead subject to a constant flux imposed upon it from an outside source or sources.

The fact that Europe, which arguably has faced an identity crisis of its own kind for a long time, seems to have come, primarily as a result of the effects of Americanization, to the same kind of cultural identity crisis as Canada is very telling. It is as if the New World Order of globalization -- the collapsing of boundaries and free movement of information flows -- has created in Europe a situation similar to that which Canada has continually encountered, in which people experience a vagueness in their

cultural identities, due, in no small part, to ubiquitous American cultural products and signifiers. There are, of course, some key differences between the European crisis of identity and the Canadian. In fact, the aggressive sense of desperation and assertive approach to facing and remedying the problem(s) generally evinced by European scholars, as well as the factors by which they gauge European identity (such as ethnic, religious, and territorial issues) suggests that their experience relates to more of a loss of a lived identity than an inability to actually determine one.[24] Indeed, the very notion of attempting to determine an all-encompassing European identity, as opposed to locating Hungarian or Dutch or Irish or French identity, illustrates two important concepts: first, that the effects of globalization have produced in Europe a sense of fear and anxiety towards Americanism so strong that the idea of Europe as a whole has become a kind of safe haven or rallying point against the onslaught of American culture; and second, that this phenomenon again parallels Canada's process of identity determination, in that it involves a collection of various groups, be they ethnic, linguistic, religious or regional, who may not be able to express a definitive understanding of their collective identity, but are instead bound together by the idea that 'We may not know who *we* are, but we do know we are not *them*, and we want to keep it that way'.

This tension and conflict within and between national identities can be attributed to the fact that the sense of nationalism practised and experienced within European cultures and even in Canada is no longer compatible with the economic, political, social and cultural environment of the modern world. The effects of globalization and modernity have not necessarily rendered nations obsolete, but they have dramatically altered the ways in which people are able to relate to nations. What is taking place in

Europe, then, can be seen as a type of growing pain, part of the process of transition between what Richard Collins often refers to as "old style nationalism" and the new nationalism required within the free-flowing structures of globalization. But in spite of talk of the declining role of the nation state in the globalized world, the role of nationalism will continue to be a prominent one, albeit in a modified form. As Morley and Robins elaborate, "whilst it is increasingly clear that technological and economic transformations are surpassing the regulatory capacities of the nation-state, there is, at the ideological level, still an obsessive and regressive 'desire to reproduce the nation that has died and the moral and social certainties which have vanished with it...to fudge and forge a false unity based on faded images of the nation'. National ambitions and endeavours will not simply disappear'."[25]

Expressions of national identity will eventually, in one manner or another, adapt or change in some way to accommodate the shifting needs and priorities of the globalized world. Richard Collins has argued that Canada in fact has been on the forefront of this transition for some time, and that the progress towards a new relationship with nationalism has been slowed by the lingering mentality of a past era:

> Canada, though deficient as a national home of the old-fashioned kind, has successfully created a tolerant, prosperous, and decent community, which Trudeau customarily named 'the peaceable kingdom'... But Trudeau's recognition of Canada's achievement and Canada's potential to act as a role model for an internationalizing world has not been incorporated into the Canadian self-image. Rather the phenomena that, from a Trudeauesque optic, are achievements and advantages still appear as problems. Canada is a new kind of community misrecognized by old-style nationalism. The irony is that the old style nationalism is dominant in Canada."[26]

However, recent events within Canada's political culture seem to indicate the beginning of a decline in this old style nationalism and a move instead towards a more fluid, decentralized political structure that emphasizes the expression of regional concerns over the imposition of federal mandates. This 'social union,' as it has been called, is an interesting animal indeed and seems to have arisen as a kind of antidote against the constitutional crises and failed attempts at 'national' unity that have plagued the country for nearly a quarter-century. What the social union represents more than anything is the recognition that the approaches associated with 'old style nationalism' have done nothing to address the concerns of the nation-state as a whole, and that a new approach to national concerns is required. The proposed social union further indicates that Canada is beginning to incorporate aspects of an internationalized world into its self image, forging a new kind of relationship to its national identity. My goal in the discussion that follows is to illustrate the manner in which English Canadian culture has had a kind of head-start in adjusting to and adopting this newer nationalism more suited to the globalized New World Order.

English Canadian Culture: Substantiating Absence

I would like to move here towards a discussion of specific elements of English Canadian identity, with the hope that my efforts are not seen as reductive and simplistic, but rather as a concise framework that is in no way meant to be definitive. Other attempts to classify the cultural components of English Canada have either led to the conclusion that English Canada does not constitute a nation and therefore cannot possess a national culture, or have tended to focus instead on the manner in which issues of industry and economy can be seen to create a definitive outline for the construction of a distinctive

English Canadian consciousness. In fact, this notion of constructing an identity has been viewed as a key element of English Canadian discourse. Richard Collins has argued that "English-Canadian nationalists have had to invent the nation to which they feel they belong. These inventions have a precarious character and are often distinguished by an overwhelming sense of the fragility of English-Canadian identity."[27] Furthermore, he states that "it is often argued that such a conception of identity is simply whistling in the wind and that the English Canadian experience is one of absence; English Canada simply does not have an integrating history or culture in the way that Quebec or other nations do."[28] On the other hand, Hardin suggests that the source of an English Canadian consciousness can be found within the social-industrial structure of English Canadian society, singling out "'a public enterprise culture,' a redistribution culture,' and 'a public broadcasting culture'" as the legs upon which the table of English Canadian identity stands.[29] Though I feel there is much validity in the notion of English Canada as a culture of absence, as I will illustrate further in the next two chapters, I also believe that specific elements of English Canadian culture, which in some ways can be seen as expressions of an inherent absence, can be identified and deserve attention.

For the purposes of this paper, then, I have decided to focus on three aspects of English Canadian identity, which can be seen not as founding elements of the societal infrastructure identified by Hardin, but rather as expressive characteristics voiced through artistic works: a relation to wilderness; a relation to technology; and a relation to the United States. I do not propose that these are the only criteria by which English Canadian culture can be judged, nor do I suggest that every cultural product produced by an English Canadian contains one or several or all of these traits. Rather, these are characteristics

that seem to best personify the ways in which English Canada has positioned itself in relation to its own history as well as the world within which it exists. It is important to note that these traits are best understood *in relation* to that which provides their substance and definition. This is an indicator of the extent to which English Canadian culture is based upon reacting to outside influences or perceived threats, a result no doubt of its colonial history and the ever-present threat of manifest destiny posited by the United States.

Ian Angus has asserted that there are "two main abiding themes throughout the history of definitions of English Canada: political continuity articulated through the intervention of the federal state and a sense of break, of difference, elucidated through relationship to the land, nature, environment. These two themes are the temporal and spatial dimensions of English Canadian identity."[30] Angus suggests that the role of wilderness, and by this I mean a relationship to the land, nature, and the surrounding environment, takes the place of a founding national mythology in the English Canadian context. Since English Canada, unlike the United States, has never had a revolution, it therefore lacks a determined beginning, a sense of establishing one's own identity and forging it into a national character. The importance of the wilderness then lies in its role as an historical and social reference point for a culture which has not provided any definitive reference points of its own making. "In revolutionary traditions," Angus continues, "time suggests discontinuity and thus difference from Europe... In the English Canadian sense, by contrast, geography becomes important for identity where history has failed to provide it."[31] Angus elaborates further on the role of the wilderness in English Canadian identity with reference to insights provided by other scholars and intellectuals:

> Cole Harris has documented the continuing appeal of the demanding northern environment as a source of identification, in opposition to the American myth of nature as a garden... Margaret Atwood has suggested the theme of survival against 'menace, not from an enemy set over against you but from everything surrounding you' as the unifying national symbol. Northrop Frye has claimed that the abiding theme in English Canadian literature is not the establishment of identity but the question 'Where is here?' which Robert Kroetsch sees as leading to a predominance of characters who have no name.[32]

Furthermore, the assertion by Atwood that the English Canadian condition is typified by "'menace, not from an enemy set over against you but from everything surrounding you,'" serves as another example of English Canadian culture that has pre-dated the effects of globalization. So prevalent is the relation to wilderness within Canada that even spontaneous sociological events have been interpreted in terms of the manner in which they reflect the mixture of fascination, affinity, and fear of nature held by Canadians. Recently, the death of former Prime Minister Pierre Trudeau's son Michel in an avalanche while skiing in British Columbia was met with a tremendous show of sympathy and remorse around the country. Though Trudeau has long been a public figure of considerable mystique, the public response to his son's death was seen by many as related as much to the nature of his death as to the celebrityhood of his family. Michael Bliss, in attempting to explain the swell of national interest in the incident, observed that "Trudeau had a relationship with Canada's natural environment and with the Canadian outdoors that no other prime minister has had. Clearly his son was replicating his father's love of Canada's wilderness, and that resonates with Canadians."[33]

The relevance of nature and wilderness within English Canadian identity, though, is most directly expressed in Angus' assertion above that the environment provides for

Canadians the sense of space and place that has otherwise been unavailable to them, either due to their own inaction or to the imposition of British or American will upon them. The relationship with wilderness, then, reflects "not so much a geographical determinism as a continuing mediation on place, experienced often as a dangerous, identity-undermining threat that requires the winning of an always tentative security through the imposition of human will in technology."[34] Traditionally then, the English Canadian relation to technology is also concerned with the attempt to establish a sense of place within a placeless world; of utilizing the tools of a modern industrial society as the means to establish modern and industrial characteristics within the vast landscape and historical vacuum that English Canada is faced with.

However, the relation to technology has also manifested itself in ways concerned less with the imposition of technology on the environment and more with the effects of the imposition of technology upon us from outside sources. After more than a half-century of living with the reality of the omnipresence of the American media, English Canada began to express a distinct sense of anxiety, fear, and at the very least a keen sense of awareness of the effects that American media either were having or, perhaps more ominously, were intended to have on the Canadian consciousness.[35] It is through the relation to technology, then, that English Canada expresses not only its apprehensions towards the outside world, but also its insight on the manners in which technology, as a tool of cultural imperialism, affects the course of human social development. Arthur Kroker, in fact, has identified the "highly original, comprehensive, and eloquent discourse on technology" as "Canada's principal contribution to North American thought,"[36] and has furthermore asserted that "the Canadian mind may be one of the main sites in modern

times for working-out the meaning of technological experience."[37]

This practice of reflecting on the impact of technology on society and everyday life can be seen in many respects as a result of Canada's colonial history, both in terms of British rule and American hegemony, which has resulted in a mentality of passive awareness and a tendency towards analysis rather than action. To paraphrase Donald Creighton, Canada can be seen as a society which has bred a race of passionate observers, a people who are situated within the world community in ways that allow them to look but not touch, or to participate but not administrate. Kroker has elaborated on this theme, asserting that Canadian thought and discourse exist "*midway* between the future of the New World and the past of European culture, between the rapid unfolding of the 'technological imperative' in American empire and the classical origins of the technological dynamo in European history. The Canadian discourse is neither the American way nor the European way, but an oppositional culture trapped midway between economy and history."[38] This position, coupled with the intense and consistent barrage of cultural products from the American media and image industry for the better part of the past century, has afforded Canadians a particularly keen insight into the technological workings of modern society.

In his discussion of the various manifestations of the Canadian discourse on technology, Kroker raises examples of how English Canadian artists in various fields have expressed this theme through their work. He mentions, for example, how the rock trio Rush "has been embraced by a wider North American audience because in songs like *New World Man* ('He's a rebel and a runner; a stoplight turning green') it has captured the dynamic *willing* which is at the centre of technological society."[39] Kroker also discusses

the music of Bruce Cockburn, "who in songs like *The Trouble with Normal* and *Civilisation and its Discontents*, provides a haunting reminder of that which has been lost by our absorption into the fully modern technical empire of the United States."[40] With regard to cinema, Kroker draws attention to the manner in which "the celebrated and pioneering animation productions of the National Film Board of Canada as well disclose the meeting of the creative imagination and technology in the Canadian mind."[41]

The films of David Cronenberg and Atom Egoyan are also indicative texts within this discourse. Egoyan's second film, *Family Viewing* (1987), features a family whose members each use video technology as a means of relating to something dear to them, be it their sex life, their lost childhood, or each other. Though the movie is shot primarily with film stock, Egoyan accentuates the impact of technology on the family's interpersonal relationships by presenting the scenes which occur in the home as grainy video images in which the shot composition and blocking is similar to that in a TV sitcom or soap opera. In an early scene, a conversation between Van, a principled but morally confused young man, and his step mother is punctuated by a laugh track and the sounds of applause from a television show Van is watching, amplified to seem as though it naturally accompanies their own conversation. Egoyan's third feature, *Speaking Parts* (1989), also concerns characters who are morally adrift, with no conception of their individual identities, who cling to technology (again, video) in an attempt to fill the void in their lives. Cronenberg's films have consistently featured commentaries on the effects of technology on society and on the individual's role in society. The movie most relevant to my discussion here, though, is *Videodrome* (1982), a horror film in which "an enthusiastic global corporate system which makes inexpensive glasses for the third world

and missile guidance systems for NATO" has developed a program which causes the formation of brain tumours in its viewers, which in turn induce the viewers to hallucinate to the point where their hallucinations will "change human reality". Most famously, *Videodrome* features a scene in which Max (James Woods) is seduced by his television set, with which he then proceeds to engage in a kind of techno-erotic asphyxiation by inserting his head through the screen and into the pulsating set itself. Some scholars have recently noted the manner in which this and other Cronenberg films have curiously prophesied the effects of technology in the modern world, with *Videodrome* keenly pointing towards "today's quest for psychosexual fulfilment on the Web."[42]

And surely the pinnacle example of English Canada's insight into the effects of modernity and globalization is Marshall McLuhan, who, picking up from Harold A. Innis, in many ways pioneered the study of the 'global village' within which we live today. Kroker also notes that perhaps McLuhan's most important contribution to the Canadian discourse on technology was that he "wished to escape the 'flat earth approach' to technology, to invent a 'new metaphor' by which we might 'restructure our thoughts and feelings' about the subliminal, imperceptible environments of media effects."[43] English Canadian identity, then, can be seen as having been shaped by the impact of technology from an outside source, and has attempted to substantiate its idea of self by expressing and analysing the void created by technological imposition.

One can see within English Canadian identity, then, a desire to see beyond the reference points of media itself, and the various other tools of cultural and economic hegemony, and examine the inner workings of the ways in which hegemony is achieved and maintained. Richard Collins has suggested that because of this tendency within

English Canada, "a distinctively Canadian emphasis has pre-echoed global preoccupations and exemplified a general contradiction -- that between the political and ideological forces of nationalism and the forces exerted by modern mass communications."[44] It is through this process that English Canada has found a voice for national expression, and why it can be seen as an example of the new form of nationalism required within the framework of globalization and modernity. As Arthur Kroker argues, "the Canadian discourse is, then, a way of seeking to recover a voice by which to articulate a different historical possibility against the present closure of the technological order."[45]

For the reasons I have just discussed, the practice of viewing Canadian national culture and expression as an entity oppressed and dominated by American interests, as I discussed in Chapter II, has become very much outdated. If we accept the validity of the assertion that nation-states as we know them have become somewhat obsolete within the framework of modernity and globalization, then we must also realize that conceptions of national identity and expression are also adapting in relation to the newer forces at hand in global communications. Though dominant interests are still prominent and in no way seem to be receding in either power or position -- as plainly evidenced by the recent plethora of corporate mergers, the persistent advancements of trans-national corporations within communications and cultural industries around the world, and the sustained influence of watchdog organizations such as the MPAA -- the old paradigm of cultural dominance/imperialism as the elephant that stamps across the border and crushes our will and ability to express national concerns and sovereign interests no longer seems to apply. Rather, English Canada serves as an example of a culture that has both adapted to and

drawn strength for cultural expression from the turbulence brought about by the decline in influence of the nation-state and the related difficulties this has imposed on the expression of national identities. To reiterate this point, Morley and Robins have noted how Eric Hobsbawm

> argues that the nation state is in retreat, and that any future history of the world 'will inevitably have to be written as a history of a world which can no longer be contained within the limits of *nations* and *nation-states* as these used to be defined, either politically, or economically, or culturally, or even linguistically. It will see *nation-states* or *nations* or ethnic/linguistic groups primarily as retreating before, resisting, adapting to, being absorbed or dislocated by, the new supranational restructuring of the globe'.[46]

English Canada, then, with its historical inability to determine a national identity within the framework of old style nationalism related to the nation-states of a bygone era, has found that the shift in emphasis from nation-states to a more fluid relationship with nationality has opened up a new realm of possibilities for the expression of national identity. The *presence* of conflict between the nation-state and national expression, trans-national communications companies and state regulating committees, the free flow of information and nationalist protection policies, has helped fill the inherent *absence* within English Canadian culture.

Looking for a Place to Happen: The Tragically Hip and an Expression of New Nationalism

In this regard, I would like to briefly turn attention towards a group of artists whom I feel serve as a prime example of the manner in which English Canadian artists are on the cusp of forging a new conception of nationalism, and one which can be directly attributed to the tensions created by the trends of globalization and modernity which I

have discussed above. The musical group The Tragically Hip, who hail from Kingston, Ontario, have been for the duration of the 1990's arguably the most popular English Canadian band in the country. Their songs, with lyrics written by lead vocalist Gordon Downie, often probe issues of historical, political, and sociological significance within English Canadian culture, which perhaps explains their enormous (and in many ways unprecedented) popularity in Canada, as well as their complete anonymity in other countries, such as the United States.[47] However, the actual content and subject matter of their music is only a part of their appeal within English Canada. Perhaps most importantly, their songs, which tend to favour the more expansive and expressive parameters of poetry over the narrative restrictions of pop song formula, employ a very idiosyncratic discourse that positions their work outside of, and in many instances in opposition to, the dominant American discourse.[48] In analysing the songs of The Hip I am proceeding from McLuhan's assertion that "'The mind of the artist is always the point of maximal sensitivity and resourcefulness in exposing altered realities in common culture.'"[49] Quite honestly, their work warrants the attention of an entire paper this size. I will focus here however on two particular songs that pertain to my discussion thus far.

"Save the Planet" and "Fireworks", from The Hip's seventh and most recent album, *Phantom Power* (1998), are both explicitly aware of the possibilities for expression presented by the shift in priority of nation-states in the post-modern world, and are also concerned with the process of locating English Canadian national identity within this context. The two songs work to complement each other, raising issues and concerns that the other in turn addresses. "Save the Planet", which precedes "Fireworks" on the album, introduces the situation by directly drawing attention to the failure of the

Canadian nation-state to provide a solid conception of Canadian identity. The song's first verse ("The man 'cross the street he don't move a muscle / though he's all covered in dust / when constitutions of granite can't save the planet / what's to become of us"), expresses a sense of anxiety over the lack of a definitive national self-image within the English Canadian consciousness. "Covered in dust" suggests that any remnants of the old conception of nation-states are obsolete, while "constitutions of granite" that "can't save the planet" is a sarcastic, and deeply cynical reference to the numerous failed attempts (i.e., the repatriation of the Constitution in 1982, the Meech Lake Accord in 1990, the Charlottetown Accord in 1992) to preserve the Canadian nation-state within the framework of old style nationalism, and also to the desire of many Canadians to believe that such constitutional patch-work would solve the country's identity crisis. "What's to become of us" implies that we are in a period of transition, of trying to figure out a better way of relating to our national identity.

The fourth verse ("That's when the powers of observation / come to the periphery town / and we carry their water / we don't make a sound") references the manner in which the hegemony of the dominant discourse, exemplified by the American and trans-national image industries ("the powers of observation"), perpetuates Canada's role as a branch plant of multinational industry, as a hewer of wood and drawer of water ("we carry their water / we don't make a sound"). This stanza, through its choice of words and imagery, references the process of cultural exportation practised by American and trans-national interests, an assertion supported by the line that follows ("and after gaining our resignation / they come through the chainlink fence"), which serves as a metaphor for the collapsing of barriers and the free flow of information that is so vital to sustaining the

hegemonic systems upon which dominant interests rely. Downie, the band's lyricist, manages to take this metaphor even further by utilizing language that alludes to key aspects of Canada's relationship with the United States, and in so doing implies that Canada's lack of self-determination can be attributed at least in part to its historical economic dependency on the United States. Prior to referencing the arrival of dominant interests in "the periphery town," Downie introduces this movement as "a tolerant hum from the core". The usage of the terms "core" and "periphery" in this context are a very clear allusion to the principles of dependency theory, which according to Dudley Seers was based on the idea "that the world consisted of a 'core' of dominant nations and a 'periphery' of dependent ones," and that it is the dominant core's "external influences that distort the process of development."[50] The song's finale, with Downie chanting "what's left to captivate us" and then reiterating "what's to become of us," hammers home the sense that nationalism as we know it has led English Canadian culture astray, and that new methods of defining and determining national identity must be turned to as alternatives. This kind of cultural questioning, manifested as a result of the tension inherent in international trends brought about in part by changes in the global communications industry, can be seen as an example of Arthur Kroker's assertion that "Canadian thought forces the question of what is the most appropriate response to the technological dynamo."[51] While "Save the Planet" expresses frustration over the failure of English Canadian culture to establish a clear understanding of its own identity, and laments the fact that a large portion of that identity may indeed be one of subordinance to American interests, "Fireworks" essentially picks up where "Save the Planet" leaves off and answers the question of "what's to become of us" with a decidedly optimistic

response. If "Save the Planet" looks back on Canada's political and social situation during the Fordist period, then "Fireworks" proceeds by celebrating the end of this period and looks forward to an international environment in which Canada's traits and characteristics, that proved so incompatible with the old conceptions of nation-states and nationalism, will benefit a stronger and more coherent idea of Canadian identity. The song begins by referencing perhaps the single most cohesive and binding event in contemporary Canadian culture ("If there's a goal that everyone remembers / it was back in ol' '72") with the kind of wistful tinge of nostalgia that implies a bygone era. The stanza that follows ("You said you didn't give a fuck about hockey / and I never saw someone say that before / you held my hand and we walked home the long way / you were loosening my grip on Bobby Orr") immediately shatters the stability and familiarity established in the first lines of the song and begins to take the narrative down a new path. Importantly, the lines "loosening my grip on Bobby Orr" and "loosening the grip on a fake cold war," which comes in the fourth verse, both serve as metaphors for the process through which the reliance on old-style nationalism has been broken, first by distancing oneself from an insular, navel-gazing ideal of Canadian culture (typified by hockey as the ultimate cultural icon), and then by distancing oneself from the boundaries and blocs of the Fordist period, typified by the polarization of political and cultural beliefs inherent within the cold war. Furthermore, by referring to the cold war as fake, Downie acknowledges the manner in which national and cultural sentiments are constructed out of a socio-political context.

The song succeeds in making such statements on national identity and cultural expression by posing the nation as a metaphor for the domestic ("We hung out together

every single moment / 'cause that's what we thought married people do / complete with the grip of artificial chaos / and believing in the country of me and you"). By using marriage as a metaphor for the relationship between citizen and nation and describing marriage as a crutch, Downie effectively criticizes the need of the nation to create an overwrought sense of dependency ("the grip of artificial chaos") to inspire faith within the citizen. The conventional conception of nationalism, then, is seen as something that has received too much emphasis in the process of self-definition within the 'relationship'. Freeing yourself from the restrictive parameters imposed by the nation thus opens up new areas of possibility ("Isn't it amazing what you can accomplish / when you don't let the nation get in your way / no ambition whisperin' over your shoulder / isn't it amazing you can do anything"). The song directly acknowledges the slide towards obsolescence taken by the nation-state, while at the same time describing the position which nationalism is still expected to fill within many cultures ("Fireworks exploding in the distance / temporary towers soar / fireworks emulating heaven / til there are no stars any more"). Interestingly, Downie has stated that these two stanzas (the second of which reads "Fireworks aiming straight at heaven / temporary towers soar / til there are no stars shining up in heaven / til there are no stars any more"), which I interpret as describing the last bursts of the nation-state, were actually intended as commentary on the fleeting nature of the star system inherent within American celebrityhood.[52] It is fitting, actually, that an observation on the nature of American stardom as a product of waning influence would so seamlessly translate into a statement on the decline in importance of the nation-state within contemporary culture, since the American and trans-national image industries have traditionally relied so heavily on 'star power' to sell their products (and hence the

ideological baggage they carry with them) to consumers both domestic and international in an attempt to bolster and maintain their influence in the world market. Finally, the last lines of the song ("this one thing probably never goes away / I think this one thing is always supposed to stay / this one thing doesn't have to go away") strike a decidedly optimistic note for English Canadian identity by acknowledging the existence of characteristics that have contributed to the difficulty in determining English Canadian identity (the "one thing" Downie refers to is not a specific causal element, but rather the net result; that the absence, the very lack of substance that typifies English Canadian identity is in and of itself a central component of who we are) and emphatically insisting that it can act as a site of empowerment, that it "doesn't have to go away."

Thus, it could be argued that the music of The Tragically Hip, along with the work of the other artists I have discussed, succeeds in expressing distinctly English Canadian concerns despite the obstacles and conditions that would seem to render even the existence of such expression impossible, and therefore supports Richard Collins' assertion that "The central proposition of the media-imperialism thesis -- that there is an equivalence between national interest, identity, survival, and communication and cultural sovereignty -- remains to be demonstrated. The Canadian case may well exemplify a reverse thesis -- that nations can survive in robust health even when their media are, as Tunstall put it, American."[53] However, this argument, particularly the degree to which English Canada's identity as a nation can be referred to as "robust," must be more closely scrutinized. It will serve well here to remember Kroker's assertion that the English Canadian discourse exists "midway" between the ideologies of America and Europe. In other words, from the point of view of the dominant discourse, English Canadian cultural

expression lacks substantive reference points and exists neither here nor there, a factor which further contributes to English Canada's status as a culture of absence.

Thus, even if one accepts that English Canadian culture can be defined and identified, there still exists a great deal of difficulty in terms of positioning English Canadian culture and identity in relation to other discourses, particularly that of the dominant ideology. This is ultimately manifested in what Michel de Certeau has identified as the "strategies" of the powerful and the "tactics" of the weak. Morley elaborates on this concept, explaining that "The weak are not totally powerless, but, given their lack of control over institutions and resources, they have to operate in the margins (temporal and spatial) left (defined) by those who do control such institutional resources."[54] In the next chapter I will examine the manner in which the expression of English Canadian culture is complicated by the fact that its institutional resources are controlled by dominant American interests, against which English Canadian culture must constantly struggle to define itself, and explore in greater detail the manner in which English Canadian culture is marginalized by the dominance of the American discourse in Canada.

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1. Stephen Clarkson, "Canadian-American Relations: Anti-Nationalist Myths and Colonial Relations," *Nationalism, Technology and the Future of Canada*, ed. Wallace Gagne (Toronto: Maclean-Hunter Press, 1976) 107.

2. Ian Angus, *A Border Within* (Montreal: McGill-Queens UP, 1997) 112.

3. Angus 26.

4. Richard Collins, *Culture, Communication, and National Identity* (Toronto: U of Toronto P, 1990) 21.

5. Angus 22.

6. Angus 23.

7. Angus 27.

8. Angus 23.

9. Angus 27.

10. Immanuel Wallerstein, "The National and the Universal: Can There be Such a Thing as World Culture?" *Culture, Globalization, and the World System*, ed. Anthony D. King (Minneapolis: U of Minnesota P, 1997) 98.

11. Ray Peck, in Manjunath Pendakur, *Canadian Dreams and American Control* (Detroit: Wayne State UP, 1990) 132.

12. Pendakur 133-34.

13. Seth Feldman, *Take Two* (Toronto: Irwin Publishing, 1984) viii.

14. Angus 32.

15. John T. Woods, "A Cultural Approach to Canadian Independence," *Nationalism, Technology, and the Future of Canada*, ed. Wallace Gagne (Toronto: Maclean-Hunter Press, 1976) 93.

16. Collins 188.

17. Ien Ang, "Culture and Communication," *European Journal of Communication*, (London: Sage Publications, 1990) 253.

18. Angus 24.

19. Trudeau once observed that Canada's plight in terms of its relationship with the U.S. was much like sleeping next to an elephant; no matter how mild tempered or well behaved the beast is, or believes it is behaving, one cannot help but be affected by every little twitch and grunt.

20. Edward S. Herman and Robert W. McChesney, *The Global Media* (London: Cassell, 1997) 157.

21. Collins 9.

22. Ang, "Culture and Communication" 256.

23. David Morley and Kevin Robins, "No Place Like *Heimat*," *Space and Place: Theories of Identity and Culture*, ed. Carter et al. (London: Lawrence and Wishart, 1993) 18.

24. For an extended discussion on the effects of globalization on European cultural identities, see any of the following: Doreen Massey, "A Place Called Home?" *New Formations* No. 17 (Summer 1992) 3-15.; David Morley and Kevin Robins, *Spaces of Identity* (London: Routledge, 1995); Erica Carter et al. *Space and Place: Theories of Identity and Location* (London: Lawrence and Wishart, 1993); J. Martin-Barbero, *Communication, Culture and Hegemony* (London: Sage Publications, 1987).

25. David Morley and Kevin Robins, *Spaces of Identity* (London: Routledge, 1992) 31.

26. Collins 23.

27. Collins 125.

28. Collins 125.

29. qtd. in Collins 126.

30. Angus 114.

31. Angus 114.

32. Angus 114-15.

33. *Vancouver Sun* 21 Nov. 1998.

34. Angus 115.

35. The origins of this discourse can be traced to Harold A. Innis who, in the early 1950's -- most notably in *The Bias of Communication* -- began analysing the ways in which the relationship between time and space was being distorted by the effects of media and the practices of an increasingly capitalistic system in the Western world.

36. Arthur Kroker, *Technology and the Canadian Mind* (Montreal: New World Perspectives, 1984) 7.

37. Kroker 8.

38. Kroker 7.

39. Kroker 8.

40. Kroker 8.

41. Kroker 9.

42. Maurie Aliof, "Videodrome," *Take One* Vol. 6, No. 19 (Spring 1998) 24.

43. Kroker 56-7.

44. Collins 8.

45. Kroker 12.

46. Morley and Robins, *Spaces of Identity* 183.

47. During their coverage of the 1999 Juno Awards, the CNN program World Beat featured an expose on the Canadian music scene. After discussing the success of Canadian artists abroad, they then moved to discuss the viability of the indigenous music scene. The Tragically Hip were featured very prominently in this section, as the narrator explained that "some Canadians, phenomenally successful at home, just don't take to alien soil. One in six households owns a Tragically Hip album. But the band's focus on their home audience and their very Canadian lyrics tragically impede progress elsewhere."

48. It is primarily discourse -- that is, the manner in which ideas are expressed and connected -- that delineates the boundaries between the values and priorities of various ideologies. Many English Canadian musical artists, such as Bryan Adams, Alanis Morissette, and Shania Twain to name but a few, have enjoyed a great deal of success producing work that exists within the parameters of the dominant discourse. For this reason, I would not consider them English Canadian artists in the same sense as The Tragically Hip or other groups or artists (54-40, the Rheostatics, Spirit of the West, the Northern Pikes, Great Big Sea, Blue Rodeo, to name but a few) who communicate through a distinctly English Canadian discourse existing outside the dominant American ideology.

49. qtd in Kroker 58.

50. Dudley Seers ed. *Dependency Theory: A Critical Reassessment* (London: Frances Pinter Publishers Ltd., 1981) 15.

51. Kroker 12.

52. http://www.thehip.com

53. Collins 18.

54. David Morley, *Television, Audience, and Cultural Studies* (London: Routledge, 1995) 275.

CHAPTER IV

THE MARGINALIZATION OF ENGLISH CANADIAN CULTURE

Before beginning my discussion in Chapter V of the appropriation of English Canadian locales and images by the American and trans-national image industry, I would like to expand on the manner in which English Canadian cultural expression exists within the margins of its own nation. Since this is largely a result of the hegemonic structure maintained by the dominant American ideology and facilitated and perpetuated by Canada's inherent dependency, it seems appropriate to examine the role and function of ideological practices and how they impact on the development of cultural attitudes and expectations.

English Canadian Cultural Consciousness

The key to understanding the link between identity and expression would seem to be that of ideology. In other words, one expresses oneself by communicating through a particular ideology, which can be defined as a set of "ideas that buttress and support a particular distribution of power in society."[1] When I speak of the dominant ideology I am not necessarily referring to a particular entity, but rather to the manner and methods by which certain ideological principles govern the perceptions of a particular group of people. Ananda Mitra has argued that "by relating culture and ideology, it is possible to examine the internal contradictions within practices, thus informing culture itself.

Ideology introduces in the discussion the elements of struggle, contradiction and dominance, all of which are important in studying culture as a set of practices."[2] It is possible, then, to examine some of the internal contradictions within English Canadian culture -- such as the fact that recent studies show that a majority of English Canadians feel that Canadian networks need to broadcast more Canadian films and programs, while at the same time 79% of English Canadians prefer American television shows over Canadian programming[3] -- by analysing the elements of struggle created by the pervasiveness of the dominant American ideology in English Canada.

My goal here is to briefly examine the extent to which English Canadian artistic voices have been marginalized within the medium of film. It seems clear that English Canadian filmic discourse has been pushed so far to the periphery, so far from the dominant discourse exemplified by Hollywood and the concerns of trans-national media, that many of the forms of indigenous expression that have been produced appear incredibly foreign to those versed in the language of the dominant discourse, as Roger Ebert has noted in his observation that Canadian films often seem more foreign to American audiences than anything from Europe or Asia.[4] Of course, given the impact of the American media in influencing English Canadian consciousness, the same can also be said of English Canadians; that many of our own cultural products seem foreign to us because of the effects of American media on our cultural consciousness. Indeed, Arthur Kroker has argued that:

> The essence of the Canadian intellectual condition is this: it is our fate by virtue of historical circumstance and geographical accident to be forever marginal to the 'present-mindedness' of American culture (a society which specializing as it does in the public ethic of 'instrumental activism'

> does not enjoy the recriminations of historical remembrance); and to be incapable of being more than ambivalent on the cultural legacy of our European past.[5]

The English Canadian discourse, positioned as it is between the ideologies of America and Europe, would seem to allow for forms of expression that offer perspectives divergent from those of other discourses, something which I illustrated in my discussion of The Tragically Hip in the last chapter. However, as I pointed out in Chapter II, the dominant American ideology has maintained its firmly entrenched hegemonic authority in Canada in part by ensuring, primarily through the control of distribution channels for cultural expression, that peripheral concerns remain on the periphery.

Essentially then, English Canadian culture is marginalized not only in relation to the dominant discourse exemplified by American and trans-national media products, but due to the dominance of this discourse in Canada, English Canadian culture exists in the margins within its own nation. For example, consider a comparison between two successful films, one Quebecois and the other English Canadian. On the one hand, Louis Sais' *Les Boys* (1997) managed to gross over $5 million within a few months of playing only in Quebec theatres.[6] On the other hand, Atom Egoyan's *The Sweet Hereafter* (1997), though its profile was bolstered by receiving the Grand Prix at the Cannes Film Festival and two high-profile Academy Award nominations (best director and best adapted screenplay), as well as being named on more top-ten-films-of-the-year lists in the United States than any other film released that year, grossed just under $3 million in Canadian theatrical release.[7] The inability of many English Canadian films to connect with English Canadian audiences, then, is not due directly to their lack of access to Canadian screens, but rather their inability to communicate through a discourse that is familiar to English

Canadians.

The unfamiliarity of English Canadian film to English Canadians is largely due to the fact that, in terms of utilizing the filmic form as a language of expression, the English Canadian cinema has evolved on a much different evolutionary scale than that of every other Western industrialized nation. This has largely been a result of Canada's dependent nature, discussed in Chapter I, which in turn has resulted in the continued state of deficiency and neglect of the infrastructure for feature films in English Canada (particularly in the distribution and exhibition sectors), brought about by the consistent inability of the federal government to both establish an independent industry and deter the expansion and economic dominance of the American industry. Magder has noted how Susan Crean asserts that:

> 'Canadian culture is consigned to an underground world where it cannot possibly function as a culture in the true sense of the word. This situation is abetted by the continentalist approach to economics, including cultural economics, and by defeatist policy-makers who...simply ignore the fact that U.S. investment in Canada has a stake in our continued cultural underdevelopment (and in the cultural receptiveness of the Canadian public)... Meanwhile, as the techniques for distributing mass culture expand, Canada is bound ever tighter to the U.S. empire.'[8]

The English Canadian filmic discourse that did evolve, then, is one that has existed both outside the realm of the dominant discourse and separate from the ideological concerns of the national consciousness. As a result, a people existing in a nation where their own cultural and ideological consciousness is marginalized have, by virtue of circumstance, been capable of creating only a marginalized mode of expression. As Chatterjee has explained, "To make a claim on behalf of the fragment is also, not surprisingly, to

produce a discourse that is itself fragmentary."[9] English Canadian cinema has thus evolved like an unwanted relative locked in a secret cell in the far reaches of the kingdom. Having never interacted with the other subjects on equal terms, it develops its own eclectic patterns of communication, even though it speaks the same language as the others.

However, the flip side to this argument demonstrates the degree to which English Canadian culture has been consumed by the dominant American discourse. For every individual, subsisting in the ideologically far-reaching realm of the kingdom, who has proven incapable of adopting the language of the dominant discourse (i.e. Guy Maddin, William MacGivillray, John Greyson) there are just as many Canadian countrymen who have not only proven capable of adapting to the language of the dominant discourse, but who converse in it so fluently that they have been invited to dine at the king's table on the basis of their contributions to the dominant culture (i.e. Norman Jewison, Ivan Reitman). Others still have been able to actually embody aspects of the very discourse in their own creative persona, resulting in a kind of iconic status within the dominant culture (i.e. Mary Pickford in the silent era, Michael J. Fox in the 1980's, Jim Carrey, Pamela Anderson Lee and Alanis Morissette in the 1990's). The significance of the success of such celebrities lies in the fact that even though they are often identified as Canadian (press clippings and interviews will occasionally mention this fact, bestowing upon it the same relevance attributed to their zodiac sign or their original hair colour), they are not *identifiable* as Canadian. Perhaps the most telling (and insulting) manner in which the Canadian-ness of such star personae is dismissed as irrelevant is the use of the label "Canadian-*born*", which seems to imply that their nationality is no more than a mere

geographic technicality that in no way interferes with their ideological and cultural affiliations to the United States. Indeed, it can be argued that their inherent amorphousness makes them rather valuable commodities in an industry that requires them to exude and personify a variety of ideological principles.[10] The Canadian-ness of such star personae, that is, their ability to be different from and yet exactly the same as the perceived American norm, ultimately propagates the idea of Canada as a place that exists somewhere else but nowhere in particular, a site of absence upon which the dominant ideology can write its own impressions.

Essentially then, with specific regard to filmic expression and film culture, the dominant American cultural discourse has been so prominent and so firmly entrenched in English Canadian society, that it has completely marginalized any other form of discourse to the extent that the following has occurred. First, those who do communicate in different discourse(s) seem, to the majority of the population versed in the American discourse, to be speaking in tongues. The cultural language that they construct has been pushed so far to the periphery and been marginalized to such a tremendous extent for such a long period of time, that it seems to have missed certain stages in the evolutionary ladder of cinema, making it seem, in many instances, *un*cinematic, *un*important, or, most alarming from a nationalist perspective, *un*pleasurable. Second, due to the proliferation of the dominant American discourse in Canada, those who do communicate through it artistically and creatively are able to speak the language fluently, making them virtually indistinguishable from the natives. However, due to their origins within a different anthropological culture, and therefore carrying with them many ideological distinctions, these Canadians are able to view matters within the dominant discourse in a different

light than an American, often to the extent that they either become capable of commenting on the discourse in very subtle ways, thereby enriching the dominant culture, or they understand the stipulations of discourse to such an extent that they are able to epitomise a specific aspect of the dominant society.[11]

As I noted in Chapters I and II, the nature of Canada's economic dependency on the United States has had profound implications for the manner in which the dominant ideology is filtered through to the English Canadian consciousness. I have also noted how this process has been abetted by the Canadian state, particularly in reference to the Canadian Co-operation Project, through which the federal government chose to align its vastly underdeveloped cultural policy to the needs of American industry, rather than establishing some form of regulation to strengthen the Canadian film industry and abate the advances of the American distribution and exhibition sectors of the industry, which eventually subsumed the Canadian distribution and exhibition sectors as part of the American domestic market. When the federal government has attempted -- beginning with the formation of the CFDC and CRTC in 1968 and continuing in the years that followed by more or less tinkering with these two institutions -- to develop a strong English Canadian culture, it has been forced to do so within the confines to which it has been relegated by its inauspicious past. Unable to curtail the flow of American cultural products (numerous attempts by government ministers have begun in a flourish of nationalist ballyhoo charged by the anticipation of cultural sovereignty, and have ended in a battle with the MPAA or other American organizations in which the minister is forced to withdraw when trade embargoes are threatened against a broad cross-section of the Canadian economy) or increase the access of Canadian films to Canadian theatres (1998

saw a 14% increase in screens with the expansion of Famous Players and Cineplex Odeon, and an increase in Canadian screen time from 1.45% to 1.7%[12]), the federal government is left to fund cultural products that can only reach the public through highly marginalized modes and channels.

This marginalization of the various forms of Canadian cultural expression is a result not only of the lack of physical access that Canadian have to the modes and channels of cultural distribution, but also to the manner in which the psychological reception of Canadian cultural products by Canadians is affected by the dominance of the American discourse within the English Canadian consciousness. As a people whose national consciousness is consistently characterized by features such as dependency, absence, and amorphousness, English Canadians have, perhaps quite logically, spawned a national culture that exists in the space between the desire to legitimate the 'national image' through the nations communication channels while simultaneously marginalizing the effectiveness of those very channels through a continual subordinance to the priorities of dominant interests. Thus, in addition to the marginalization of English Canadian cultural expression through film by the hegemonic authority exercised by dominant interests over the flow of cultural products in Canada, English Canadian culture is also marginalized within the shared consciousness of English Canadians by the gap which is created between the conception of what constitutes the national character and the actual existence of such conceptions in the lived identities constructed by English Canadians. This sense of there being a kind of enforced distance between the national ideal and the national reality is perhaps best exemplified within the Canadian broadcasting industry and the manner in which it is forced to exist and persist within the shadow created by the

dominance of the American commercial broadcasting system. Richard Collins has explained how this process arises as an inherent result of the structure within which Canadian broadcasting exists:

> The condition [of Canadian broadcasting]... is known by nationalists as 'cultural dependency' -- the subordinate relation of a peripheral to a metropolitan culture. It is to resist and transform this dependent relationship flowing from competitive market conditions that the Canadian state has promoted non-market institutions. A penalty attached to such practices; insulation of market conditions (the *raison d'être* of state policy and institutions) slows adaptation to changed conditions and (unless countervailing channels through consumers can express preferences are established) stifles responsiveness to demand.[13]

Thus, due to the necessity of the English Canadian discourse to exist and operate outside of and in opposition to the American discourse, English Canadian discourses are immediately marginalized and made subordinate within the priorities and structure of the dominant American discourse.

Joyce Nelson introduces her book *The Colonized Eye* with Jean-Paul Sartre's assertion that "We only become what we are by the radical and deep-seated refusal of that which others have made of us". The implication behind the use of this quote in the particular context of Nelson's book, which focuses on the influence of John Grierson's policies and beliefs on the landscape of Canadian cinema, would seem to be that Canadians, as a people colonized by the continentalist tendencies of its ruling elite and the economic imperialism of America, are only able to define themselves and achieve some level of self-determination by rebelling in some way against the dominant powers that be; against the dominant perceptions and conceptions of English Canada and English Canadians held and propagated by those who control the means of forming opinions, the

infrastructure of information dissemination, the 'powers of observation'. However, if Sartre's words of wisdom offer a set of directions, if you will, for the formation and definition of a particular distinct identity, then perhaps they also provide an explanation for the incredible difficulty experienced by English Canada in its attempts towards self-determination. In applying Sartre's comment directly to the English Canadian condition, one must pose the question, Has English Canada, in any kind of radical or deep-seated fashion, refused the conceptions formed of us by others? In attempting to answer this question one must first choose a particular avenue of investigation. Studies of English Canadian literature, for example, may reveal signs of such refusal, or perhaps at least resistance. The brief case study I provided in the last chapter of The Tragically Hip also serves as an example of how English Canadian music has, in many respects, successfully constructed its own discourse that exists outside, and in many ways in opposition to, the dominant American discourse.[14] However, the primary focus of this study is film and broadcasting media, the most prominent, pervasive and influential avenue available for cultural expression, and it seems sadly obvious that English Canada has not been able to, and perhaps in some instances has not been permitted to even come close to the kind of epiphanal refusal Sartre alludes to.

Effectively, then, the inability of English Canadians to perform such an act of self-definition not only propagates the conception of English Canada held by the dominant ideology, but is also a direct result of the extent to which such a conception is, in its own way, valid and accurate. In other words, there may in fact be a great deal of truth in Richard Collins' assertion that "there is an effacement of aggressive individualism in Canada that is distinctive and attractive,"[15] and that English Canada's amorphousness is in

part a result of the antipathy many English Canadians seem to feel towards the fact that their culture is essentially one of absence. Wilden echoes this assertion in his insistence that Canadians represent an "anomaly amongst a supposedly non-third-world people; a people whose 'national identity' is almost exclusively defined by *what we are not*."[16] My objectives for the remainder of this chapter are to illustrate the manner in which, from a purely economic and industrial perspective, English Canada's cultural amorphousness has in fact been an advantage in many aspects of the international image industry, while from the perspective of English Canadian identity and culture these developments have further solidified English Canada's inability to achieve substantial self-determination, suggesting that an inability to define ourselves, to perform Sartre's act of refusal, is perhaps in and of itself an essential component of English Canadian identity.

How 'Canadian' is the Film Industry in Canada?

That's when the powers of observation
come to the periphery town
and we carry their water
we don't make a sound.
-- The Tragically Hip

As I have previously illustrated, the development (or lack thereof) of the Canadian film industry is implicitly related to the behaviour, principles, and character of the Canadian state. Failure on the part of the federal government at numerous points in the first half of the century to either provide for the development of a feature film industry or prevent the take-over of the distribution and exhibition sectors by American interests can be seen as a development in keeping with the character of the Canadian state as a whole. As Magder explains:

> the establishment and growth of a commercial cinema in

> Canada shared a characteristic common to many other sectors of the Canadian economy: a heavy, almost exclusive reliance on foreign capital and goods. The Canadian political economy has been, and continues to be, the prototype of dependent industrialization among liberal democracies. The internationalization of first British and then American capital are the hallmarks of Canadian capitalist development. The history of the cinema in Canada is perhaps the clearest example of this dependent development in the sphere of cultural production. By the early 1930's, the emerging U.S. giants in the motion picture industry (firms such as Famous Players, Paramount, MGM, and Columbia) and their Canadian allies had established a branch plant distribution and exhibition network that controlled the Canadian market through monopolistic practices and ensured the dominance of foreign -- mostly American -- films. For the most part, Canadian capital was satisfied to assume an ancillary role. Canadian theatre owners (or exhibitors) were quite happy to play American films and seek out permanent arrangements with the Hollywood majors; a good living could be made showing American films."[17]

The "Canadian allies" Magder alludes to who helped propagate the branch plant structure within the Canadian film industry were primarily the Motion Picture Exhibitors and Distributors of Canada. This organization was nothing more than the Canadian bureau of the MPAA. The founding of the Motion Picture Exhibitors and Distributors of Canada in 1922 was one of the first official acts of the MPAA, also founded in 1922, and it effectively enabled the American majors to consolidate Canadian screens for their own benefit. As Joyce Nelson explains, "Hollywood's vertical integration could successfully proceed only if these two aspects of the industry, distribution and exhibition, were well enough entrenched in Canada to prevent indigenous films from playing on local screens."[18] Thus, with no infrastructure in place for the production of feature films and with no action on the part of the government to either address this fact or curtail the involvement of American business interests in the other two sectors of the industry

(distribution and exhibition), Canada rather effortlessly became a part of the domestic American market for motion pictures.

As I noted in Chapter I, the roots of Canada's economic dependency on an imperial centre, be it Britain or the United States, have often been perceived in light of Innis' staples theory, which argued that Canada's basic economic structure during its development as a nation-state was based on the extraction and exportation of a particular staple good -- fur, wheat, lumber, minerals, etc. -- to the dominant metropole where it was manufactured into a finished product which was then exported to other countries, including Canada, for the benefit of the dominant business interests overseeing production. Indeed, it has been argued that so ingrained was this process in the Canadian economic mind-set that it also came to determine the economic relationship between western and central Canada for the better part of this century, with the older established firms in Ontario forming the dominant metropole in relation to the peripheral western provinces who were utilized for the extraction of resources necessary for the success of businesses in central Canada. Collins, among others, has argued that staples theory is an insufficient component of dependency theory, which he also feels has failed "to have decisively demonstrated its contentions,"[19] and that Canada's economic situation, is not "one that necessarily has to be perceived as disabled by dependency,"[20] but rather can be more accurately explained by the restrictions placed on Canada by geographic and climatic circumstances.

However, it would be more accurate to suggest that all these aspects contributed equally in separate regards to the formation of Canada's economic character, and are in fact still affecting Canada's economic behaviour. One can see many aspects of Innis'

staples theory, for example, presently at play in the use of Canada, though primarily British Columbia and particularly Vancouver, as a branch plant for American film and television productions. The criteria Innis established for understanding the dynamics of staples theory can be directly applied to the current climate of American film production in Canada with a great deal of ease. "Agriculture, industry, transportation, trade, finance, and government activities," Innis argued, "tend to become subordinate to the production of the staple for a more highly specialized manufacturing community. These general tendencies may be strengthened by government policy as in the mercantile system but the importance of these policies varies in particular industries."[21] The more highly specialized manufacturing community in question here is of course Hollywood, which the B.C. film industry has come to serve by specializing not just in the production of American products for the international image industry, but more specifically in the making of syndicated television series and movies-of-the-week (MOW's), which represent the bulk of American productions in Canada. Recent statistics show that 80-85% of film production in B.C., the total of which in 1997 was $630 million[22] and in 1998 $808 million (not to mention more than $2 billion in spin-off revenues),[23] consists of American productions, be they film or TV programs. Largely as a result of such activity, B.C. is now the largest film production centre in North America behind Los Angeles and New York.[24] Also in evidence are the government policies Innis refers to, which not only encourage American film production activity in B.C., but in many respects make it possible. For example, B.C. Premier Glen Clark recently initiated an 11% tax credit for all foreign productions in B.C., in response to Ontario Premier Mike Harris' similar tax credit, which was aimed at drawing some of the American productions

away from Vancouver to Toronto. The producers of films and programs shot in Canada consider these policies, which also include Film Incentive B.C. and the Canadian Film or Video Production Tax Credit, a major incentive for shooting there.

The provincial governments not only ease and encourage the use of their geography, labour, and infrastructure as a branch plant for the international image industry, they also actively pursue it. In April 1998, just prior to instituting the 11% tax write-off to foreign productions, Premier Clark and his "Team B.C." of industry insiders made a three-day trip to Hollywood where they met with the top executives and decision-makers at 20th Century Fox, Paramount, MGM, and other prominent studios. Also, in October 1997, shortly after the announcement of an 11% tax credit offered by the federal government, the Canadian consulate in Los Angeles held a tax seminar focussing on the advantages and procedures involved in filming in Canada which drew more than 250 executives from all the major American studios.[25] As I pointed out in Chapter I, however, the desire to pursue economic security by establishing a branch plant of American industry in one's community or region is virtually engrained within the Canadian political and economic frame of mind. Michael Bliss has explained that at the turn of the century, when the Canadian confederation was still relatively young and the most recent economic credo was that of the Macdonald government's National Policy,

> every Canadian province, every Canadian city, every Canadian hamlet pursued its own 'national policy' of offering all possible incentives to capitalists and developers to come into its territory and establish manufacturing enterprises. The practice of granting bonuses to industries in the form of free sites, free utilities, tax concessions, loans, and outright cash grants was universal and persistent...[and] was responsible for the attraction of countless American branch plants to specific cities.[26]

In other words, the plight of Canadian culture is very much a result of the necessity, or at least the reality, of Canadian economics. As Magder explains, "Whereas dependency theorists might see Canada's feature film policy as being produced at the behest of the American film industry and the American state, I see it as being determined by forces within Canada that are influenced by the process of dependent capitalist development."[27]

At this point, however, a significant distinction must be made between the 'Canadian film industry' and the 'film industry in Canada'. While one can talk at length about the activities of the film industry in Canada, any such discussion of the Canadian film industry would prove impossible, or at the very least unproductive and misleading, for the simple reason that a Canadian film industry does not exist. A film industry per se is comprised of three sectors: production, distribution, and exhibition. Since Canadian firms exercise extremely limited control and influence within the distribution sector in Canada, and virtually none whatsoever in exhibition, a feature film industry that can be identified as Canadian simply cannot be located. One can, however, speak of a Canadian film production industry, since the production of feature films in Canada by Canadians is a viable, though highly marginalized, enterprise, and is even extensive enough in terms of capital (manpower as well as monetary) to warrant consideration as an industry in and of itself. Historically speaking, Michael Dorland has asserted that the only thing resembling a film production industry in Canada has been "a peripheral film production infrastructure sufficiently established to support the periodic emergence of discursive formations (among critics, filmmakers, producers, or government bureaucrats, for instance) that produce 'talk' about an imaginary or potential industry. In displaced national cinema contexts, it is the survival of these production elements that made possible the

continuation of the polemic. In this sense, the 'film industry' both exists and does *not* exist simultaneously."[28]

When one speaks of the film industry in Canada, then, one is generally referencing that portion of the American film production industry that has taken up shop in several Canadian urban areas (though primarily Vancouver and Toronto) as a cheaper alternative to shooting in the United States. Far from constituting a Canadian film industry, these productions, though often consisting of feature films with Hollywood budgets, primarily consist of syndicated television programs, designed for export as much as for domestic consumption, and MOW's which networks and studios favour for their low budgets and short shooting schedules and their ability to deliver time slots that demand relatively high advertising rates. In short, this 'film industry in Canada' can be seen as yet another manifestation of the branch plant economy at work between American business and Canadian labour: a raw material, which in this case can be either a location (chosen for its suitability for a particular production) or the labour itself (attractive for the financial advantage it offers in an industry notorious for stratospheric budgets) or both, is utilized for purposes laid out by American business interests, shipped back to the United States where its production as a finished product is completed,[29] and then exported around the world and back into Canada by way of the extensive and tightly controlled American distribution system. Taking into consideration both the dependent character of the Canadian state and its inability to provide the Canadian nation-state with a film industry equivalent in form and function to other Western industrialized states -- complicated further by the Canadian tendency to ignore the fact that resistance against the hegemonic order is nullified by its own dependent, branch plant economic structure -- it is helpful to

remember Dorland's explanation that, "for Tadros, Canadian policy development consisted in a dialogue of illusions, between, on the one hand, a production milieu given to massive self-delusion as to its own capacities, and, on the other hand, a state apparatus given to 'totally misguided readings of the industry workings'. The interaction between the two would produce film policies she characterized as 'the great lie'."[30] The 'film industry in Canada', then, requires Canadians to fulfil their somewhat familiar roles as hewers of wood and drawers of water within the new technological and economic parameters of the international image industry.

The question of how 'Canadian' is the 'film industry in Canada' not only concerns the preponderance of American stories, images and locales reproduced by Canadian labour for international consumption, but also, and perhaps more importantly, the difficulty in determining the 'Canadian' characteristics of actual Canadian programming. In many cases, the attitude of those within the Canadian broadcasting industry seems to be that American programs -- series that are at the very least set in America, featuring American characters and narrative tropes -- are simply a more economically viable undertaking than a program set in Canada with Canadian characters and narrative tropes. Collins notes how Caplan and Sauvgeau assert that "'what does sell, when we succeed in the big time, is in most instances American programs made in Canada. The actors and production personnel may be more or less Canadian, the locations usually neutralized by altering licence plates and taking down flags, may be Canadian, but the programs in their style and substance are American.'"[31] Collins also offers a practical, industrial explanation for this activity, arguing that "The availability of American services has denied Canadian commercial broadcasters revenue and raised audience expectations so

that Canadian programming must now offer gratifications to those of U.S. productions, which are funded by a revenue pool many times larger than that in Canada."[32] However, the assumption that Caplan and Sauvgeau seem to make here, which Collins also alludes to, is that there exists an identifiably Canadian style and substance that is simply passed over in favour of the more economically viable American model. A much more accurate argument, however, is that a Canadian filmic "style or substance" has been so marginalized by the dominance of the American narrative discourse in English Canada, made possible in no small part by the infiltration of American media in English Canada for more than half a century at the least, that it has become something of a matter of survival for business interests within the broadcasting industry to produce 'American' programs, even for consumption by Canadian audiences.

Indeed, many Canadians involved in these productions may not even feel that communicating through an American discourse threatens English Canadian identity, arguing instead that the creative energy and financial resources coming from Canadian individuals is enough to qualify the program as 'Canadian', irrespective of the actual ideological messages through which the program communicates. For example, Brad Wright, a Canadian and one of the producers and writers of *Stargate SG-1*, an American syndicated series shot in Vancouver (which will be discussed in detail in the next chapter), has publicly criticized the Canadian Gemini (equivalent to the Emmy) nominating committee for overlooking the show and its crew on the basis that it is an American program: "I'm a Canadian writer, a Canadian executive producer," Wright has exclaimed, "who hires Canadian actors, Canadian production designers, a Canadian crew. Yes, there is a certain amount of American money. Yes, it's sold to the American

market. But *Due South* was sold to the American market. It had to have a guy in a red Mountie suit to call it Canadian."[33] It would seem, in fact, that the only programs that do manage to employ a very identifiable Canadian 'style and substance' are those which diverge from the dominant discourse to such a tremendous extent, utilizing narrative tropes and character traits akin to the dominant discourse only in a highly ironic, satirical, and oppositional fashion, that they are either seen by Canadians as being extremely marginal and therefore are largely ignored (ie. Ken Finkleman's brilliant but short-lived 1997 CBC comedy *The Newsroom*), or are recognized as being so far from the dominant discourse that they provide a kind of perverse, cultish attraction that also, significantly, appeals to American viewers as well (ie. *SCTV, The Kids in the Hall,* and also, it can be argued, *Saturday Night Live*, produced as it is by Canadian Lorne Michaels and featuring a long history of Canadian writers and performers, including Dan Aykroyd, Martin Short, Phil Hartman, and Mike Myers).

The unwillingness of many Canadians to subvert the practices of the dominant discourse, preferring instead to enjoy the security provided within the international image industry, can perhaps be explained in part by Morley and Robins' assertion that "There is a fear of knowing the truth which can make people desire to limit their freedom of thought and thinking."[34] They go on to quote Jean Baudrillard, who suggests that "'The deepest desire is perhaps to give the responsibility of one's desire to someone else... Nothing is more seductive to the other consciousness (the unconscious?)...than not to know what it wants, to be relieved of choice and directed from its own objective will... One factor, at least, in the crisis of politics may well be the desire to not know, to not act. And it may be that television, particularly, functions to support the processes of

inhibition and evasion of anxiety." The particular process of television that Baudrillard is referring to here, of course, is that of consumption by an audience. I would propose, however, that the economic rewards available within the international image industry are attractive enough to have this same effect on those who produce the images for consumption. Again, referring back to Sartre's earlier assertion, the power of a Canadian 'style or substance' that might be identified, then, must involve a refusal of the ideological conceptions made of us and disseminated by the dominant ideology, which begins with a refusal of the ways in which that ideology operates. Therefore, a show like *Stargate SG-1*, regardless of the nationality of those involved in its creation, strongly reaffirms its affiliations to the values and priorities of the dominant ideology by complying with the conception of Canada held by the dominant ideology (as well as for all the other reasons I will illustrate later). On the other hand, consider the symbolism and implications that are apparent in the opening sequence of *SCTV*, which features a shot of dozens of television sets being thrown from the windows of an apartment complex, smashing to pieces on the street below.

English Canada, then, with its long history of dependency on British and then American capital, has developed a culture based in no small part on reacting and responding to the manner in which the agenda of the dominant power affects English Canadian perceptions of the world, both within the nation-state and outside of it. As Anthony King explains, "In any discussion about identities, the built environment of space and place is a crucial, critical factor which both inhibits as well as facilitates the construction of new individual as well as social identities."[35] Since American media have been so prevalent in Canada for so long, it should not be surprising then that they have

been as much a factor in the construction of social identities in this century as Canada's colonial history and the absence of a revolution were in influencing the Canadian character in the nineteenth century. Furthermore, when considering the factors of English Canada's built environment, that is, the cultural character that has been constructed over time, one must consider the milieu in which the events and attitudes that contributed to this environment occurred and were formed. As Ananda Mitra has argued, "Culture becomes imbedded within the structures of dominance that characterize society and the network of practices and relations within which particular individuals are positioned and identified."[36] Proceeding from this assertion, then, it can be said that an indelible aspect of English Canadian identity is one of subordinance, or obedience, to the dominant order; and that this aspect manifests itself in cultural forms and expressions either as modes of resistance to dominance or of acceptance. In the final chapter, I will elaborate further on the marginal and subordinate position of English Canadian identity and culture by discussing modes of acceptance in greater detail in my analysis of back lot Hollywood productions and the numerous syndicated American television programs that receive Canadian funding and production assistance.

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1. William O'Barr, *Culture and the Ad: Exploring Otherness in the World of Advertising* (Boulder: Westview Press, 1994) 2.

2. Ananda Mitra, *Television and Popular Culture in India: A Study of the Mahabharat* (New Delhi: Sage Publications, 1993) 45-6.

3. *Vancouver Sun*, September 24, 1998.

4. *Cinemania 95*. Microsoft. Review: *The Apprenticeship of Duddy Kravitz.*

5. Arthur Kroker, *Technology and the Canadian Mind* (Montreal: New World Perspectives, 1984) 7-8.

6. *Take One*. Vol. 6, No. 19 (Spring 1998): 40.

7. It should be noted that, relatively speaking, this is considered successful for an English Canadian film. *The Sweet Hereafter* is only the third English Canadian film made in the last fifteen years to actually turn a profit. The other two are Patricia Rozema's *I've Heard the Mermaids Singing* (1987), and Egoyan's 1994 film *Exotica*.

8. qtd. in Ted Magder, *Canada's Hollywood: The Canadian State and Feature Films* (Toronto: U of Toronto P, 1993) 16.

9. Partha Chatterjee, *The Nation and its Fragments: Colonial and Postcolonial Histories* (Princeton: Princeton UP, 1993) 13.

10. Keanu Reeves comes to mind as perhaps the epitome of this example. An actor whose most defining trait is perhaps his utter blankness, he has appeared in a stunningly broad range of projects: valley boy in the *Bill and Ted* movies; villain in Branagh's screen version of Shakespeare's *Much Ado About Nothing* (as well as Hamlet on the stage in Winnipeg); the Buddha in Bertolucci's *Little Buddha*; and a virile male action hero in *Speed*. Also, the manner in which his Canadian-ness has allowed him to side-step the traditionally thorny issue in Hollywood of ethnicity (his background is a mix of Chinese, Hawaiian, and Lebanese) further illustrates the advantage of such an amorphous persona within the dominant discourse.

11. Pamela Anderson Lee and Alanis Morissette are two English Canadians who have been extremely successful in understanding and exploiting the tropes and signifiers of two very different brands of femininity within American patriarchal culture. Anderson Lee has built her entire career around her ability to personify the image of the American sex goddess. Morissette, who began her entertainment career as a child actor on Canadian television and later became a Tiffany-esque teeny-bopper pop star, signed with Madonna's record label, Maverick, in the U.S. and reinvented herself as the new voice for female empowerment.

12. *Take One*, No.22 (Winter 1999): 51.

13. Richard Collins, *Culture, Communication, and National Identity* (Toronto: U of Toronto P, 1990) 158-9.

14. However, what I have not discussed but only alluded to briefly is the dizzying extent to

which English Canadian musical artists have both embraced and been embraced by the dominant discourse. Bryan Adams, Alanis Morissette, Shania Twain, and Sarah McLachlan to name but a few. The Barenaked Ladies, after years of being dismissed by Canadian music critics as too "pop" and banal, recently broke into the American market with the single "One Week," virtually a love letter to American pop culture. Thus, even though these artists are English Canadians, there is little that is especially English Canadian about their work, with the exception of their ability to so successfully decipher and emulate characteristics and traits of the dominant discourse.

15. Collins 23.

16. Tony Wilden, *The Imaginary Canadian* (Vancouver: Pulp Press, 1980) 138.

17. Ted Magder 4.

18. Joyce Nelson, *The Colonized Eye: Rethinking the Grierson Legend* (Toronto: Between the Lines, 1988) 81.

19. Collins 173.

20. Collins 163.

21. Harold A. Innis, *The Fur Trade in Canada: An Introduction to Canadian Economic History*, revised ed. (Toronto: U of Toronto P, 1973) 385.

22. *Vancouver Sun*, April 23, 1998.

23. *Vancouver Sun,* February 13, 1999.

24. *Vancouver Sun,* February 13, 1999.

25. *Vancouver Sun*, April 23, 1998.

26. Michael Bliss, "Canadianizing American Business," *Close the 49th Parallel*, ed. Ian Lumsden (Toronto: U of Toronto P, 1970) 33.

27. Magder 18.

28. Michael Dorland, "Policy Rhetorics of an Imaginary Cinema," *Film Policy: International, National, and Regional Perspectives*, ed. Albert Moran (London: Routledge, 1996) 120.

29. This process may take place only in an ideological form. Even if the entire production and post-production procedure takes place in Canada, the product itself is still seen to "come from" the United States.

30. Dorland 116.

31. Collins 275.

32. Collins 9-10.

33. Alex Strachan, "Stargate guru fills X-Files void," *Vancouver Sun* 9 Jan. 1999.

34. Morley and Robins, *Spaces of Identity* (London: Routledge, 1992) 194.

35. Anthony D. King, "The Global, the Urban, and the World," *Culture, Globalization, and the World System*, ed. Anthony King (Minneapolis: U of Minneapolis P, 1997)149-54.

36. Ananada Mitra, *Television and Popular Culture in India* (New Delhi: Sage Publications, 1993) 52.

CHAPTER V

THE PERPETUATION AND APPROPRIATION OF ENGLISH CANADA'S ABSENCE AND AMORPHOUSNESS

Canada's status as a dependent capitalist state has had a long history. The lack of autonomy engrained into the socio-political consciousness is a result of geographic circumstance, two hundred years of colonial rule, and over a century of economic dependency on a dominant power, all of which has made Canada the nation that it is, always subject to but constantly resisting -- or at least trying to convince itself that it is able to resist -- the ramifications of its own fate. As I illustrated in Chapter III, many characteristics of Canada's socio-economic character -- itself a product of history, a result of Canada's general evolution -- are now in evidence in other nation-states around the world, ostensibly a result of the effects of increasing globalization and the manner in which this has forced these nations to deal with the same kind of culturally threatened situation that has been continually faced by Canada. Also in the last chapter, I alluded to the commonly-held conception that the nation-state as we know it is teetering on functional obsolescence and that new imperatives -- market driven imperatives rather than those motivated by national concerns or sentiment -- will likely be the force shaping and determining the development, or should I say evolution, of the new nation-state.

If the traditional model of the nation-state is truly in retreat, then perhaps what

will replace it is a cluster of regional nationalities all vying for economic affiliation with the trans-national corporations that exist outside the boundaries and framework that restrict the current nation-states; clusters of peoples who identify themselves with particular nationalist traits, but at the same time place a greater emphasis on satisfying their specific economic requirements, willing to sacrifice the character of their culture for the benefits to be reaped from the culture of the market. Morley and Robins have explained how:

> The new culture of enterprise enlists the enterprise of culture to manufacture differentiated urban or local identities. These are centred around the creation of an image, a fabricated and inauthentic identity, a false aura, usually achieved through 'the recuperation of *history* (real, imagined, or simply created as pastiche) and of *community* (again, real, imagined, or simply packaged for sale by producers)'. The context for this is the increased pressure on cities to adopt an entrepreneurial stance in order to attract mobile global capital. The marketing of local identities and images is a market of inter-urban competition, and success 'is often short-lived or rendered moot by competing or alternative innovations arising elsewhere'. Under such conditions, local economics are precarious and local identities and cultures may be false and fragile.[1]

In this context of "intensified inter-urban competition," aspects of placelessness and cultural amorphousness can be seen in a way as advantageous, allowing for the locales and images to convey the persona not only of the area itself, but also of another location, or, to an even greater extent, appear universal rather than distinct, filling in as 'anywhere at all' rather than 'somewhere in particular'. Morley, drawing heavily from Meyerowitz, has argued that as a result of this abolition of a sense of locality, "these media...create new 'communities' across their spaces of transmission, bringing together otherwise disparate groups around the 'common experience' of television... It is in this sense,

Meyerowitz argues, that the electronic media are destroying our sense of locality, so that 'places are increasingly like one another and...the singularity...and importance of...locality is diminished'...so that 'locality is no longer necessarily seen as the centre stage of life's drama'."[2] The ability of a place to facilitate this process as easily as possible (i.e., without the time and labour intensive efforts of the production crew to construct or fabricate necessary amenities or, inversely, to hide or conceal specific regional markers that would betray the intended transformation) would therefore be seen as a definite advantage from a logistical and economic perspective.

In many respects, then, regional and national cultures are increasingly required by the international image industry to repress the distinctiveness of their culture, geography, and other defining characteristics in order to fulfil the requirements of an industry intent on conforming to the cultural signs and narrative tropes of the dominant discourse. Though there are exceptions of locales that are deemed to be so intrinsically distinct that they are rarely utilized to 'stand in' for other regional or national contexts (New York City and Ireland are good examples of this), this is clearly not the case with Canada, whose amorphousness lends itself to portrayals of locales that seem either anonymous and rootless or recognizable but indistinct, and in many ways actually makes the portrayal of a distinctly 'Canadian' sense of location almost impossible (this will be discussed further in my analysis of the film Intersection). Massey has explained that, as a result of this cultural synchronization, "the vast current reorganizations of capital, the formation of a new global space, and in particular its use of new technologies of communication have undermined an older sense of a 'place called home', and left us placeless and disoriented."[3] This sense of distance from a 'place called home' has become a recurring

theme in products produced by and consumed through the international image industry, and Canadian locations, with their inherent amorphousness within the dominant ideology, have proven to be the ideal commodity to facilitate the materiality of this alienation.

Films and Television Series and the Appropriation of Canadian Space: From A Culture of Absence to An Amorphous Community

I have selected nine television series (see Appendix), produced and distributed by American media production companies affiliated with trans-national corporations, all of which are filmed in Canadian locations, Vancouver being the most common. These programs, both in their use of locations and in their narrative concerns, utilize their setting -- in other words, Canadian space -- in one of two ways: Canadian locations are positioned as either 'Anywhere,' or 'Nowhere'. In either case, the Canadian-ness of the locations is perceived to be irrelevant within the context of the programs, all of which are set in American or 'Americanized' locations. I will be discussing some of these series in more detail than others, based on the extent to which the actual content of particular episodes lends itself to in-depth analysis. Two of the series, *The Outer Limits* and *Nightman* (whose descriptive information is included in the Appendix, Table 1), will not be discussed in the body of the text due to the similarities they possess to the other programs in terms of their conception of space and the redundancy that would result from their analysis.

I would like to take a moment here to clarify the manner in which I am analysing the use of locations in these films and programs, and extrapolate on the implications of these practices on the general conception of English Canadian identity. Obviously, the use of one location to stand in for or 'play the part' of another is nothing new within the

medium of film. Shooting a movie in a location different from the actual setting of the film is often one of the main ways of keeping the production budget within reasonably feasible limits, even if other steps need to be taken to ensure the appearance of authenticity within the film itself. Examples of motion pictures that were shot in a location drastically different from the film's setting are plentiful. The famous scene in David Lean's *Doctor Zhivago* (1964), in which the characters return to their long-abandoned house to find it thoroughly frosted over, was shot in Spain, with bee's wax used to give the impression of an all-encompassing ice. The shot that concludes this scene, a long-shot of Zhivago riding his horse carriage across the horizon, required that an entire field be thickly covered in fake snow. Similarly, there have been many films renowned for their depiction of a specific milieu and environment that were actually shot somewhere else entirely. For example, Martin Scorsese's *Mean Streets* (1973), famous for its naturalistic portrayal of life in New York's Little Italy, was shot primarily in Los Angeles.

In instances such as these, the locations used for shooting the film are altered, adapted, or shot in such a way so that any identifiable traits or characteristics of the actual location are repressed to prevent them from obscuring the fictional or otherwise specified location in which the action of the film takes place. In the case of these television shows shot in Canada, however, in addition to the fact that Canadian space -- be it in a studio or on location -- is being appropriated by American and trans-national interests for their own economic and ideological benefit, any identifiable traits and characteristics of the particular Canadian locations are considered to be irrelevant within the Americanized context of the program. In other words, even though American societal signifiers (i.e.,

flags, mail boxes) or regional markers (i.e., licence plates) are utilized to assert the American-ness of the show's setting, signifiers and markers that connote the specific Canadian or regional identity of the location itself (i.e., distinctive landmarks, street names and addresses, background paraphernalia that carries certain intertextual baggage) are often *not* omitted from the show, as though there were nothing regionally or culturally distinctive about them at all. In fact, a more recent trend is that many distinct markers and signifiers, such as geographic or man-made landmarks, have come to be appropriated by some of these series in an attempt to lend a sense of authentic specificity to the show's fictionalized setting (examples of this will be discussed later).

But it is not just the use of geographic locations that reveal the placelessness of English Canada within the dominant ideology. It is also a matter of how the use of these locations -- and the manner in which all the intertextual baggage associated with them as Canadian locations is deemed to be unspecific, intangible, and amorphous -- illustrates both the conception of Canada and of global space within the dominant ideology as that which exists to be shaped, manipulated, and utilized for the ideological means of dominant interests. Conceptions of locality, and of the identity associated with a particular community, are not just a matter of how geography is conceived of, utilized, and represented, but more so of the attitudes and preconceptions that both determine and disseminate conceptions of characteristics attributable to a particular space and place. As Morley explains, it is not simply "a matter of physical geography somehow ceasing to exist or ceasing to matter. It is rather a question of how physical and symbolic networks become entwined and come to exercise mutual determination on each other."[4] Or as Shields explains, "Spatializations are central to cultural hegemony and dominant

ideologies as well as what we might call 'dominant practices'."[5]

Television Series that Position Canadian Locations as 'Anywhere'

As Morley and Robins have explained, the mandate of many production companies within the international image industry, reacting to the pressures and demands of a globalized world, has been to create within the story worlds of their programs a "fabricated and inauthentic identity," usually achieved through the "recuperation of history and of community". The history and community through which these programs (see Appendix, Table 1) seek to fabricate this sense of identity is typically that of the dominant American ideology, whose values and priorities largely dictate those represented within the image industry. However, the creation of a fabricated and inauthentic identity seems destined to result in an empty, generic identity that further alienates people from a sense of history and community and instead creates an increasing sense of ambivalence towards the markers and signifiers that people are used to relying on for their sense of identity. As Massey notes, "it is argued that this new round of time-space compression has produced a feeling of disorientation, a sense of the fragmentation of local cultures, and a loss, in its deepest meaning, of a sense of place... [P]laces seem to become both more similar and yet lacking in internal coherence; home grown specificity is invaded -- it seems that you can sense the simultaneous presence of everywhere in the place where you are standing."[6] As a result of their inherent amorphousness, Canadian locations, as I have explained and will now illustrate further, facilitate the production of space that lacks "internal coherence" and thus can be utilized to represent Anywhere, at the expense of ultimately seeming as though they really exist nowhere.

Something that these programs tend to capitalize on is an overall feeling of

longing for a sense of 'home', predicated by the manner in which the processes of globalization have altered the ways by which people relate to place and space, and to their nation-state, the entity that supposedly has the responsibility of preserving the sense of identity which people base on their sense of location within the world, both physically and ideologically. As Massey explains, "Powerful forces for forging a sense of what is 'home' are produced by capital which comes from somewhere else entirely. Their messages flow across old earth boundaries in ways which no national government can easily prevent."[7] This has resulted in an inability of people to identify their national, cultural, or even individual identities based on location, on a sense of place and space, and has thus caused people to look beyond the traditional realm of space and place in an attempt to locate a new 'place called home'. As Naficy explains, "Today, it is possible to be exiled in place, that is, to be at home and to long for other places and other times so vividly portrayed in the media. It is possible to be in internal exile and be unable to, or wish not to, return home."[8]

A recurring theme in these programs that position their Canadian locations as Anywhere is the quest to locate oneself in a place called home, a process which is portrayed to be paradoxically a result of and reliant upon the characters' predilection towards technology. In other words, their reliance on technology -- whether it be a single technological device or system or, in a more comprehensive sense, the overall impact of modernity on their lives and well-being -- has gotten them into this mess, and yet they also see it as the only means to escape their predicament. The cast of *Sliders,* for example, are sucked into a portal created by junior physics genius Quinn Mallory (the goofily amorphous Canadian Jerry O'Connell, serving as a typical apple-pie-faced

American hero) that transports them instantaneously to an alternative dimension that is exactly the same as, but fundamentally different from, their place called home, due to the fact that it is a world "whose history diverged from ours at some point in the past."[9] They are thereby forced to 'slide' into a new version of home every episode, hoping that the next slide will lead them to their real home(land). *Stargate SG-1* utilizes an almost identical premise, with the exception that this group is a military unit, accompanied by an alien co-hort, who operate out of an American military base in Cheyenne, Wyoming. Their episodic mission is to 'gate' to other planets possessing Stargates (the SG-1 of the title refers to the Cheyenne home base, while gates on other planets are designated SG-7, SG-12, etc.) in the attempt to connect all the worlds together in an interglobal alliance that transcends time and space. Along the way our heroes encounter developing civilisations whom they assist in both a technological manner (i.e., giving them equipment, teaching them how to do things more efficiently, saving them from a technologically advanced rival, etc.) and an ideological manner (i.e., teaching them new ways of thinking and of perceiving their own and other worlds[10]).

There are also individual *Stargate SG-1* episodes which, aside from conforming to the criteria above, also illuminate other ideological priorities that seem to be of particular concern to the operation of the trans-national corporations who fund this and other programs. For example, in an episode from the first season entitled "Singularity," a child is transported through the Stargate from one of the alien planets to the Cheyenne home base (in other words, from the periphery to the centre). Her presence at the military base causes a great deal of anxiety when it is discovered that an alien race has manipulated her genetic tissue in such a way that her voyage through the Stargate triggered the production

of an organic device next to the girl's heart that threatens to destroy the base. The timer of the bomb was activated when the girl was taken through the Stargate, and is set to explode either in two hours, or if the girl is taken even close to the Stargate, or if the device is tampered with. The situation is resolved when, after isolating the girl in an underground nuclear testing facility, the bomb fails to detonate, and it is later diagnosed that the distance from the Stargate caused the device to recede back into the girl's normal genetic makeup. The denouement of the episode takes place in a park where the members of the military unit discuss how the girl, who cannot travel through the Stargate again due to the threat it poses to her life and the existence of the Stargate home base, will be assimilated into 'earth culture', facilitated by the adoption into a family with the proper security clearance. The final minutes of the episode consist of a discussion between the girl, Cassandra, and Captain Carter, a member of the Stargate team who brought her to earth and who has assumed the role of Cassandra's surrogate mother. Their conversation, in which Carter ensures that Cassandra is familiar with the details of her assimilation into the dominant culture, deserves full attention here:

> Cassandra: "When you find me a new home, will you come and visit me?"
> Carter: "You betcha, all the time."
> Cassandra: "That is, when you're on earth."
> Carter: "Right. Now, about that, Cassandra..."
> Cassandra: "I know -- Stargate is a secret, and I was born in a place called... Toronto?"
> Carter: "Right."
> Cassandra: [looking across the park] "What are those."
> Carter: "Ah. Those are swings."
> Cassandra: "Never had any of those... in Toronto." [the episode then fades to credits with Carter and Cassandra running towards the swings]

The key to understanding the motivations behind the ideology inherent within this

particular episode is its title, "Singularity", which is never spoken by any character during the episode and does not refer explicitly to any activity or event relevant to the episode's plot. It would seem, rather, that the 'singularity' with which this episode is concerned is that of culture, and all the implications of character and identity associated with it. The threat posed by the object from the periphery is nullified once the object in question is distanced from the periphery[11] and assimilated into the dominant culture. It is also important to note here how Canada is perceived to serve as a suitable place of origin for this person who comes from a place that no one knows anything about.

Another series that is very concerned with issues of culture and ideology between the centre and the periphery is *Earth: Final Conflict (EFC),* a twenty-first century science-fiction series based on a premise and pilot written by *Star Trek* creator Gene Roddenberry, which is currently in its second season and has been renewed in 85% of the U.S. for the next two years. The show, which operates on a very allegorical level, is highly invested in examining such issues as the obsolescence of the traditional nation-state, the manner in which power and technology are utilized to sustain the hegemony between the dominant centre and the marginalized periphery, and the extent to which a successful resistance against hegemony must involve the willing and collective refusal of the marginalised group. In this sense the show can be seen as an interesting hybrid, addressing the concerns of the marginal from the perspective of the dominant ideology. In many ways, the appropriation of Canadian locations for this program, which is set in the United States (though in the future) and focuses on American characters, makes a certain amount of sense in a particularly post-modern context, and may perhaps explain the amount of Canadian financial involvement in the show's production (see Appendix,

Table 1), as well as the fact that many fans of the series actually acknowledge it as a Canadian program.[12]

In *EFC*, an alien race known as the Taelons has come to earth on a mission of peace, and within the first several years of interacting with humans they have managed to use their highly advanced technological knowledge to rid earth of virtually every disease, thereby winning over the trust and acceptance of most of the human population. However, the overall goal of the Taelon 'nation' would appear to be the utilization of the human species as 'volunteers' for the benefit of Taelon operations in other parts of the galaxy, and the technology with which the humans were won over was simply a series of token gestures aimed at winning their support and allegiance. While the majority of humans have either embraced the Taelons or continue to treat them with ambivalent indifference, an underground resistance, which works in concert with a Taelon faction that opposes their nation's human agenda, has emerged. The goal of the resistance is not to defeat the Taelons in any way or to try and rid Earth of their presence; such actions, though pursued by some of the more radical members of the resistance, are viewed by the resistance leaders as merely digressive and ultimately impossible. Instead, the resistance aims to reveal the manner in which the Taelons maintain their hegemonic power over the humans, thus allowing the human race (embodied by the American characters who constitute the resistance) to return the balance of their lives to the place they know as 'home', where they constitute the dominant order, rather than being marginal and subordinant.

The essential conceit of *EFC*, then, is that American culture has lost its dominant position and is marginalised, even to the extent of only surviving as an 'American'

cultural identity through an underground resistance, which positions itself against not only the Taelons, who through their superior technology have assumed the role of planetary protectors, but also the American political system itself, which the resistance distrusts for its laissez faire policy towards the Taelons.[13] The series essentially puts American culture in a position similar to that faced by other national cultures in the face of media imperialism. The series does tend to preserve the dominance of the American ideology, however, in the sense that the 'American' resistance is depicted as the best chance for the 'human' resistance in the struggle against the Taelons.

Although the parallels between the on-going plot of *Earth Final Conflict* and the historical and continual plight of English Canadian culture and identity seem fairly obvious and direct, I am not proposing that the show's premise is based on some kind of Canadian cultural allegory. What I would argue, however, is that this series, along with the others I am discussing here, are reacting in various ways from an American perspective to the numerous shifts in the economic, political, and social aspects of the American 'way of life' that have resulted from the processes of globalization and the impact of these on the stability of the traditional ideal of the nation-state. It would seem that the dominant American ideology, as I have been referring to it throughout my analysis, has become so pervasive and so reliant upon its continual evolution for its own survival (a true perpetual motion machine, as I described it in Chapter II), that it has somehow alienated the needs of many American people, who, paradoxically, still see it as the means by which their alienation can be averted. The significance of the Canadian cultural situation in this regard, then, is the manner in which it has anticipated many of these circumstances through its natural evolution.

The X-Files, the longest running and easily most popular and successful of all these shows, is perhaps the prototype for these kinds of programs that are invested in themes of placelessness and dislocation (both physical and ideological) whose materiality is facilitated by the use of Canadian locations. The series follows FBI agents Fox Mulder and Dana Scully as they travel to every corner of the U.S. and occasionally other areas of the world investigating anomalous events and attempting to uncover government conspiracies (thereby both safeguarding and debilitating the nation's ideological and physical borders). Though the series' structure shifts from episodic to serial, the narrative is primarily motivated by Mulder's search for a place called home, which exists in the ideological sphere in the sense that it can only be attained through the provision of answers. These answers, it appears, are at once both repressed by certain factions within the U.S. government and yet are only obtainable by Mulder and Scully through the financial and technological means provided by the U.S. government (the partners' travel expenses have become a recurring joke both amongst the show's fans and within the episodes themselves). However, rather than bringing the series to a cathartic sense of resolution, the more answers Mulder obtains the more disillusioned he becomes in his search for 'home', which as a result comes to seem farther away, if not completely unreachable. This same structure is also applied to episodes and narratives that do not concern Mulder at all, even though his character provides the impetus behind the search for truth that will supposedly lead to the place this series calls 'home'. For example, the 1997-98 season featured several episodes centering on Scully's remorse for the death of a child she originally tries to identify and protect, and later on learns to be her own daughter. Essentially, then, *The X-Files*' structure is one based on the belief that 'the truth

is out there', and the constant realization that the 'truth' is not what the characters had hoped for, therefore frequently shattering and relocating the 'place called home' that the characters strive to identify and locate.

To summarize, then, and doing so in an analysis based on both the actual diegesis of these programs as well as the extra-textual baggage they carry with them as productions, these shows that position their Canadian locations as Anywhere are essentially about a group of Americans (actors, representatives of the international image industry), running around in a strange new world that seems the same as the one they know as home but has been altered in some crucial way by its relation to technology (and whose materiality is facilitated by Canada). Their presence in this new world is a result of their access and ability to manipulate advanced technologies (the technological and financial superiority of the dominant order), which they occasionally use to solve problems that result from their presence in a new environment, or to assist the inhabitants they encounter (which not only reinforces their own dominance but also the inhabitants' dependency upon them). Ultimately, the desire of the characters (who, in *The X-Files*, *Stargate SG-1*, *Earth Final Conflict* and often in *The Outer Limits,* are all representatives of either the United States government or military) to return to their place called home, within individual episodes and the series in their entirety (so far, at least) remains unresolved and ambivalent. In other words, with the nation-state which these characters identify as 'home' in a state of flux, they are forced to soldier on, with their ideological values and priorities still largely intact, using their technological and ideological dominance to try and make sense of the amorphous space they find themselves in.

Canada, it would seem, provides the perfect place where the materiality of this

amorphousness can be realised. As Naficy explains, "It now appears that one's relation to 'home' and 'homeland' is based as much on actual material access as on the symbolic imaginings and national longings that produce and reproduce them."[14] The anxieties within the dominant ideology towards the question of what constitutes 'home', which seem to be a result of a general disillusionment towards the function and legitimacy of the American nation-state, are addressed by creating a kind of pseudo nation-state in which the tensions and concerns of 'home' can be presented and examined without actually tarnishing the function and legitimacy of the ideals and values which the American nation-state stands for and represents. But what is the effect, then, of the commodification of Canadian locations as part of the attempt by those within the image industry, who rely upon the health and perpetuation of the dominant ideology, to somehow relocate their idea of 'home' and 'homeland'? Would this not ultimately constitute Canadians as exiles in their own homeland, and render the history and character of Canada as nonexistent within the dominant ideology? After all, why would Canadian history, or for that matter Canadian identity, be considered distinct or unique when the history and identity of Canada predominantly purveyed through the dominant discourse is conveyed as virtually nonexistent, and Canada itself as merely an amorphous space indistinguishable from anywhere else in which dominant interests can attempt to dispel their anxieties towards their own 'homeland' by expanding upon what they consider to be 'home'? The most alarming rebuttal to these questions, however, is that these developments parallel the evolution of the Canadian nation-state from its infancy, reflecting the extent to which Canada remains subordinate to the ideology of the dominant interests as a result of our dependency upon the capital of the dominant order.

Magder notes how "Dallas Smythe sees the extension of American culture and communications into Canada as the necessary corollary to economic dependency. The 'consciousness industry,' in Smythe's words, functions to produce 'the necessary consciousness and ideology to seem to legitimate that dependency.'"[15]

Television Series That Position Canadian Locations as 'Nowhere'

As I mentioned earlier, many of these productions reflect the conception of Canada as irrelevant, intangible, and placeless through their failure or reluctance to obscure or repress in any way the distinctive geographical markers and signifiers of their Canadian locations. In fact, it would seem that one of the advantages, from the perspective of the production companies who shoot these programs in Canada, of filming in a Canadian city is the availability of all the amenities necessary for the portrayal of an urban American environment without the recognizable distinctiveness that marks them as being foreign or from another identifiable location. This way of thinking reflects the conception of Canada within the dominant ideology, as well as the manner in which such conceptions are not based on actual physical locations or markers, but rather on the system of representations that both determine and perpetuate the character and definition of that which is being identified. As Natter and Jones explain:

> space is not simply a socially produced materiality but a socially produced -- and forceful -- object/sign system. This, which we refer to as a 'system of representation', does not deny materiality, but rather argues that any materiality is attached to the representation(s) through which that materiality both embeds and conveys social meaning... Social space, despite its apparent substantive materiality, is thus also characterized by an emptiness, one which social powers work to substantiate with meaning content, truth value, objectivity.[16]

The purveyors of the dominant ideology, then, in Natter and Jones' words, assume that the

materiality of these locations as 'Canadian' can only be attached to the representation of those locations which in turn both "embeds and conveys social meaning". There is therefore nothing inherently Canadian about these locations so long as the dominant discourse -- the dominant 'system of representation' -- continues to present them as American, thereby further embedding and conveying the meanings which they represent within the dominant ideology.

These series simply assume that the Canadian origin of these landmarks, signifiers, and the general space itself is of little relevance to the fact that it is all being used to portray an Americanized location. I say American*ized* because all of these programs that position their Canadian locations as 'Nowhere', which, incidentally, are all shot in Vancouver (see Appendix, Table 2), are set in *fictional* urban American areas. *Viper*, for example, is set in Metro City (which exists in an undisclosed state), and *The Sentinel* takes place in Cascade, Washington. Though it may seem that this approach would have the effect of positioning the locations of these shows as 'Anywhere' -- due to the attempt to make the show as generically American as possible and therefore appear as though it could be taking place 'anywhere' in the country -- they come across instead as 'nowhere' due to the indistinctness of their environments created by the attempt to appear generic, and by the lack of a sense of place caused by the unwillingness to address the programs' actual physical location. Referring back to the quote by Natter and Jones above, it is as though the emptiness that characterizes the social space attempting to be created within these shows, which the programs try to substantiate by being situated within the reference points of American society, cannot be fully overcome or substantiated. What these programs are trying to accomplish, in other words, is to use an

amorphous space for the production of another amorphous space. The end result is a representation of placelessness.

These programs that position their Canadian locations as 'Nowhere' project a much different relationship to concepts of 'home' and 'homeland' than do the 'Anywhere' shows discussed above. The 'Anywhere' shows seem convinced that the current manifestation of the American nation-state is somehow incompatible or insufficient with the needs of the American people, and therefore offer fantasy scenarios which facilitate the desire to locate a sense of 'home' which can no longer be obtained in the present 'homeland'. Their Canadian locations are positioned as 'Anywhere' to support the assertion that the dominant American ideology can still prevail in new circumstances and environments, and can therefore still serve as the means by which a new homeland can be located. These 'Nowhere' programs, however, are not nearly as invested in themes of 'home' and 'homeland', and can actually be better understood through an analysis based on the object/sign system of representation referred to above by Natter and Jones. If anything, the 'Nowhere' programs' generic American-ness -- conveyed not only by setting, which is utilized to appear universal(ly American), but also by their narrative tropes and ideological motivations (all these programs feature either police officers or crime-fighting heroes) -- represents an attempt to reassert the traditional idea of 'home' which the anywhere shows assume to be lost or inaccessible in some way (although *The Crow* does serve as an exception to this). Indeed, the ease with which these programs believe their Canadian locations can stand in for American ones -- indicated by the failure to omit Canadian signifiers (*The Crow* has featured scenes in which the cars are adorned with British Columbia licence plates), as well as by the use of distinctive landmarks to

represent specific locations within the series' diegesis (numerous examples of this shall be cited) -- acts as an assertion that the American ideology and all its attendant amenities, values, and characteristics can be transplanted into Canada, that part of the world which has been most affected by the transmission of American culture. In the eyes of the international image industry and the dominant ideology, then, Canada serves as a successful product of the process of cultural synchronization; it is perceived to be virtually indistinguishable from the dominant culture and exists as a subordinate and dependent satellite which can be utilized to fulfil the needs of dominant interests.

Before moving on to discuss the programs that position their Canadian locations as 'Nowhere,' I would like to momentarily address the fact, which I alluded to in my discussion of *Earth: Final Conflict,* that most of these series, including the five I have discussed above, could very easily be mistaken for Canadian programs, not necessarily because the locations themselves can be identified by an American or international audience as being distinctly Canadian, but rather because the shows that receive financial assistance from government incentive programs or are funded in part by Canadian production companies contain a very prominent title card in the end credits, advertising -- as though it were a seal of approval -- the involvement of "Canada" in the show's production (see Appendix). Even though this is most likely meant to illustrate the involvement and autonomy of Canadian interests in the respective productions, it actually has the effect of propagating Canada's economic and ideological dependency on the United States in several ways. First, it perpetuates the idea of Canada as a mere appendage of the United States. What else should one think after watching a show about American characters in an American city with American flags and U.S. mail boxes and

then seeing a very prominent "Canada" sign posted in the production credits? Second, such actions reaffirm Canada's position of ideological subordinance to the United States, solidifying the hegemonic order through the acceptance by Canadian officials and business interests of the criteria established by dominant interests. And ultimately, it further contributes to the sense of Canada as an amorphous space; a place that exists somewhere else but nowhere in particular, geographically resourceful but ideologically indistinct.

A series that can be discussed in the context of its use of Canadian locations as both 'Anywhere' and 'Nowhere' is *The Crow: Stairway to Heaven*, which is the next installment in the franchise which began with the comic book series and has also spawned three feature films. The series resembles in many ways the shows discussed above, in the sense that it is driven by the quest of the lead character, Eric Draven, to find his particular 'place called home', and also by the fact that he often utilizes a portal to other worlds to try and accomplish this goal, thereby emphasizing the importance of the concept of time-space compression within the show's thematics. Eric himself exists quite literally between worlds. After both he and his girlfriend Shelley are brutally murdered, Eric rises from the grave and assumes the form of the living, fulfilling an ancient prophecy that a crow can carry the soul of a person back from the land of the dead so that they can set right the terrible wrong done against them. Like *The X-Files, The Crow* is both episodic and serial in its narrative structure, but is ultimately driven by Eric's quest to avenge his and Shelley's deaths and somehow reunite with her, either in the land of the living or the land of the dead. Although he kills the ringleader of the gang responsible for their deaths in the series' first episode, a sense of resolution or closure, of coming one step closer to

'home', is not achieved, and the ringleader actually returns from the dead in a later episode. Other attempts to seek revenge against those who performed the murders consistently fail. Eric often uses a portal, which is normally but not always provided by the large, circular window of his apartment from which he was thrown to his death, to travel back in time to the night of the murder to try and set things right.

Physical geography, then, is largely irrelevant within the thematics of this series, and the protagonist instead manipulates time and space in an attempt to locate himself in an ideological sphere where reality conforms to his ideal. However, not only can his and Shelley's fate not be averted, but in one particular episode his time-travelling attempt actually results in the death of Det. Albright, another major character who assists Eric in his quest. Albright was alive again in the following episode without any mention of his death the previous week, emphasizing again the manner in which physical reference points are largely irrelevant and time and space are manipulated in this series. The portal which Eric travels through also takes him to places and times in the distant past, utilizing the conceit that he and Shelley have been together in past lives. This recreation, or recuperation, of history results in the wrongs of the past being set right, but never results in the union of Eric and Shelley, thus driving the cycle for the search of Eric's place called home upon which the show relies.

The series, however, also differs in ways that distinguish it from the 'Anywhere' programs above and are more similar to the shows that position their Canadian locations, which in the case of all these shows is Vancouver, as 'Nowhere'. *The Crow*, perhaps in an attempt to emulate its comic book heritage, takes place primarily in a non-descript, urban American city. So invested is the show in its urban anonymity that the name of this

fictional city, Port Columbia, was only revealed towards the end of this, its first season. Markers and signifiers remain purely generic. U.S. mail boxes and flags appear when appropriate, and licence plates, it appears, are actually British Columbia plates, but are kept out of focus whenever they are in the shot.[17] The police and law enforcement branches, which are figured prominently due to Det. Albright's role in the show, are identified as typically American in structure, function and purpose. However, *The Crow* utilizes many Vancouver landmarks to construct a milieu specific to this fictional, generic city. The Suntower building, a distinct Vancouver landmark with a pale-green, copper-roofed tower, is used frequently as an establishing shot to signify the location of Eric's apartment. The red Woodwards 'W', one of Vancouver's oldest and most recognizable landmarks, is used as a recurring motif of the city's urban sprawl, and is featured prominently in the opening credits as well as being visible from Eric's apartment window.[18] Also visible from Eric's apartment is the Harbour Centre Tower, and playing a major role in creating the character of the fictional environment in *The Crow* is the Capilano suspension bridge, a popular Vancouver tourist site which is featured in the opening credits and used in several episodes as the link between the world of the living and the world of the dead.

Two other series that follow this same pattern of utilizing Vancouver locations and landmarks in an attempt to somehow substantiate the fictional character of their settings are *Viper* and *The Sentinel*, which are both the products of executive producers Danny Bilson and Paul DeMeo and are produced and distributed in first-run syndication by Paramount. *Viper*, which is sold in more than 185 markets representing 95% of the United States, is set vaguely in the future (the show's official website describes it as being

"set the day after tomorrow") in the fictional Metro City (identified in the website only as a "western city"), while *The Sentinel* takes place in Cascade, Washington, a kind of pseudo Seattle. Both series, then, attempt to situate the program's diegesis within the reference points of American society while at the same time attempting to extend the boundaries within which the American ideology operates and exists. Though the end credits of each series identify Vancouver, British Columbia as the production site, neither show's website, key components in connecting with the audience and fan base, makes mention of Vancouver or Canada in any way. In fact, the only program's website to do so is that of *Earth: Final Conflict*, and it is done only to address the query of its fans who mistake the show for Canadian and explain that it is in fact an American show (Figures 2 & 3 illustrates how this misconception is understandable, in spite of the American societal reference points that populate the series).

Viper seems to be even less concerned with any distinctiveness of the locations it utilizes than *The Crow*, and has fully appropriated very distinct Vancouver landmarks to serve as amenities within the fictional world of Metro City. For example, in one episode the Viper squad, a special investigations unit of the FBI who utilize a state-of-the-art car, which morphs into a bullet-proof machine with all manner of technological devices known as the Defender, in their crime fighting endeavours, attempt to foil an assassination attempt against a U.S. Senator. The assassin plans to shoot the Senator as he arrives at the Metro City Science World (which is actually the Vancouver Science World, a very distinctive-looking building originally built for the World's Fair held in Vancouver in 1986, whose very name is apparently felt to be amorphous), and has gained the best shooting angle by climbing atop the nearby Metro Stadium (B.C. Place Stadium,

which, due to its grey concrete base and puffy white dome, seems a particularly amorphous structure, and has also appeared in a number of films set in Seattle, presumably as a stand in for the King Dome, which it hardly resembles). Interestingly, the Senator is greeted by a group of protestors picketing with signs emblazoned with the slogans, "American jobs for Americans," and "America runs on American jobs," a vicious irony that seems completely lost on the producers of this American show shot in Canada, and serves as another example of the manner in which these programs attempt to completely transplant their ideological motivations, insisting that their Canadian locations will in no way act as a barrier.

The Sentinel, in its fourth season premiere episode, "Siege," also utilizes another Vancouver sports arena, the PNE (Pacific National Exhibition) Coliseum, which is identified as the Cascade Arena. This episode, in which an American militia group takes an arena full of people hostage and the Sentinel and his partners, members of the Cascade police force, must protect the innocent civilians and capture the militia's leader, serves as an interesting counterpoint to the premise and motivations of *Earth: Final Conflict* -- in which the show's protagonists are all essentially militia members -- and helps accentuate the different attitude towards concepts of 'home' and 'homeland' communicated by these two types of programs. While *EFC* focuses on protagonists who are attempting to locate a new ideal of 'home' by revitalizing the revolutionary character of the United States (albeit in reaction to an alien rather than American entity), *The Sentinel* treats such an organization as a direct threat to the ideals, values, and ideological priorities of the show's protagonists, thereby illustrating again the extent to which the values and priorities of the dominant ideology are transplanted intact in this fictional environment.[19]

Series like *The Crow*, *The Sentinel*, and *Viper*, then, essentially represent an attempt to construct a fictional, generic, and anonymous urban American environment utilizing the real amenities that constitute the character and substance of Vancouver. It is as though Vancouver were seen as nothing more than a giant prop shop, a warehouse, an already-built set full of all the necessary amenities needed to create a particular milieu, and all of which comes with the added bonus of being recognizably characteristic but not recognizably distinct. The use of actual, existing locations to stand in for other recognizable locales would be unthinkable in Los Angeles or New York, and is why American studios and production companies have always relied on studio space and back lots in order to construct from scratch a particular area, environment, and scene. For example, American television shows regarded for their depiction of or investment in a specific urban milieu are either shot on a back lot constructed to look like somewhere else (i.e., *Seinfeld* and *NYPD Blue* have both shot their exteriors on a lot in Los Angels), or take the pains to actually coordinate location shooting in the specific location where the show is set (i.e., *Law and Order* is shot on the streets of New York City, *Homicide: Life on the Streets* in Baltimore, and the producers of *ER* seem to feel that it is worth the expense to shoot many of the show's exteriors in Chicago, even though the bulk of the production takes place in Los Angeles). Vancouver, and Canada in general, however, does not seem to benefit from possessing an identifiable character within the reference points of the dominant ideology that would prevent it from being used as a mere stand-in for another environment, and has therefore become a kind of post-modern, globalized back lot for American production.

These 'Nowhere' programs, then, rely heavily on the object/sign system of

representation referred to by Natter and Jones above to establish and convey a specific sense of environment through the use of geographical markers and signifiers. However, it is the inherent *lack* of specificity of these markers and signifiers within the overall system of representation (the dominant discourse) that facilitates their ability to represent these fictional, generic environments. With the physical space utilized by these programs represented as merely generic -- and generically American -- Canadian space is relegated to the ideological wasteland of the American consciousness, existing as an unspecific, generic replicant of American space. As representations increasingly supplant materiality as the basis for conceptions of reality, the ideological imperatives that dictate the function and application of systems of representation increasingly become the templates which determine the character and identity of that which is being represented. Canadian identity, then, becomes increasingly amorphous as a result of its inherent absence and the manner in which this is perpetuated within the system of representations disseminated by the dominant discourse. Morley and Robins explain further how systems of representation blur the line between the real and the imaginary to the extent that the imaginary comes to assume the representation of the real:

> Richard Kearney describes a world in which the image reigns supreme, a 'Civilisation of the Image' in which 'reality has become a pale reflection of the image... The real and the imaginary have become almost impossible to distinguish'. With 'the omnipresence of self-destructing images which simulate each other in a limitless interplay of mirrors', argues Kearney, 'the psychic world is as colonised as the physical world by the whole image industry'. This globalization of image flows and spaces is fundamentally transforming spatiality and sense of space and place. Frederic Jameson refers to the 'existential bewilderment in this new postmodern space', a 'culture in which one cannot position itself'.[20]

This evaluation of postmodern space and the existential bewilderment it necessitates seems to apply directly to the English Canadian consciousness, which, it seems quite clear, cannot be positioned within its own culture as a result of the perpetuation of its inherent amorphousness by the dominant ideology. Keeping in mind the historical developments and the set of circumstances that facilitate this process, the amorphousness, indistinctness, and placelessness of English Canadian identity, then, can be interpreted as a product of Canada's inherent dependency, perpetuated through the hegemonic relationship with the dominant American order.

The Conception of Canada Within the Dominant Ideology

I would like to accentuate these points above by citing examples from Hollywood movies that use Vancouver as a back lot for locations that are set somewhere else, but somewhere specific and tangible, as opposed to the generic and fictional locations of the 'Nowhere' programs or the rootless and indistinct locales of the 'Anywhere' shows. These films also serve to illustrate why Canadian culture cannot position itself within its own space, due to the appropriation of Canadian space and signifiers and the assertion that Canada, as a result of the amorphousness of these locations and markers, can simply stand in for another location and environment.

In the case of the film *Unforgettable* (John Dahl, 1996, MGM), the setting is clearly and repeatedly identified as Seattle, with several establishing scenes shot at locations such as the Space Needle to confirm this conceit. The majority of the film, however, was shot in Vancouver, and many identifiable landmarks, locations, and even street names are appropriated and presented as though they exist as Seattle. For example, St. Paul's Hospital on Burrard Street in the downtown core is portrayed as, well, St. Paul's

Hospital. The University of British Columbia Main Library is used to signify the exterior of a university research lab, the second floor of which is destroyed by a bomb. At one point in the film, Dr. Krane (Ray Liotta), a King County medical examiner investigating the murder of his wife, gets a lead that the suspect is "staying at the Dorland Hotel, 25 Hastings Street." Interestingly, *Unforgettable* utilizes the copper-roofed tower of the Suntower building on Pender, also used prominently and repeatedly in *The Crow: Stairway to Heaven*, in a shot that is immediately followed by the Space Needle in order to both reaffirm the film's Seattle setting and, in the process, claim any distinctiveness of the Suntower building and the overall space for its own. This kind of geographical transplantation occurs completely at the expense of the Canadian-ness of the reference points utilized in the film. The object/sign system employed by the film embeds the locations with meaning by associating them not only with American societal reference points, such as flags, licence plates, newspaper boxes, and law enforcement characters, but also with American geographical reference points, such as distinctly recognizable landmarks, all of which combine to convey these locations as part of a specific American urban environment. Vancouver itself, then, is positioned as Nowhere due to the fact that if it were perceived to be Somewhere, this kind of embedding of meaning would not be conceived to be possible.

Another Hollywood film that also conveys this same conception of Vancouver as Nowhere is *Intersection* (Mark Rydell, 1994, Paramount), which is quite ironic, or perhaps perfectly appropriate, considering that the movie is actually set in Vancouver. The film centres around the life of Vincent Eastman (Richard Gere), a successful architect torn between his ex-wife and his new lover, who has just completed a museum

dedicated to the preservation of the culture of the local aboriginal peoples. Though the film explicitly establishes its Vancouver setting, through geographical reference points as well as written signs, the characters never acknowledge the fact that they are in Vancouver, and the story and plot of the film itself is such that it really could take place anywhere in America. Most importantly perhaps, the characters and situations portrayed are typically American, which is to say that I, for one, could not determine whether Richard Gere's character (and the others for that matter, played by recognizable American actors Sharon Stone and Martin Landau) was a Canadian architect or simply an American who managed to get a job building a museum in Canada. Rather than transplanting Canadian locations into an American environment, *Intersection* serves as an example of the manner in which the dominant ideology finds it equally acceptable and possible to transplant an American environment (in terms of ideological values, priorities, and reference points) into a Canadian setting. It would be more accurate, then, to say that the film is set in the *conception* of Vancouver possessed and expressed by the dominant ideology, and not in the city of Vancouver itself; the imaginary representation usurps the materiality of the real.

This emphasis on imaginary representation is perhaps best exemplified in the film by the fact that the museum which Richard Gere's architect (a builder and manager of space) has built is actually the UBC Museum of Anthropology (an award-winning structure which, to my understanding, is very famous in architectural circles) built by Arthur Erickson. By saying that the museum of the film is actually the real museum, I do not mean that the Museum of Anthropology is utilized in *Intersection* in the same fashion as the buildings and landmarks I discussed in the subsections above, as a kind of stand-in

to merely represent a museum. Rather, the film positions the Museum of Anthropology as an actual creation of the architect played by Gere.[21] In other words, even though this film is set in Vancouver (which itself seems nothing more than an act of appeasement to Canadian interests, something I will expand on towards the end of this chapter), the Canadian space used for production is still fully appropriated to suit dominant ideological priorities. The reality of the Canadian space is substituted with the imagined representation of what the dominant ideology deems to be Canadian space. In what would appear to be an attempt to compensate for this misrepresentation (again, most likely in an attempt to maintain good faith with Canadian officials), the film positions the museum in a different location than that of the actual Museum of Anthropology, achieved by having characters refer to the location of the museum in such a way that positions it nowhere near its actual location. But this of course only worsens the matter. Not only is the structure itself appropriated by dominant interests, but by repositioning the landmark's location within its native geography, the dominant ideology reinforces the amorphousness of Canada and Canadian space, and further asserts the ability it possesses in determining the representations that define conceptions of Canada.

Other examples of the irrelevance of specific Canadian landmarks, locations, and cultural signifiers within the dominant discourse disseminated by Hollywood movies can be seen in the John Badham film *Bird on a Wire* (1990, MCA/Universal), which seems intent on making full use of what it perceives to be the amorphousness of its Canadian locations. Shot in and around Vancouver and Victoria, the film, which is essentially a road movie, is set in Hunsboro, Pennsylvania, New York City, Atlantic City, Detroit, and Racine and Loyal, Wisconsin. All of the exterior scenes set in these locations utilize

actual Vancouver and Victoria locations as a back lot, as though they were -- as I have described above -- an already-built set, or a warehouse of various amorphous locations. In fact, so blank, indistinct, and lacking in any kind of recognizable specificity are these locations from the perspective of the makers of this film that some very distinct Canadian cultural signifiers are actually included within the film's diegesis. At one point, when Rick (Mel Gibson) and Marianne (Goldie Hawn) are shopping in a mall in downtown Detroit, they walk down a flight of stairs and are flanked by several Canadian provincial and territorial flags hanging in the background. Despite the fact that the location has been dressed with Detroit newspaper boxes, the cars have been adorned with Michigan licence plates, and the entire foyer of the mall has been cordoned off and blocked with dozens of extras and all manner of film equipment, the removal of these flags was apparently not perceived to be a priority, due to the sheer irrelevance of their meaning and significance within the dominant ideology.

Natter and Jones have explained that "hegemony not only perpetually processes identifications to which 'identity' may then become attached, it does so spatially, by disciplining the meanings and practices associated with any social space. This structuring, historically and geographically, has served the aim of stamping both identity and space with a resolute correspondence: every identity has its place."[22] Thus, the categorizations of Canadian space constructed by the dominant discourse as either Anywhere or Nowhere, and the ease with which the dominant ideology imagines this to be possible (evidenced by the antipathy towards cultural signs and markers that would seem to contradict the messages attempting to be conveyed), implies rather prominently that English Canada has no tangible place, no substance or presence, within the

conceptions held by the dominant ideology and disseminated by the dominant discourse by way of the international image industry. Furthermore, this dissemination is aided and abetted by Canadian governmental and business interests, continuing the legacy of Canada's economic dependency and the hegemonic order that it both enables and perpetuates.

Those who disagree with the principles of staples theory and oppose its application to American film production in Canada, would argue perhaps that the production industry in Canada is strengthened by such activity; that statistics and profit margins indicate that there is little imbalance between the use of Canadian labour and locations and the ultimate profits of the American production companies involved, and that it is therefore not a situation in which the Canadian side is being exploited by American interests. However, as I have been suggesting throughout this thesis and have argued more concretely in this chapter, the primary channels through which dependency is established and maintained are those of ideology and discourse, and it is through the images conveyed, the caricatures portrayed, and the attitudes transmitted by these (and certainly most other American) films and television shows that English Canada is ultimately relegated to the ideological wasteland it has continually occupied within the film and media industries; a resource hinterland that remains placeless and amorphous, perceived to be somewhere else but nowhere in particular, in both geographical and ideological terms. It would seem, in fact, that Watt was quite correct when he observed in 1966 that, due to elements such as our "'indistinctness, apathy, [and] uncertainty of behaviour, this facelessness is beginning to be recognized as a national characteristic'."[23] Indeed, the placelessness, as it were, of Canada as an entity would become so tangible as

to actually serve as a commodity, ripe for export and exploitation by both American industry and the Canadian state.

Conducting the research for, as well as ultimately writing this thesis while living in the United States has offered a particularly interesting optic through which the issues I am concerned with can be analysed. Surely, the amorphousness of English Canadian identity and the manner in which Canadian locations are rendered blank and placeless when used in American films and programs becomes much more apparent, much more relevant when viewed from within American culture itself. Even in everyday conversation with my American friends and colleagues, I am consistently surprised by the lack of reference points -- be they cultural, political, social, or geographical -- they have to associate with Canada or Canadians. However, it is not so much the lack of reference points that best exemplifies the conception that Americans have of Canada, as these are fairly common factors that distinguish most nation-states, even ones so closely associated in matters such as trade and international finance. After all, not many Canadians would be able to name a territory of Mexico or Japan, or even be able to point to Mexico City or Tokyo on an unmarked map. Rather, it is more the case that most Americans do indeed have a very tangible, very concrete conception in their general consciousness of Canada as an entity, which is that Canada is intangible, unspecific, and exists somewhere beyond the realm of that which is America. In fact, it actually does not seem uncommon for the American consciousness, not to mention those of other nationalities whose conceptions of Canada are based largely on information filtered through the dominant American discourse, to consider Canada to be both within and yet somehow separate from the common reference points of American culture; just like America, but without actually

being America.

Thus, the conception of Canadian locations as blank and anonymous, as culturally amorphous and geographically indistinct, is utilized in the image industry as a commodity in and of itself, a resource. And in an industry notorious for extremely large overhead, such a commodity -- which also includes an attractively low exchange rate (subject to periodic fluctuation) as well as incentive programs and tax credits offered by provincial and federal governments -- becomes incredibly attractive and economically sound, both for the producers writing the cheques and the labour, agencies, and ancillary services who cash them. However, the same reasoning and set of perceptions that results in this activity also reflect the manner in which dominant interests perceive these locations in general, and when it comes time for Canada to have her close-up, her portrayal is affected by the same attitude that landed her the starring role in the first place.

This is a common occurrence among films and particularly television shows that are shot in Canada but set in a different (usually indistinct) location. Every so often there will be a film, or in the case of television series a scene or subplot or episode, in which the action of the story actually takes place in Canada. On the one hand, this is a move by the producers to maintain good faith with the Canadian officials through whom the shooting of the program/film is arranged. The final episode of *The X-Files* fifth season, for example, was the only episode of the series, which had been shot in and around Vancouver for five years, to actually take place in Vancouver, and can be seen as a kind of 'thank you' to the local industry and community on behalf of Chris Carter, the series' creator and executive producer. On the other hand, such acts of appeasement can be interpreted as an extension of the same philosophy behind the Canadian Co-operation

Project; that Canadian audiences, who represent an important part of the domestic American market, will take more interest in the material if they contain some form of 'Canadian content'. The overall response to shifting the diegesis of such material to Canada is generally a positive one from both American producers and Canadian production services and audiences, the opinion being that the representation of actual Canadian locations in such films and programs helps increase the profile of Canada and Canadians. This, however, is really nothing more than a continuation of the mentality that led to the acceptance of policies like the Cooperation Project fifty years ago. I would argue that these instances propagate the conception of Canada as placeless, as seeming to exist somewhere else but nowhere in particular. Morley and Robins note how Michael Rustin has referred to this phenomenon of placelessness as "'abstract universalism, with its 'denial of the particular location of human lives in place and time', its placeless and nonreferential sense of identity."[24] This is primarily due to the fact that, since these programs/films that are shot in Canada are not actually set in Canada, when characters in the program participate in a story set in Canada, they must leave the location of the program's diegetic setting, which has been constructed to be Anywhere, in order to go to Canada as it is presented in the program. How can a program/film be said to be fostering a sense of Canada on screen when the *representation* of Canadian locations requires that the diegesis deny its *actual* Canadian location?

Keeping in mind Sartre's assertion that a people can only define themselves by refusing the definition applied to them by others, I would argue that Tony Wilden is exactly right in his assertion that "We have been brought up with an artificial nation, a 'Canada' created by other countries for their benefit. This imaginary nation is not the

same as the country we live in, nor the land we know: the entire 'consciousness industry' in Canada thrives on manipulating this national derangement."[25] In other words, having yet to refuse the conceptions of us held and propagated by the dominant American ideology, the definition of Canada and Canadians is disseminated by the international media empire through which the dominant discourse communicates. So powerful and pervasive is this discourse and the channels upon which it relies to convey its messages, that the images created about English Canada, and images that utilize Canada as a substitute or stand-in for another locale, remain primarily for the benefit of others even when such images are created by English Canadians. The mentality becomes so pervasive that it dictates economic necessity and affects the creative process, as was illustrated in my discussion of the syndicated television series shot in Canada. The end result, to quote Wilden's laceratingly accurate assertion, is that English Canadians (or Anglo Canadians as Wilden prefers, thereby emphasizing the commonality of language rather than that of a supposed 'English' heritage) exist "in Notland, where 'being Canadian' means *not* being someone else -- not English, not American, not Asian, not European, and especially not French."[26] This sense of English Canada as a placeless place, an amorphous space, which has been created by centuries of colonial existence and propagated by the dominant discourse, is now being utilized as a commodity for the creation of products for the benefit of the dominant ideology.

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1. David Morley and Kevin Robins, *Spaces of Identity* (London: Routledge, 1995) 37.
2. David Morley, *Television, Audience, and Cultural Studies* (London: Routledge, 1992) 279-80.
3. Doreen Massey, "A Place Called Home," *New Formations* 17 (Summer 1992): 7-8.

4. David Morley, "Bounded Realms: Household, Family, Community, and Nation," *Home, Exile, Homeland: Film, Media, and the Politics of Place*, ed. Hamid Naficy (New York: Routledge, 1999) 159.

5. Rob Shields, "Spatial Stress and Resistance: Social Meanings and Spatiality," *Home, Exile, Homeland*, ed. Hamid Naficy (New York: Routledge, 1999) 189.

6. Massey 7.

7. Massey 5.

8. Hamid Naficy ed. *Home, Exile, and Homeland* (New York: Routledge, 1999) 3.

9. It is important to note that this description of the show, available on the official website, assumes that the reader/viewer will identify with the fact that the histories the show refers to are designated to be "ours". In other words, the dominant ideology demands that its discourse be completely inclusive, a demand that requires the capitulation of those outside the dominant ideology, rather than any ideological concession made by dominant interests.

10. This appears to be the main role of their alien co-hort, Tiulk (who is played by a black actor, the only principle, or even marginal, black character in the series), who seems to serve more as a pupil to be assimilated into the 'human' way than as an interlocutor between the humans and the other alien life forms they encounter. Also, it is an important ideological distinction of this series to realize that, even though the American military members whom we follow are the real "aliens" on these other planets, it is never depicted as such. With the exception of Tiulk, the audience is never encouraged to benefit from the point of view of the Other, as opposed to other syndicated science fiction series such as *Star Trek: The Next Generation*, or even *Earth: Final Conflict* (which I'll discuss in a moment) which can be much more complex in their handling of such issues.

11. This is ultimately shown to be a distance manifested in physical terms, but the process of distancing Cassandra from the peripheral culture is also demonstrated at various points in the episode as a form of distancing her from the behaviour of the peripheral culture as well, thus assimilating her within the dominant 'earth' culture. This culture is represented by specifically American signifiers, such as when Captain Carter introduces Cassandra to earth food by showing her how to eat a hot dog.

12. The show's official website contains a Frequently Asked Questions section, which addresses the fact that the series, although shot in Toronto, featuring many Canadian actors, and funded in part by Canadian companies, is aimed at an American audience.

13. This also parallels in striking fashion the rise in the United States in the last decade of militia movements, who organize themselves against the U.S. government in the name of American patriotism. The militia movement is perhaps the most glaring example of the manner in which some Americans have begun to react against what they see as the obsolescence, inefficiency, and

corruptibility of the contemporary nation-state.

14. Naficy 5.

15. Ted Magder, *Canada's Hollywood: The Canadian State and Feature Films* (Toronto: U of Toronto P, 1993) 15.

16. Wolfgang Natter and John Paul Jones III, "Identity, Space, and Other Uncertainties," *Space and Social Theory: Interpreting Modernity and Postmodernity*, ed. Georges Benko et al. (Oxford: Blackwell Publishers, 1997) 151.

17. There have been several shots which included B.C. licence plates that were not out of focus at all, and were clearly recognizable to me, though someone not immediately familiar with them may not particularly notice.

18. Woodwards, it should be noted here, was one of the oldest and largest department store chains in Canada until it went bankrupt in 1990 and was forced to liquidate its assets. The Woodwards building in downtown Vancouver was built in the 1920's, and the large red 'W' that extends from the roof is one of the oldest and most recognizable landmarks in the downtown core. In 1994 the building was acquired by a developer and zoned by Vancouver City Council to be renovated into low income housing, something that was deemed to be a necessity in that fairly impoverished part of town. When the renovations hit a bureaucratic snag and were delayed, the developer began leasing the space out to American production companies, who used the building's interiors to portray a run-down or abandoned warehouse, or to serve as a kind of expendable studio space for scenes featuring explosions or destruction of some kind. The enterprise has proved so fruitful that the developer has received permission from City Council to forego the low income housing project and focus instead on serving the American film industry. The building, and an entire city block surrounding it, were recently used to create a battle scene between UN soldiers and Serbian rebels for the pilot of Chris Carter's new series, *Harsh Realm*.

19. *The Sentinel* does, however, seem to be trying to capitalize on the currency of the militia movement within the American consciousness. Though I have not seen any other episodes in the course of my research featuring this militia group, the "Siege" episode in question does feature flashbacks to a previous episode in which the group took members of the Cascade police force hostage, and ends with the escape of the group's leader, suggesting that *The Sentinel* has positioned this group as its main recurring antagonist.

20. Morley and Robins, *Spaces of Identity* 38.

21. It is, however, never actually referred to as 'the Museum of Anthropology' in the film, and Arthur Erickson is acknowledged in the film's production credits.

22. Natter and Jones III 153.

23. qtd. in Richard Collins, *Culture, Communication, and National Identity: The Case of*

Canadian Television (Toronto: U of Toronto P, 1990) 23.

24. Morley and Robins, *Spaces of Identity* 39.

25. Tony Wilden, *The Imaginary Canadian* (Vancouver: Pulp Press, 1980) 1.

26. Wilden 1.

AFTERWORD

LOOSENING OUR GRIP ON BOBBY ORR: CONCEPTUALIZING CANADIAN SPACE WITHIN THE "WIDER NETWORK OF RELATIONS"

"I'm fascinated by the process of loss. What do you do when you lose something you need emotionally? How do you reconstruct that? What rituals, what obsessions begin to take over the mind that is in need of something that it doesn't have access to?" -- Atom Egoyan

A key concern running through most of my analysis and fuelling much of my argument is the extent to which Canada's dependent nature has continually resulted in a lack of autonomy in areas where outside interests are dominant, particularly in the distribution of cultural products in Canada, thereby weakening the ability to both define and defend a notion of Canadian culture, while simultaneously strengthening the hegemonic authority of the dominant American discourse in Canada. Specifically then, the English Canadian filmic discourse that has evolved under these circumstances is one that has existed both outside the realm of the dominant discourse and, due to the dominance of this discourse in Canada, separate from the ideological concerns of the national consciousness. As a result, Canadian interests, existing in a nation where their own cultural and ideological consciousness is marginalized, have by virtue of circumstance been capable of creating only a marginalized form of expression. Dominant

interests, on the other hand, capitalizing on the inherent dependency of Canadian interests, have perpetuated the marginalization of English Canadian culture within Canada and the amorphousness that arises from Canada's intrinsic lack of autonomy, by appropriating Canadian space and capital for the furthering of their own financial goals and the benefit of their ideological imperatives. The amorphousness of Canadian space within the dominant ideology is thus established by Canada's inherent dependency on dominant capital, maintained by the hegemonic structure of dominant interests, and perpetuated by the commodification of this very amorphousness within the international image industry, which in turn helps to continue the cycle of Canadian dependency that contributes to Canada's amorphousness.

Ultimately, a strong, distinct understanding of English Canadian identity must of necessity be one that incorporates rather than denies issues of dependency. Dependency itself must be incorporated into conceptions of English Canadian identity in order for such conceptions to be legitimate. It is not my contention that Canada's political and economic culture are disabled or handicapped by dependency, but rather that they are inherently characterized by dependency; that the very structure of the national apparatus that determines the character of English Canadian culture and identity is defined in relation to the parameters of Canada's dependent nature. Only by coming to terms with the impact of dependency on the Canadian consciousness and the manner in which Canadians construct their lived identities will Canadians be able to forge a distinct, identifiable discourse that is able to address concerns relative to the national consciousness and yet still manage to exist and operate within the modes and channels made available by hegemonic interests. To ignore, discount, or downplay in any way the

inherent dependency of the Canadian condition is to continue to struggle against the discourse of the dominant ideology on its own terms, thereby continuing to marginalize English Canadian culture within its own national boundaries, both physical and psychological.

One factor that contributes to this process of struggling against the conceptions of the dominant ideology is the tendency to fetishize the modes and channels of cultural resistance that are available to Canadians. In other words, the means of production and distribution of cultural products in Canada is constructed as the means to achieve cultural sovereignty, when in fact this process is immediately sabotaged by the lack of access Canadian cultural producers have to cultural distribution in Canada. As a result, the process of attaining cultural sovereignty and the institutions through which the realization of this process is attempted become fetishized due to the inherent lack of access they actually provide to that which is ultimately desired: an autonomous and distinct conception of Canadian culture and identity. This, again, is very much a result of Canada's inherent dependency and the manner in which Canada's historical subordinance to a dominant power resulted in an intrinsic lack of autonomy. The statement by Atom Egoyan that introduces this chapter concisely summarizes the situation faced by English Canadian artists in the face of the inherent amorphousness of English Canadian culture.

The amorphousness of English Canadian identity, then, can be seen as a result of Canada's inherent dependency, and, as I have illustrated is further perpetuated by the dominant ideology by way of the international image industry and the dominant discourse, the system of representation whose imaginary construction of our identity has, in many ways, provided the substance that has filled the absence inherent in English

Canadian culture. Rotstein has suggested the inevitability of this process, stating that, "In the absence of a vision of our nationhood and of a political culture possessed of symbols to evoke and protect our independence, it is no cause for wonder that the ideological pull of the United States has been strong and attractive throughout our history. We have found no alternative vision to sustain us in terms of our own political culture."[1] With our increasing tendency to live vicariously through the ideological reference points of the United States, even if it is largely in opposition to such values, priorities and preconceptions, we have effectively become something of an appendage to American society and culture. I am not in any way suggesting that Canada can be considered a 'miniature replica' of the United States, and my discussion in Chapter III has outlined in better detail the distinctiveness of English Canadian culture and identity. Rather, the characteristics and traits that connote Canadian-ness can often only be identified and recognized in relation to or in the context of American-ness. From a Canadian perspective, this results in a hyper-awareness of what 'America' is, what it represents and what it stands for. This is quite simply a necessity in the efforts to try and understand what we represent and stand for as a national culture. However, since we can only be defined in relation to the United States, from an American perspective we remain irrelevant, intangible, placeless and amorphous, and it is this conception that we have constantly been struggling against in our Sisyphean attempt to achieve that which we do not inherently possess in our own culture by absorbing it from the dominant society. In short, the American cultural discourse is not an oppressive, suffocating force descending upon us through media and other avenues, but rather it is something that Canadians ingest and engage with in order to help fill the inherent absence of our own culture.

In fact, many of our business elite and government officials have throughout the nation's history actively engaged with American interests in order to fill the economic absence resulting from our history as a colonial state and the circumstances we have faced due to geographic and climatic conditions. However, if the Canadian pursuit of American capital takes place in an attempt to provide that which is inherently lacking in Canadian political culture, perhaps it can be argued that the American appropriation of Canada's absence and amorphousness (indeed, the very commodification of these qualities, as I illustrated in the last chapter) can be seen as an attempt on the part of the American elite to provide that which is unobtainable in American culture, namely a peaceable, politic society exemplified by an ideal de-ethnicized whiteness, itself typified by an inherent absence. This is an assertion that I touched on briefly in my discussion in Chapter IV of Canadian celebrities who have been able to exude and personify certain desired traits within American culture. I have chosen to discuss this topic in my Afterword as opposed to the body of the text due to the fact that the appropriation of Canadian whiteness by American culture seems a particularly weighty subject, and one that really deserves further study of its own. The analysis I have provided can serve as a kind of backdrop for a discussion on issues of whiteness, which has been taken up in greater detail by George Elliott Clarke, whose observations deserve mention here:

> Left pretty much to its own devices, the white majority in Canada exudes a kind of ideal whiteness, ready for export. All my life, I've considered Canada to be a kind of discount warehouse where American networks and film companies go to purchase images of immaculate, politic whiteness. You want cool? Check out Mike Myers or Dan Aykroyd. You need cerebral poise? Try Alex Trebek or Peter Jennings. You want family values? Here's Michael J. Fox. You want sex appeal? Take Pamela Sue Anderson or Shannon Tweed. You're in the market for a sellable lesbian. Choose k.d. lang. You're

> searching for clean-cut action heroes? Hire William Shatner or Keanu Reeves. Weary of Alice Walker? Read Alice Munro. Sick of Babyface winning all the Grammys? Give one to Celine Dion. Bruce Springsteen too aggressive for your sensibilities? Listen to Bryan Adams. Polite, pacific, respectable, Canadian whites are abundantly available for Americans who want to glorify whiteness...[2]

The key distinction of such celebrities, of course, is that they are used to glorify an ethnic ideal without actually being identified as ethnic. After all, is 'Canadian' an ethnicity? It would seem, rather, that Canadian-ness represents the closest available materiality to a white ideal for American culture, which also explains the use of Canadian locales as a kind of back lot or warehouse for American films and television shows that attempt to relocate the American idea of 'home'. By positioning Canada as America, the dominant ideology effectively appropriates the inherent qualities of whiteness (facilitated by absence) in order to create its own image of the ideal 'homeland' for the new American nation-state.

Returning now to the Canadian perspective, conventional wisdom has led us to believe that English Canadian culture and national identity have been threatened, weakened, or crippled in some way by the sheer omnipotence of American ideology and cultural discourse. The perspective that most Canadians have been encouraged to adopt is that English Canadian cultural identity has been kept under the heel of American media, cultural products and signifiers, and the values espoused by the image industry for so long and to such a great extent that it has prevented us from developing or determining who we really are, what our place in the world is, and what it is that we stand for. English Canadian culture could exist if only our films occupied a greater percentage of screen time in Canadian theatres, if only English Canadians enjoyed watching English

Canadian TV programs more than American ones, if only Canada was able to exercise even some semblance of autonomy with regards to legislation to restrict the flow of American cultural products in Canada, and so forth. What I have set out to achieve in my analysis is to illustrate the opposite; that, for better or worse, English Canada exists, and has only ever existed, in a relationship of dependence to a dominant presence. As Tony Wilden explains:

> Whatever our supposed intentions, most of us have been induced to believe that if only the *others* would stop doing whatever it is we have been persuaded to believe they are doing, then our own alienation would disappear. We would at least be safe and secure in the selves that our social relations have induced us to construct. But those very selves, our Imaginary selves, are dependent for many of their characteristics on the paranoid relationship of opposition to the *others* ('I'm *not* like *them*'); and this is where Imaginary identifications come in to complement Imaginary projections.[3]

If we can assume for the sake of argument that Sartre is correct, and a people are only able to define themselves through an act of refusing the definition constructed of them by others, then the group must take the responsibility for this refusal into their own hands, rather than leaving the onus of representation in the hands of their oppressors. Only by identifying and addressing the set of circumstances that perpetuate the means of representation will English Canada achieve the autonomy necessary to develop a discourse independent from that of the dominant ideology, and thus be able to define itself on its own terms, rather than those laid out by, and therefore inevitably benefitting, the dominant power.

However, it is crucial to remember that a refusal of the definition formed of Canada and Canadian identity by the dominant ideology does not necessarily involve a refusal of the entire system of relations that exist between the dominant and subordinant

interests. In fact, the attempt to achieve Canadian cultural autonomy is paradoxically weakened by any attempt at self-definition that refuses to acknowledge the inherent subordinance, absence, and dependency that constitute the reality of the Canadian cultural consciousness. To act as though these qualities and characteristics are externally imposed and therefore assert that cultural autonomy can only be achieved through internalizing cultural expression, represents not a refusal of the definition made of us but rather a refusal to fully comprehend the nature of the relationship with the dominant order that has formed the basis of our lived identities as Canadians. Morley, in discussing the nature of defining place in relation to identity, has stated that:

> Certainly, as Massey notes, in the face of these developments it has come to seem to many critics that any search for a 'sense of place' must of necessity be reactionary. Massey's argument is that this is not necessarily the case and that it is in fact possible, if we approach the question differently, 'for a sense of place to be progressive; not self-enclosing and defensive, but outward-looking'. This approach rejects the notion that a 'sense of place' must necessarily be constructed (a la Heritage Industry) out of 'an introverted, inward-looking history, based on delving into the past for internalized origins'.[4]

This Heritage Industry approach to constructing a sense of place from internalized origins has essentially been the approach taken by English Canadian cinema, endorsed and determined by government agencies and policy makers who have tended to view Canadian cultural dependency as the proverbial straight-jacket imposed upon us by American dominance, something that we can struggle out of by continually reasserting our 'Canadian culture' in the attempt to provide a counterbalance to the onslaught of American cultural products and signifiers flooding our national reference points. Such internalization, however, does not attempt to refuse the conception made of English Canadian identity by dominant interests, but rather tries to pretend that English Canadian

identity can exist separate and independent from the ideological reference points of the dominant culture. The result of this denial of the actual framework within which English Canadian identity exists is the production of an extremely fragmentary discourse that is unable to connect with the group it claims to speak for because it fails to address the entire framework that has helped to shape the lived identity of the group.

This approach also assumes that a particular end result can be achieved, that it is possible to actually free ourselves from the straight-jacket and come to a clear, definitive understanding of what Canada is, in and of itself. However, such thinking fails to recognize that Canada's identity as a nation is characterized by its inherent dependency, absence, and amorphousness. Such qualities do not permit a concrete definition, and therefore any attempt to reach such a definitive conclusion is destined to fail due to the fact that it ignores the actual substance (or intrinsic lack of substance) of that which it is attempting to substantiate. Indeed, the inability to come to a definitive understanding of English Canadian identity is in and of itself an integral component of English Canadian culture. It is a paradox of an inherently dependent and subordinant nation such as Canada that a solid conception of identity -- that is, a refusal of that which the Other has made of us -- can only be achieved by first accepting, or at least addressing, the definition made of us by the dominant order, for it is only through this process that we will be able to appropriate the codes and signifiers of the dominant discourse, rather than those that fail to express a relationship to the dominant discourse and therefore hold little relevance for people whose lived identities are defined in relation to the dominant ideology. In keeping with this philosophy, Morley has further noted that:

> Against any inward-looking definition of place and identity,
> Massey argues for 'a sense of place which is extroverted, which

> includes a consciousness to its links to the outside world', where what gives a place its identity is not its separate or 'pure' internalized history, but rather its uniqueness as a point of intersection in a wider network of relations. This is then not simply a bounded, self-contained sense of place, constructed in antagonism to all that is outside (the threatening otherness of externality), but 'an understanding of its *character* which can be constructed by linking that place to places beyond' and where it is the 'particularity of linkage to that *outside* which is...part of what constitutes the place'.[5]

I think one of the main reasons why many English Canadian films often come across as seeming so placeless -- so lacking in a sense of where they are -- in spite of the use, in some cases, of fairly distinctive locations (Hard Core Logo [Bruce Macdonald, 1996] and Live Bait [Bruce Sweeney, 1995] are good examples of this) is because they fail to recognize their "links to the wider world". Placelessness, as I have illustrated throughout my analysis, is not so much a matter of location and geography as it is a result of the kind of consciousness people are operating under. The fact of life in Canada is that a sense of place can only be successfully achieved through a conceptualization that takes into account the conceptions of Canadian space held within the dominant ideology, or in other words, understands the 'particularity of linkage to that *outside*,' which is part of what constitutes the character of the place.

This is primarily why it has been so helpful for me to conduct this study from outside the physical and ideological boundaries of Canada. Analysing issues of Canadian cultural identity from within American society accentuates the relevance of the extent to which Canada's identity and conceptualization is determined and perpetuated by forces and interests within the United States, or at least within the structure of the dominant American ideology. An understanding of English Canada's intersection in the wider network of relations is also essentially what The Tragically Hip accomplish, and is the

main reason why they have figured so prominently in this study devoted primarily to the image industry, and is also why a line from their song "Fireworks," which I discussed in detail in Chapter III, introduces this section of my analysis. In fact, my original intention was to devote an entire chapter of this thesis to the English Canadian music industry in an attempt to illustrate the manner in which it has succeeded to a much greater extent than English Canadian cinema in developing a distinctly English Canadian discourse that connects with the nation.[6] Though I feel my current analysis succeeds in illuminating issues related to the inability of English Canadian interests to develop a discourse that successfully expresses a sense of place, an analysis of equal length could very easily be devoted to the manner in which English Canadian musical artists have been able to substantiate English Canada's sense of place.

I would like to draw attention here to a film that has succeeded in communicating through a discourse that substantiates an English Canadian sense of place, in order to illustrate the manner in which this can be accomplished through an understanding of English Canada's place within the wider network of relations that constitute the dominant ideology. Keeping in mind that issues of space and place are, in many respects, more a matter of discourse and ideology than of actual physical geography, the film which I will discuss is Wayne's World (Penelope Spheeris, 1992), whose discourse is very Canadian in its origin, and is highly invested in the relationship between space and marginality.[7]

The Canadian-ness of Wayne's World extends far beyond the nationality of its star and writer, Mike Myers, and its producer, Lorne Michaels (who, it is worth reminding, is also the producer of *Saturday Night Live* and *The Kids in the Hall*). Wayne's World, which was a blockbuster hit in the U.S. and spawned a respectably

successful sequel, was of course based on the "Wayne's World" sketches from *Saturday Night Live*, which in their own way preceded and determined the success of the film by working their way into the American pop culture landscape. The original sketches, in which Wayne (Mike Myers) and Garth (Dana Carvey) sit in their basement and, through the guise of a public access TV show, riff on various trends and components of American pop culture, were really nothing more than a remake, updated and Americanized for a Generation-X audience, of the Bob and Doug Mackenzie skits which Dave Thomas and Rick Moranis performed for years on *SCTV*. In those sketches, Bob and Doug are two unemployed losers who broadcast their own show on the pseudo SCTV network from a minimalist set in which they drink beer, eat doughnuts, and basically riff on both Canadian and American culture. The Bob and Doug sketches (as well as *SCTV* in general), were essentially an embodiment of the amorphousness and blankness of Canadian culture, with Bob and Doug themselves presented as the products of a culture and society lacking in reference points and signifiers worth celebrating. The backdrop in front of which Bob and Doug sat, consisting of a giant geographical outline of Canada lacking any detail and emblazoned only with the words 'The Great White North', can be seen as a kind of self-deprecating awareness and acknowledgement of the conception of Canada held within the dominant culture.

Wayne's World, then, picking up from its Bob and Doug-inspired origins, is intrinsically concerned with the relationship between marginal and dominant interests and the manner in which discourse facilitates both the maintenance of the dominant order and the opportunity for empowerment on the part of the marginalized. The film essentially transplants the sensibilities and priorities of an English Canadian discourse

into the structure and reference points of the dominant American discourse. In fact, Wayne's World can, in many regards, be viewed as an attempt by the marginal to subvert the dominant discourse by revealing the methods upon which its hegemonic order relies. The marginalized, then, appropriate the codes and signifiers of the powerful so that they can be deconstructed and satirized, their operation and systems of representation laid bare. Of course, it must be noted that the simple fact that an expression such as this is produced and disseminated through dominant channels demands that the dominant order not be deconstructed to the point where its legitimacy is challenged. Rather, such an expression acts as an outlet through which the marginalized are empowered by the appropriation of dominant codes, even though these same codes can never be fully relinquished by the dominant order due to the structure of its hegemonic authority over the marginalized interests.

The plot of the film concerns the appropriation of Wayne and Garth's public access show by a large Chicago television network. Even though Wayne and Garth are presented as Americans, residing in suburban Chicago, they are constructed as marginal characters in opposition to the corporate media interests who try and appropriate their form of expression. Wayne and Garth, despite the American setting, are also presented as leading explicitly Canadian lifestyles: playing street hockey, hanging out at Stan Makita's Donut Shop (a Chicago-ized version of Tim Horton's Doughnuts, the favoured brand of Bob and Doug Mackenzie), and of course, living vicariously through American pop culture. In short, Wayne and Garth represent the kind of empowerment that can be obtained within the margins of the dominant discourse.

In many ways, the film serves as an attempt to transplant an English Canadian cultural discourse into an American setting, the success of which is aided by the innate hyper-awareness of the operation and function of the dominant American discourse that constitutes the English Canadian perspective. As I mentioned above, the film is also extremely aware of issues such as the marginalization of certain groups through the appropriation of their ideological sense of space by dominant interests. At one point in the film, Wayne and Garth and the small crew come to the large corporate studio from where their show will now be filmed. As they stand in the control room looking down on the studio space, which has been constructed to look identical to Wayne's basement, the narrative quite literally comes to a halt as Garth steps forward and says: "Does this seem weird to anybody else? I mean, we're looking down on Wayne's basement, only that's not Wayne's basement. Isn't that weird?" In doing so, the film directly draws attention to the process by which dominant interests appropriate the sense of place and space held by marginal concerns to promote their own interests. This scene is immediately followed by a short sequence in which Wayne and Garth, standing in front of a blue screen that has been lowered down in front of their stand-in basement, announce, We've got a new feature on Wayne's World this week, which allows us to travel through time and space and come home again. Various different regionally-oriented backdrops then appear on the screen (New York, Hawaii, Texas) and Wayne and Garth begin to act out the appropriate behaviour that is considered to be associated with that particular environment: strutting like street toughs, hula dancing, and talking in a cowboy twang. When the final backdrop is revealed to be Delaware, Wayne and Garth simply stand there, perplexed, until Wayne mutters a pathetic, "Hi, I'm in Delaware."

The film succeeds, through this reconstruction of space and the portrayal of the manner in which some identities can be substantiated while others remain amorphous, in acknowledging the manner in which English Canadian identity intersects with the wider network of relations posited by dominant interests. The film also achieves this in a later scene in which Wayne spoofs the practice of product placement and thereby the billboard effect upon which the dominant discourse relies for the perpetuation of its hegemonic authority. The scene begins as though there were nothing out of the ordinary, but then large glowing lights appear behind Wayne as he samples various products in a very obvious fashion, calling attention to one of the ways in which hegemony is established and maintained. In the case of Wayne's World, then, the relationship of English Canadian culture to the wider network of relations is examined by utilizing the English Canadian discourse that facilitates a kind of hyper-awareness of American culture and the manner in which the hegemony of the dominant order is maintained.

It is through these kinds of attempts at cultural expression, which externalize cultural conditions and thereby allow them to exist within the reference points of the dominant ideology that determine the lived identity of English Canadians, that English Canada is best able, and really only capable, of formulating a discourse or form of national expression that can substantiate a sense of place, a sense of where we exist in the wider network of relations. Canada's place within this network, as I have argued, is becoming increasingly prescient in terms of the manner in which it serves as a model for the evolution of the contemporary nation-state. There is an opportunity, then, for modes of English Canadian cultural expression to reconfigure the way they position themselves within the dominant ideology. They can remain subservient to the economic and

ideological imperatives of the dominant order by continuing to exist as nothing more than a branch plant society; they can continue to internalize their forms of expression and marginalize themselves even further within the wider network of relations of the globalized world; or they can utilize the unique perspective allowed by the English Canadian discourse to construct in relation to dominant reference points modes of resistance that empower the English Canadian character within the structure of dependency and subordinance that represents an intrinsic and undeniable condition of the Canadian mentality. Such a culture would remain a culture of absence, but would accept absence as empowering within the fluid, increasingly homogenized hegemonic structure of the New World Order.

"*but i'm helpless more with the people*
than the space
I mean I'm helpless less with the people
than the space.
You see, I don't know Neil
I don't know Neil"
-- The Tragically Hip

1. Abraham Rotstein, "Binding Prometheus," Close The 49th Parallel: The Americanization of Canada, ed. Ian Lumsden (Toronto: U of Toronto P, 1970) 219.

2. George Elliott Clarke, "White Like Canada," Transition Issue 73 Vol. 7 No.1. 100.

3. Wilden 67.

4. David Morley, "Bounded Realms: Household, Family, Community, and Nation," Home, Exile, Homeland: Film, Media, and the Politics of Place, ed. Hamid Naficy (New York:

5. Morley, “Bounded Realms”157.

6. It should be noted here that the Quebecois cinema and music industry are both far more successful at expressing a sense of place and connecting with the French Canadian nation through a very distinct discourse. Again, this in itself could be examined in an analysis of its own.

7. Further study of this kind -- an examination of the expression of an English Canadian discourse in films made by Canadians within the structure of the dominant ideology -- also deserves attention. The films of James Cameron, for example, are particularly interesting in terms of the manner in which they comment on technology, both in their storylines and their means of production. Cameron, as a director and screenwriter who happens to be Canadian, seems to embody the material realization of the desire on the part of the marginalized to appropriate with a vengeance the technological superiority of the dominant order, utilizing it to express anxieties that are very much in keeping with the inherent concerns of the Canadian consciousness. The plot of Terminator 2 (1991), for example, directly parallels the discourse of left-nationalism -- the primary expression of Canadian nationalism in the Fordist period -- as described by Ian Angus: "a lament for the failure adequately to preserve the past and an argument that such preservation requires a radical reorientation in the future."

APPENDIX

Programs that Position Canadian Locations as Anywhere

Series:	Location Shot:	Location Set:	Identifiable Markers:	Production Companies:[1]	Cdn. Financial Involvement:[2]
Earth: Final Conflict (in 2nd season)	Toronto	America in the future, Washington D.C. as a home base	American Flags, geographical markers and monuments	Tribune Entertainment; in assoc with TMG & Polygram Television	Alliance/Atlantis; in assoc with CTV; Cdn. Film or Video Production Tax Credit
The Outer Limits (in 4th season)	Vancouver	New every week, often in the future or some alternative reality; sometimes outer space or another planet	American flags & societal reference points	Trilogy Entertainment Group; MGM Domestic Television Distribution	Alliance/Atlantis; in assoc. w/ Global, a Canwest Company, & Superchannel; Cdn Film or Video Production Tax Credit
Sliders (March/95-May/97, then cancelled by Fox; renewed by Sci-Fi Channel, shot in LA)	Vancouver	New every week; portal leads cast to altered reality of the	American flags & societal reference points; licence plates when applicable; same non-descript American urban area with alternate character depending on episode	20th Century Fox Television	None
Stargate SG-1 (in 2nd season, 4 more seasons already pre-sold to networks)	Vancouver	New every week; portal leads cast to another world or dimension; home base in Cheyenne facility	American flags, military & societal reference points	MGM Worldwide Television Productions Inc.	None
The X-Files (first 5 seasons, Sept./93 May/98)	Vancouver	New virtually every week; often different locales in same episode; Wash. DC home base	American flags, governmental &societal reference points; other applicable flags, licence plates & markers when applicable	20th Century Fox Television	None

[1]Excluded from mention here are the production companies run by the show s producers, as these companies only oversee that one series.

[2]This includes only direct Canadian financial involvement identified in the show s end credits. It must be remembered that all these programs enjoy significant financial advantages in the form of tax production credits, exclusions from paying Canadian income tax, and various other financial incentives offered by federal and provincial governments, not to mention the advantageous exchange rate on the Canadian dollar.

Programs that Position Canadian Locations as Nowhere

Series:	Location Shot:	Location Set:	Identifiable Markers:	Production Companies:[1]	Cdn. Financial Involvement[2]
Viper (shot in Vancouver since 2nd season, Sep/96; currently in 4th season	Vancouver	Metro City	American flags, governmental & societal reference points; CA licence plates	Paramount	None
Nightman (currently in 1st season)	Vancouver/ San Francisco	Bay City, CA	American flags; CA licence plates	Tribune Entertainment; Alliance Atlantis; Cescent; in assoc. with WIC Entertainment	Canadian Film or Video Production Tax Credit
The Sentinel (currently in 4th season)	Vancouver	Cascade, WA	American flags, governmental & societal reference points; WA licence plates	Paramount	None
The Crow, Stairway to Tax *Heaven*[3] (currently in 1st season)	Vancouver	Port Columbia	American flags, governmental & societal reference points (BC licence plates are kept out of focus when in shot)	Alliance/Atlantis; Crescent; Polygram Television	Film Incentive BC; Canadian Film or Video Production Credit

[1]See first footnote on previous chart.

[2]See second footnote on previous chart.

[3]The Crow can also be considered under the locations as anywhere scenario. Using the premise that the lead character, Eric Draven, is reincarnated, the show will often feature episodes that revolve around his other past life experiences in other places and times through history.

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